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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON
GREECE
by
FLORA LEVENTI
Advisor: Professor Merih Uctum
This dissertation consists of three chapters where I examine several aspects of the European so-
vereign debt crisis. The first chapter focuses on systemic risk. Following the financial crisis of
2007-08, both in academic as well as policy circles, much of the research has focused toward
the systemic importance of financial institutions. Parallel to that research, but to somewhat lesser
extent, there have been improvements in our understanding of how risk is transmitted from the fi-
nancial system to the real economy. This chapter investigates a related yet distinct manifestation of
systemic risk, namely systemic sovereign risk. Using data on sovereign credit default swap spreads
from 11 euro member countries the study seeks to examine how the sovereign risk of one member
country can affect others, as well as the overall impact in the system. The proposed work is based
on the approach of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), used to assess systemic risk contributions
among financial institutions. Focusing on sovereigns rather than financial institutions, this work
will expand a small but growing body of literature examining the recent European sovereign debt
crisis.
In the second chapter I present a brief overview of the stylized facts for the Greek economy starting
from the period after the end of the military dictatorship and the transition to democracy up until
early 2016.
In the third chapter I revisit the issue of fiscal sustainability in Greece in a retrospective framework,
meaning that our interest lies in evaluating the sustainability of past fiscal policies and whether
vthese can lead to a sustainable fiscal path. My empirical analysis uses annual data from 1970 to
2015 from a single source (AMECO). The econometric methodology is divided into two parts. In
the first part, I focus on the sustainability of government debt using unit root tests that allow for
structural breaks. In the second part, I test for cointegration between government revenues and
expenditures with two procedures, namely the Bounds test of Pesaran and Shin and Johansen’s
test. The results from both the unit root tests and the cointegration tests indicate Greek fiscal
policy is unsustainable. In order to account for structural breaks, I employ the methodology of
Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998) and incorporate the breaks when testing for cointegration
between government revenues and expenditures. The methodology employs the Dynamic OLS
framework of Stock and Watson (1993). Even when I account for structural breaks, I find no
evidence of strong form sustainability between the two series. However, my results do not reject
the weak form sustainability of Quintos (1995). I argue that evidence of weak form sustainability
for Greece can be interpreted as a higher risk of unsustainability, which can be used to explain
Greece’s current fiscal distress.
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Chapter 1
Conditional risk in the euro-zone: Using
CDS data of European sovereigns to
quantify interconnectivity
1.1 Introduction
The last ten years have undoubtedly been very turbulent for financial markets worldwide. The
financial crisis of 2007-2009 wiped out several global financial institutions and led academics
and policy makers to re-consider the importance of financial linkages and the role of contagion.
Without even having recovered from the credit crisis, financial markets were hit yet again with
another crisis - the European sovereign debt crisis. While perhaps not having as far-reaching
implications as the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the European sovereign debt crisis has certainly
caused significant stress within the Euro area and led many observers into even questioning the
effectiveness and purpose of the European Monetary Union and its future.
1
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1.2 Statement of the Problem
There has been a lot of emphasis on studying the co-movements in the credit risk of financial
institutions, in other words estimating how the credit risk of one institution affects that of other
institutions. Several econometric methodologies and data have been employed to address this
question. Most papers, for example, use the CDS spreads of financial institutions, Moody’s KMV
model for expected default frequencies, corporate bond spreads, distance to default measures, and
Value at Risk (VaR) analysis. An important complication in studying the co-movements of risk
measures is that these co-movements will most likely differ depending on the state of the economy
and the general market sentiment. In other words, as has been well documented in the literature,
co-movements of the risk-measures exhibit a non-linear pattern, and in particular they tend to be
more acute in times of distress (i.e. when the risk is higher). This in turn implies the need to use
non-linear estimation techniques, such as extreme value theory, regime switching estimation, and
quantile regressions.
Compared to the studies focusing on systemic risk in the financial system and the co-movements
of risk measures for financial institutions, systemic sovereign risk has received relatively less at-
tention, at least until recently. The European sovereign debt crisis however has lead researchers
(mostly at the policy level) to address the issue of sovereign risk and how it can be transmitted
between countries.
The increased internationalization of financial markets has led to financial institutions being
dependent on economic developments that take place far beyond their origin country. Partly, this
is the result of having subsidiaries or holding companies abroad. Moreover, financial innovation
in the form of complex financial instruments (such as various derivative products) amplified the
interconnectedness among financial institutions, and consequently their interdependence. Our level
of understanding of the mechanisms through which risk is transferred between financial firms and
the financial system has greatly improved by recent research in that area. A related area that can
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benefit by more theoretical as well as empirical work is the spreading of risk from the financial
system into the real economy.
Along the same lines, systemic sovereign risk is a promising area for future research. How
financial distress experienced in one country can spread to another is a question that is not suffi-
ciently explored. One way in which countries can affect one another is through their interlinked
financial institutions, given the common exposures of the latter. Another way, which might have a
more direct connection to the real economies of the countries, is through sovereign debt. This is
in a sense a special case since it requires that the countries under investigation are part of system
in which they share a common currency, follow the same monetary policy, and have some general
formulations regarding fiscal policy that has implications for national debt and deficit levels.
This work seeks to broaden our understanding of systemic sovereign risk by quantifying risk
contributions between countries, and between countries and the entire system. The purpose is to
develop a systemic risk measure that can identify the systemic importance of certain countries,
by how much they are increasing the risk of other countries and the risk of the entire system.
Moreover, the goal is to construct a measure that can be used not only to predict systemic sovereign
risk contributions but also to forecast them. These last elements can prove to be useful at the policy
level. They could be used by regulators and policy makers both at the country as well system level
as a tool to guide austerity measures. Additionally, investors and other market participants might
benefit from such information.
1.3 Background of the Study
Theoretical and empirical work on systemic risk and concepts related to it has exploded follo-
wing the financial crisis of 2007-2008. A review of that literature would be a formidable endeavor
but it is beyond the purposes of this paper. Instead, this section reviews some of the recent empiri-
cal work that is more closely related to this paper, namely systemic risk within the sovereign CDS
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markets. Before reviewing the literature however, I briefly discuss the characteristics and nature of
credit default swaps.
1.3.1 The characteristics of credit default swaps
Without going into great lengths, here I offer an overview of the main characteristics of credit
default swaps as financial products, as well as the market and its participants. A credit default
swap is one of the most popular types of credit derivative products. It provides insurance against
the credit risk of a reference entity which can be company, a sovereign, an index, or a basket of
assets. In the case of a single-name CDS the reference entity is either a company or a sovereign,
whereas as in a multi-name CDS the reference entity is an index or a basket of assets 1. Just
like in all financial products there are two parties involved in this type of contract: the buyer of
protection/insurance and the seller of protection/insurance. The payoff depends on whether or not
the reference entity (the company or the sovereign in the case of the single-name CDS) defaults on
its obligations, or more specifically if there is a so-called “credit event”. Buying protection gives
the right to sell bonds that have been issued by the reference entity for their face value 2 in the case
of a credit event. The seller of protection has the obligation to buy the bonds for their face value in
the case of a credit event. The buyer of protection pays a periodic fee to the seller (typically every
quarter, half year, or year) until maturity or until a credit event occurs. This periodic fee depends
on the total face value of the underlying bonds that can be sold; in other words, the notional value.
When expressed in annual terms, the premium paid as a percentage of the notional amount is
known as the credit default swap’s spread. CDS’s are quoted in basis points, where 1 basis point
is equal to 0.01%. Thus, if the CDS spread for Greece is 1,000 basis points or 10% per year, then
in order to insure $10 million of debt against default, an investor would have to pay $1,000,000 or
10% of the notional amount of $10 million per year.
1The most widely used multi-name credit derivative is the collateralized debt obligation or CDO
2Recall that the face or par value of a coupon bearing bond is the principal amount that a bondholder receives when
the bond matures, given that there is no default
CHAPTER 1. CONDITIONAL RISK IN THE EURO-ZONE 5
There are several instances that qualify as credit events and thus protection is triggered. Accor-
ding to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)3 these are: bankruptcy, failure
to pay (either the principal or a coupon), obligation acceleration or obligation default, repudiation
or moratorium (in the case of sovereign reference entities), and restructuring. If any of these credit
events occur, there are two forms of settlement: physical or cash. In physical settlement the pro-
tection buyer delivers the defaulted underlying bond and the protection seller pays the face value
of the bond 4. In cash settlement, the protection seller pays (in cash) the difference between the
face value and the recovery value of the underlying bond. The recovery value is determined at the
time when the credit event occurs and depends on the type of credit event 5.
Credit default swaps first appeared during the early nineties and a number of authors attribute
their introduction to JP Morgan6. Since then, the market for credit default swaps has grown signifi-
cantly even though their use (or misuse) has been heavily criticized by many, especially in relation
to the financial crisis of 2007-087. In Fig. 1.1 we see the evolution of all over-the-counter derivati-
ves products in terms of notional amount outstanding and gross market values respectively, while
Fig. 1.2 shows the evolution of these two measures only for credit derivatives, breaking them down
according to the reference entity (i.e. single-name vs. multi-name).
1.3.2 The joint dynamics between bank and sovereign CDS spreads
One line of the recent empirical literature examines the relationship between the sovereign and
bank CDS markets, with an emphasis on whether and how bank bailout programs have affected
3Credit default swaps are traded over-the-counter (OTC), and as such, are for the most part unregulated. However,
the ISDA provides legal and technical guidelines for the trading of OTC derivatives. Moreover, the ISDA has created
the ISDA Master Agreement, which is a standardized contract used for transactions of OTC derivatives products. For
more information see http://www2.isda.org/
4In most cases, the buyer has the right to deliver any bond that has defaulted and was referenced in the contract,
provided that they are of the same seniority. This implies that the buyer of protection essentially buys the so-called
cheapest-to-deliver option.
5The recovery value is the market value of the bond right after default. This value is set by an auction procedure.
6See for example Lanchester (2009),Tett (2006),and Philips (2008) among others.
7Stulz (2009) provides a nice overview of the use of credit default swaps and their use before and during the
financial crisis.
CHAPTER 1. CONDITIONAL RISK IN THE EURO-ZONE 6
sovereign CDS spreads. Alter and Schüler (2012) for instance investigate differences in the re-
lationship between sovereign and bank CDS spreads before and after government interventions.
They use daily data from June 2007 to May 2010 on a number of euro-zone countries (both core
and periphery), and their respective domestic banks. They find that prior to the bailout programs
the direction of contagion is from banks to sovereigns, whereas changes in sovereign CDS spre-
ads have only a weak impact both on bank CDS spreads and the sovereign CDS market overall.
The previous finding is supported in all countries in their sample with the exception of Italy and
Portugal. This implies that there might be important differences between core and periphery coun-
tries. They also find a reversal of the relationship after the bailout programs; the effect of changes
in banks’ CDS spreads on sovereigns becomes insignificant in the long run and sovereign CDS
spreads are the major driver of bank CDS spreads. Finally, the authors find that even though the
effects of a sovereign shock on banks is homogeneous at the domestic level, it is country depended
when looking across countries and can be grouped into core versus periphery countries. This once
again implies that there might be important gains in examining the dynamics of sovereign credit
interdependencies across countries.
Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2014) also find support for a two-way feedback effect bet-
ween the financial sector and euro-zone sovereigns for the period of 2007 to 2011. The authors
show that a higher level of stress in the financial sector is associated with greater bank bailouts,
increases in sovereign credit risk, and higher debt-to-GDP ratios. Moreover, using bank and CDS
data they show that in the period after the implementation of bailout programs, changes in bank
CDS spreads are largely explained by changes in sovereign CDS spreads. This result is strong
even after controlling for aggregate and bank-specific determinants of CDS spreads. Thus, their
main conclusion is that bank bailouts lead to higher sovereign credit risk, which in turn leads to
a weakening of the financial sector since it reduces the value of government guarantees and bond
holdings.
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Ejsing and Lemke (2011) examine the same relationship during the period of January 2008
to June 2009. They find that the introduction of bailout programs led to a decline in bank CDS
spreads at the expense of a rise in sovereign CDS spreads. Moreover, the authors find that while
the bailout programs decreased the sensitivity of bank CDSs to future shocks, they increased the
sensitivity of sovereign CDSs.
Finally,Dieckmann and Plank (2012) highlight the private-to-public risk transfer in countries
that implemented bailout programs. Their work focuses on the period from January 2007 to April
2010, using data on eighteen European economies. They show that the state of the financial system,
both at a country as well as a global level, are important factors for the behavior of CDS spreads,
and the size of this impact depends on how important a country’s financial system is. Moreover,
they show that Economic and Monetary Union member countries are more important to the health
of the financial system, and because of this the private-to-public risk transfer tends to be larger.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the authors similarly to Alter and Schüler (2012), stress the
importance of examining the public-to-public risk transfer, which reinforces the motivation behind
the present paper.
1.3.3 The relationship between sovereign CDS and bonds spreads
Some other authors have focused on the relationship between the sovereign CDS and their
respective sovereign bonds. Fontana and Scheicher (2010) for example focus on 10 euro area
economies for the period from January 2006 to June 2010, using weekly observations on CDS
spreads and bond yields. They find that common factors strongly affected the recent repricing of
sovereign risk, and argue that some of these factors signal changes in investor appetite for risk.
Moreover, the authors find that for the majority of the countries in their sample, CDS spreads
are greater than bond spreads which might be attributed to‘’flight to liquidity’ effects and limits
to arbitrage. Finally, they find that price discovery in the sovereign CDS and bond markets is
heterogenous across countries.
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Arce, Mayordomo and Peña (2013) use daily CDS spreads and sovereign bond yields for eleven
EMU countries from January 2004 to January 2012 in trying to explain differences in pricing
between the two markets by looking at several risk factors and sources of market frictions. For
example, they find that counterparty risk and funding costs have a negative effect on the CDS-
bond basis 8, while higher liquidity in the bond market relative to the CDS market has a positive
effect on the basis. Finally, the authors show that the price-discovery process is state-dependent
and use risk factors and market friction proxies to examine this state dependency. They show for
example that the level of counterparty risk lessens the ability of the CDS market to lead the price
discovery process, whereas ECB’s debt purchases negatively affect the bond market in leading the
price discovery process.
Delis and Mylonidis (2011) focus on four Southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal
and Greece) from July 2004 to May 2010, and use 10-year bond and CDS spreads. They conduct
a series of rolling Granger-causality tests and find that CDS spreads Granger cause bond spreads
almost uniformly. However, at times of increased financial and economic distress, the authors
detect feedback causality that they appoint to higher levels of risk aversion.
O’Kane (2012) also finds that CDS spreads Granger cause bond spreads for the case of Spain
and Greece, but for Italy and France the direction is reversed, while for Portugal and Ireland he
finds evidence of two-way causality. The author uses the 5-year maturity in both the CDS and
bond markets for the period from January 2008 to September 2011.
Delatte, Gex and López-Villavicencio (2012) use daily 5-year maturity data on CDS and bond
spreads on ten euro-zone member countries (five core and five periphery countries) from January
2008 to July 2010. They use a panel smooth transition regression to study the adjustment process
to the equilibrium relationship between CDS and bond prices and find that it is not linear. More
specifically, they show that the bond market leads the price discovery process only in the core
countries and during tranquil periods. As the level of stress increases however, the CDS market
8The CDS-bond basis is defined as the difference between the CDS and bond spreads.
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leads the discovery process. For countries in the periphery the CDS market dominates both in low
and high stress periods.
Calice, Chen and Williams (2013) use a time varying vector autoregression model to study
the price discovery process in the sovereign CDS and bond markets paying particular attention to
the effect of liquidity differences in the two markets. The authors find evidence of considerable
variation in the patterns of the transmission effect (between the CDS and bond markets) between
maturities and across countries. Liquidity in the sovereign CDS market appears to have a strong
time-varying effect on sovereign bond spreads in several countries, including Greece, Portugal
and Ireland. The authors also comment on the importance of studying spillover effects between
countries rather than the relationship between the CDS and bond markets in individual countries,
providing further support for the present proposal.
1.3.4 Sovereign CDS spreads and economic fundamentals
A third strand of literature looks at the relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and eco-
nomic fundamentals. Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak (2013) use dynamic panel regressions to
study the effect of debt-to-tax and deficit-to-tax ratios, as well as other macroeconomic fundamen-
tals, on the pricing of sovereign risk as proxied by CDS spreads. The authors run their analyses
on fifty countries with an emphasis on the so called SWEAP (South-West Euro-zone Periphery)
9 countries. Not surprisingly, they find that fiscal and macroeconomic variables are important de-
terminants of sovereign risk. Their interesting finding is that the CDSs of periphery countries are
priced much higher compared to countries out of the euro-zone that have similar fundamentals.
One possible explanation that the authors offer is that these differences might reflect the market’s
negative expectations about future fundamentals in the SWEAP countries.
Ang and Longstaff (2013) study CDS spreads for the U.S. Treasury, a number of U.S. states
and several euro-zone countries. They decompose spreads into a systemic and a sovereign specific
9The SWEAP countries are Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece.
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component. They find that systemic risk represents a much larger fraction of total credit risk in the
case of European sovereigns as compared to U.S. states. Moreover, they find evidence of a strong
correlation between the U.S.’s and euro-zone’s systemic sovereign credit risks, and show that this
systemic component is affected by global financial market variables rather than macroeconomic
fundamentals.
Caceres, Guzzo and Segoviano (2010) consider two main factors that can explain large mo-
vements in sovereign CDS spreads, namely changes in global risk aversion and country-specific
risks 10. They find that global risk aversion and a country’s fiscal fundamentals are both important
determinants but at different phases. At the beginning of the financial crisis global risk aversion
appears to have played a more important role, while during the more recent sovereign debt crisis,
country-specific changes in fundamentals are the main driven behind the increased volatility in
sovereign CDS spreads. Moreover, during the early phase, countries that were largely hit by the
financial crisis seem to be the source of risk, while during the later sovereign debt crisis countries
at the euro-zone’s periphery are the main source of risk.
Finally, Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) also find support for a change in factors explaining
sovereign CDS pricing. For the period after August 2007 prices are mostly driven by changes
in macro fundamentals and international risk factors. Regarding the European sovereign debt
crisis in particular, the authors find that initially the main source of contagion was the Greek debt
crisis, while after February 2010 sources of contagion include Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal.
Finally, the authors find that the rapid worsening of the Greek debt crisis during the period from
November 2009 to February 2010 was largely due to adverse market expectations regarding the
country’s fiscal fundamentals.
10The authors distinguish between country specific risks that can affect CDS spreads directly due to a deterioration
of a country’s fiscal fundamentals, or indirectly through spillovers from other sovereigns.
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1.3.5 Contagion and spillover effects among sovereigns
Most of the recent literature falls within the aforementioned lines. However, a growing fourth
body of empirical research and the one that is most related to this paper, investigates the contagion
and spillovers effects among sovereigns. The intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis
is the main motivation for the authors of the following papers.
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) detect the presence of contagion during the crisis by distinguis-
hing three types of contagion: fundamentals contagion due to increased sensitivity of financial
markets to existing fundamentals, regional contagion arising from an increase in sovereign risk
spillovers across countries, and herding contagion due to a simultaneous but transitory overre-
action of financial markets. The authors examine the period from 2004 to 2010 for a total of
31 advanced and emerging economies, using CDS spreads, sovereign bond yields, and sovereign
credit ratings as measures of sovereign credit risk 11. During the crisis period, the authors find
evidence of fundamentals contagion as financial markets’ sensitivity to country specific economic
fundamentals increased compared to the pre-crisis period. Moreover, countries in the periphery of
the euro-zone experienced this increase more strongly. Regional contagion appears to have been a
less important factor in explaining the rise of sovereign risk. Similarly, herding contagion although
present, was short lived and not as strong as the transmission from the fundamentals channel.
Caporin et al. (2013) use a definition of contagion that is based on a change in the propagation
mechanisms for the transmission of shocks. They study eight countries (France, Germany, Italy,
U.K., Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) from November 2008 to September 2011 using three
econometric methodologies: nonlinear regressions, quantile regressions, and Bayesian quantile
regression with heteroskedasticity. Their results indicate that the co-movements of CDS spreads
that were observed during the sovereign debt crisis are not the result of a change in the intensity or
size of the shock. In other words, the interdependence of spreads and consequently the relationship
between different countries is the same during normal and stress times, but this does not mean that
11Data on sovereign yields and credit ratings start at 1999.
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transmission effects are not present.
Kalbaska and Ga˛tkowski (2012) use the same set of countries (plus the U.S.) as Caporin et al.
(2013) but for the period of 2005 to 2010. The authors conduct an exponentially-weighted moving
average correlation analysis in four different periods and find that the estimated correlations in-
creased after August 2007. This result is also supported using Granger causality tests. Moreover,
impulse response analysis showed that the CDSs of Spain and Ireland have the largest impact on
European CDS spreads, whereas the U.K. has the lowest. Finally, focusing on the periods before
and after the first bailout package to Greece (May 2010), they perform an adjusted correlation
analysis and find that core countries (Germany, France, and the U.K.) have a larger capacity in
triggering contagion compared to periphery countries. Portugal is found to be the most susceptible
country to shocks, while the U.K. the least.
Bai, Julliard and Yuan (2012) look at eleven euro-zone countries for the period from January
2006 to May 2012. The authors approach contagion by studying correlations in country funda-
mentals, stemming from local and aggregate credit shocks, as well as liquidity shocks. They set up
a stylized rational expectations equilibrium model to illustrate the feedback and spillover effects
between credit and liquidity risks. They show that even though liquidity affected sovereign spreads
after the credit crisis of 2008, it played a minor role after the late 2009. Additionally, using a VAR
model with structuÏA˛al breaks, they find no evidence of a feedback effect from liquidity shocks to
fundamental credit shocks both at the domestic and aggregate levels. The authors identify however
significant spillover effects stemming from the fundamental credit component. In particular, credit
shocks in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and the Netherlands appear to have significant effects on the
aggregated credit shocks in other European countries. In addition, the CDS spreads of Ireland,
Italy, and Portugal react positively and significantly to foreign credit shocks. Finally, as the sove-
reign debt crisis intensified, the observed variation in sovereign bond yields is largely attributed
to the fundamental credit risk channel. Thus, the authors conclude that contagion during the Eu-
ropean sovereign debt crisis is mainly through the fundamental credit risk channel rather than the
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liquidity one.
In Lucas, Schwaab and Zhang (2014) 12, particular attention is given to skewness and heavy-
tails, typically observed with high-frequency financial data. The authors estimate joint and conditi-
onal probabilities of default using CDS data for ten euro-zone economies for the period from Janu-
ary 2008 to February 2013. Their empirical framework is based on a dynamic skewed t-distribution
13 allowing for dynamic volatilities and correlations, which takes into account the observed incre-
ase in uncertainty and risk dependence during distress. Their analysis yields three main results:
Firstly, risk dependence is strongly time-varying (both correlations and volatility increase substan-
tially during stress periods). Secondly, sovereign credit events appear to have significant spillover
effects and lead to an overall increase in conditional risk. Lastly, key ECB announcements had a
major impact on joint and conditional risk perceptions, as proxied by CDS prices.
Focusing on the case of Greece, Brutti and Sauré (2013) estimate the transmission of shocks
originating from Greece to other European countries. Their sample includes twelve countries for
the period from January 2008 to March 2011. The authors use financial news shocks that are re-
levant to Greece’s debt problems, and through a VAR model of CDS spreads identify structural
shocks for the remaining eleven countries. In addition, they use cross-country financial exposures
on sovereign debt holdings to assess the transmission of these structural shocks in those coun-
tries. Their results indicate that cross-country bank exposures to sovereign debt are an important
determinant in the transmission of shocks. On the other hand, the authors do not find significant
evidence for the transmission of shocks through bank-to-bank lending.
The preceding section briefly reviewed a selection of papers relevant to this paper. Neverthe-
less, there are far more papers that share a common background with this paper, than there is space
available here. A more extensive review of the literature on sovereign CDS spreads can be found
12A previous version of this paper appeared as a Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper under the title “Conditional
Probabilities and Contagion Measures for Euro Area Sovereign Default Risk”, 2012.
13In particular, they use a Dynamic Generalized Hyperbolic Skewed t Distribution, and consider four parametriza-
tions for time-varying volatility and correlation.
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in Augustin (2014).
1.4 Conditional risk in the euro-zone
In this section, I undertake the analysis of my proposed model, using the models of Adrian and
Brunnermeir (2010), Chan-Lau, Espinosa and Solé (2009) and IMF (2009) as a benchmark, and
then providing some slight modifications.
1.4.1 Introduction and background
To remind the reader, my goal is to construct a statistical measure of sovereign systemic risk.
Central in the analysis is the concept of value-at-risk (VaR). Instead however of using asset returns
we use credit default swap (CDS) spreads and thus the VaR in this case is the threshold value
above which the sovereign CDS spreads do not rise above, for a chosen level of confidence. In
other words, the VaR for a confidence level q is defined by:
Pr(X it > V aR
i
q) = q (1.1)
where X i is the value of CDS spread of country i. Note here that in the typical VaR definition for
asset returns the above inequality is reversed since in that case we are interested in specifying the
threshold value at which the asset returns will not fall below. With CDS spreads however it is the
higher values that indicate a worse scenario and not vice versa, hence our definition of the VaR
has the inequality reversed. This VaR definition relies on historical CDS values and in our setting,
signifies the unconditional VaR. One of the key insights of Adrian and Brunnermeir (2010) was
to recognize that looking at the VaR of an institution in isolation might overlook the effect that
other institutions can have, thus failing to account for the interconnectivity among financial firms
and consequently the level of systemic risk. Instead of using the unconditional VaR the authors
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propose a new measure which they call conditional VaR or CoV aR. This is defined as:
Pr(X it > CoV aR
i|j
q |Xjt = V aRjq) = q (1.2)
This definition gives the VaR of bank (or country in our model) i, conditional on the event that
another bank/country j has reached a stressful state (i.e. has reached its own VaR level). A large
positive number for CoV aRi|jq would mean that country j contributes a lot to the risk of country i,
or the risk spillover is large. One would therefore expect that when a systemically important coun-
try is under stress, the VaR of another country will tend to be higher as well. It is also important to
know exactly how much higher the conditional VaR will be compared to the unconditional. This
is given in Adrian and Brunnermeir (2010) by ∆CoV aR:
∆CoV aRi|jq = CoV aR
i|j
q − V aRiq (1.3)
Another way to think of ∆CoV aRi|j is in terms of the externality imposed by country j on country
i. Once again, one would expect this measure to be positive with higher values indicating a higher
spillover.
To estimate CoV aR I followAdrian and Brunnermeir (2010), Chan-Lau, Espinosa and Solé
(2009) and IMF (2009) and use quantile regressions. Quantile regression is of course not the
only method to estimate this model. The CoV aR measure can be estimated from models with
time-varying second moments or from models using measures of extreme events. For example,
Girardi and Ergün (2013) use a multivariate GARCH model to obtain CoV aR estimates for a
large number of financial institutions, while Zhou (2010) uses a multivariate Extreme Value Theory
(EVT) framework to estimate the CoV aR of financial institutions. One of the main advantages of
using the quantile regression framework as opposed to a stochastic volatility or a GARCH model, is
that one does not need to make any specific distributional assumptions about . On the other hand,
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EVT’s major short coming emanates from its exclusive focus on tail realizations, thus ignoring the
information content of the main portion of the data.
The quantile regression model that I follow is described by the following equation:
X it = α
i|j
q +
K∑
m=1
βi|jq,mRm,t + γ
i|j
q Xj,t + 
i|j
t (1.4)
where Xi is the first difference of the CDS of country i, q is the quantile I wish to estimate, and R
is a vector of m common risk factors.
Before moving on to express the CoV aR metric, it is worth discussing this model a bit further.
First, I should note that Adrian and Brunnermeir (2010) focus on the case where i = system, i.e. all
financial institutions (commercial and investment banks, and insurance and real estate companies).
In this way, the authors aim to study the systemic impact of individual financial insitutions on the
entire financial system, and they term this “Contribution ∆CoV aR” 14. Clearly, there are several
conditioning possibilites, and therefore direction matters. Here I examine the case of “Network
∆CoV aRi|j”, i.e. the V aR of country i conditional on country j being at its V aR level. This
can be viewed as the most general case. One last possibility is to examine the vulnerability or
the exposure that a specific country or financial institution has given the entire system being in
distress. Adrian and Brunnermeir (2010) call this “Exposure ∆CoV aR”, which measures the
extent to which an individual institution (or country) is affected by systemic events. Both Chan-
Lau, Espinosa and Solé (2009) and IMF (2009) focus on the case that I examine here in the baseline
model, namely the change in the V aR of i conditional on j being in distress (i.e. at its own V aR
level). Regardless of how the conditioning event is defined, it is important to note that I am not
making any causal statements here and neither any of the other papers that I have cited. Rather,
what I am after are associations or correlations between the metrics of i and j. For example, when
14I examine this case as an extension in subsection 1.5.2
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estimating the quantile regressions, in one equation we would have the following causal link:
X it ←− Rm,t, Xt,j (1.5)
while in another we would have the opposite:
Xjt ←− Rm,t, Xt,i (1.6)
From equation (1.4) one could argue that, if the CDS spread of country i and j are co-determined
then this would possibly lead to reverse causality issues, given that both spreads are at time t. In ot-
her words if i’s spread is an explanatory variable for j’s spread and vice versa, then this essentially
make them endogenous. Therefore, to make any causal statements we would need an instrument.
I have made a strategic choice to focus on associations rather than causation. This is because I feel
that the association is of interest on its own, and for many economic questions it is in fact the rele-
vant aspect. Another reason is that finding a good instrument in this particular setting maybe quite
challenging, and the consequences of an invalid instrument would bring us back to the original
problem arising from endogeneity. Finally, bootstrap techniques could be employed to estimate
the covariance matrices, which will be valid even if i|jt and 
j|i
t are not independent of X
j
t and X it
respectively.
Going back to equation (1.4) the CoV aRi|j is simply the fitted values of the previous quantile
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regression:15
CoV aR
i|j
q,t = αˆ
i|j
q +
K∑
m=1
βˆi|jq,mRm,t + γˆ
i|j
q V aR
j
q,t (1.8)
where V aRjq,t is the unconditional VaR of country j based on the empirical sample. Then the
∆CoV aRi|j is calculated as:
∆CoV aR
i|j
q,t = CoV aR
i|j
q,t − V aRiq,t (1.9)
I also express the conditional VaR as a percent change following Chan-Lau, Espinosa and Solé
(2009) and IMF (2009) using the following formula:
∆CoV aRijq,t = 100×
(
αˆ
i|j
q +
∑K
m=1 βˆ
i|j
q,mRm,t + γˆ
i|j
q V aR
j
q,t
V aRiq,t
−1
)
= 100×
(
CoV aR
i|j
q,t − V aRiq,t
V aRit
)
(1.10)
Chan-Lau, Espinosa and Solé (2009) and IMF (2009) term the above metric as CoRisk and I
adopt this term from now on. With it I can quantify the extent of financial interconnectedness by
determining the change in a country’s VaR if another country were to be at its own stress VaR level
(the 95% or 99% for example). Thus to compute CoV aRi|jq,t, ∆CoV aR
i|j
q,t, and CoRiskij , I use
the V aRjq,t for q = 0.95 or q = 0.99 and for the time period t when country j’s VaR reached that
percentile.
15Quantile regression procedures ensure that the error term, i|jt evaluated at quantile q is 0 on average. In fact, the
quantile regression in equation 1.4 consists of optimizing the following function:
min
αq,βq,γq
∑
t
{
q|Xi|jt − αi|jq −
∑K
m=1Rm,tβ
i|j
q,m −Xjt γi|jq | if (Xi|jt − αi|jq −
∑K
m=1Rm,tβ
i|j
q,m −Xjt γi|jq ≥ 0)
(1− q)|Xi|jt − αi|jq −
∑K
m=1Rm,tβ
i|j
q,m −Xjt γi|jq | if (Xi|jt − αi|jq −
∑K
m=1Rm,tβ
i|j
q,m −Xjt γi|jq < 0)
(1.7)
The quantile regression estimators are obtained as the solution to this linear programming problem, for which several
algorithms exist (EViews uses a modified version of the simplex algorithm; in Matlab the minimization was done
both using “CVX”; a Matlab-based modeling system for convex optimization, as well as standard linear programming
techniques using the simplex algorithm. My results were identical for all practical purposes). The estimated quan-
tile regression coefficient can be shown to be asymptotically normally distributed under mild regularity conditions
(Koenker (2005)). Moreover, there are several alternatives for estimating the covariance matrices depending on the
model assumptions. Koenker (2005) shows that the covariance matrices estimated using bootstrap techniques are valid
even if the residuals and explanatory variables are not independent. There are also several other direct methods for
independent but not identical distribution settings.
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The CoRisk thus express the additional VaR of country i if country j is in distress, as a per-
centage increase compared to country i’s unconditional VaR. The values of the risk factors in the
previous formula are those when country j hit that high stress value, i.e. country j’s VaR. If this
VaR happens to fall in between two values, I take a linear interpolation of the following form:
rV aRq,low + (1− r)V aRq,high = V aRq (1.11)
1.4.2 Data description and sources
Daily data on sovereign credit default spreads were collected for eleven euro-zone economies:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain. The CDS data refer to 5-year senior contracts and all are denominated in US dollars. I
follow the literature and choose the USD denominated contracts as they are the ones that are most
liquid and actively traded. For all CDS data I have the mid-price, ask-price, and bid-price. In the
analysis, following convention, the mid-price quotes were used. All CDS data were downloaded
from the S&P Capital IQ platform, which collects CDS quotes from outside vendors. I performed
cross deletion to take care of missing observations. This results in a sample with 1476 observations
per series, ranging from April, 02 2008 to June, 03 2014. Table 3.1 presents some basic descriptive
statistics of the series. As evident in Fig. 1.3, Greek CDS spreads hit record levels, far above than
those of other Southern euro-zone economies. I therefore run 110 regressions for every chosen
quantile. Following the literature, I choose the 95th and 99th quantiles. I use the first differences
of the CDS data since the level series all contain a unit root (see Fig. 1.4).
I include a set of six common risk factors that have been shown to affect sovereign CDS spreads
in the literature. The return on the Eurostoxx 50 index is used to account for the effect of the
European stock market. The slope of the yield curve, defined as the difference of the spread
between the 10 year and the 3 month US Treasuries, is used as a proxy for the business cycle.
The spread between the 1 year Euribor rate and the 1 year US Treasury, is used as a measure of
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default risk in the interbank market. I also include the spread between the 3 month EONIA swap
rate and the 3 month US Treasury to proxy the severity of liquidity squeeze. The VIX index is
used as a measure of the general risk appetite. Finally, I control for currency fluctuation using
the appreciation/depreciation of the euro spot rate against the US dollar. The EuroStoxx50 index
is obtained from the S&P Capital IQ platform. The VIX index was obtained from the Chicago
Board of Options Exchange. The spot exchange rate was obtained from Bloomberg. The 3-month
EONIA swap rate and the 1-year Euribor rate were obtained from the European Money Markets
Institute. Finally, rates on the US Treasuries were obtained from the Federal Reserve’s website.
1.4.3 Results: Baseline model
Table 1.2 presents my results from the baseline model. All estimated coefficients (the β’s and
the γ’s are significant at conventional levels. Each entry in the table reports the additional of
CoVaR over VaR at the 95th percentile (i.e. ∆CoV aR) for the country listed in the row, when
the VaR of country listed in the column is has hit its own 95th percentile. For example, when
France comes under stress (i.e. when its VaR reaches the 95th percentile), Italy’s VaR at the
95th percentile increases by four basis points or 67% compared to its unconditional VaR 16. An
important observation here is that these effects don’t need to be symmetric, and in fact are not.
When Italy for example is in distress, France’s VaR at the 95th percentile increases by nine basis
points or 56%. Moreoever, as one can see in Fig. 1.5 the conditional risk as measured byCoV aR is
higher than the standalone V aR. The most vulnerable country in my sample is Greece, followed by
Portugal. That is Greece registers the highest (on average) increase in the conditional risk measure
16An example to illustrate how I get the numbers in the tables: After running the quantile regressions, I compute the
estimated values (i.e. the CoV aRi|jq,t). Recall at this point that the values of the common risk factors are those when
country i is at its empirical q. This ensures that these values are discrete. To get ∆CoV aRi|jq,t or the absolute increase
(in basis points), I subtract the V aRiq based on the empirical sample (for any given j and q this will be a constant
number), fromCoV aRi|jq,t. Finally, to get the % increase in ∆CoV aR
i|j
q,t I divide ∆CoV aR
i|j
q,t by V aR
i
q . For example,
the V aRAustria95 is 7.5. The CoV aR
Austria|Belgium
95,t was estimated to be 11.76. Thus ∆CoV aR
Austria|Belgium
95,t is
approximately 4 bps and the % ∆CoV aRi|jq,t is approximately 58%
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as the “Vulnerability" index indicates, which is simply the column average for each country when
the corresponing row country is in the same level of distress (the 95th percentile in this case).
In particular, the change in the Greek CDS spread increases on average by 154% or 339 basis
points, when another country reaches its own 95% V aR. Portugal has the second highest excess
of CoVaR over VaR with 22 basis points (or 71%). The most systemically important country is the
Netherlands, having a systemic importance index of 95%. This means that when the Netherlands is
at it’s own distress state (the 95% value) the CoRisk metric of other countries increases on average
by 95% or 60 basis points. Greece on the other hand is found to have an average systemic impact
of just four basis points. The numbers in the“ Systemic Importance" (S.I.) column is simply the
row average for each country.
1.4.4 Results: Model with lagged risk factors
I also consider a model where the set of common risk factors are introduced with a lag. The
main model specification of Adrian and Brunnermeir (2010), the common risk factors are in fact in-
troduced with a lag. This follows from a standard factor model for asset returns, which the authors
present in an appendix. While in my setting the variable of interest is not an asset return as in their
work, I chose to examine the case of lagged common risk factors as a additional robustness test. I
should note that in Chan-Lau, Espinosa and Solé (2009) and IMF (2009), where the main variable
used to define V aR is CDS spreads, the common risk factors enter the model contemporaneously.
In the lagged specification scenario I run the following quantile regression:
Xi,t = α
i|j
q +
K∑
m=1
βi|jq,mRm,t−1 + γ
i|j
q Xj,t + 
i|j
t (1.12)
and the conditional risk metric is consequently defined as:
CoRiskijt = 100×
(
αˆ
i|j
q +
∑K
m=1 βˆ
i|j
q,mRm,t−1 + γˆ
i|j
q V aR
j
q,t
V aRiq,t
− 1
)
, (1.13)
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Table 1.3 presents the results from this specification. As one can see my previous conclusions
do not change. Greece is again the most vulnerable country; the increase in CoVaR is 348 basis
poitns or 158%, followed by Portugal with an increase of 70 basis points (or 21%). As in the
previous model we see that the difference between the first most vulnerable country (Greece) and
the second (Portugal) is substantial. The Netherlands once again is the most systemic country;
when the Netherlands reach their 95% VaR the average increase in other countries 95% is 60 basis
points (the same increase as in the previous model).
1.4.5 Higher stress regime
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present my results based on a more extreme scenario. In both cases I
perform the analysis at the 99th percentile, which compared to my previous models, represent a
higher stress state. It is true that the further we go into the tail, we run the risk of producing less
reliable estimates given the rare occurrence of extreme points17. However, there is an extensive
body of literature that address precisely these issues. For example, Koenker and Bassett (1978)
and Bassett and Koenker (1978) provide details on small sample and asymptotic properties of
quantile regression, while Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001) and Chernozhukov and Du (2006)
focus specifically on VaR applications of quantile regressions near extremes. In addition, VaR
analysis by definition focuses on extreme events, and with respect to the models used in this paper,
Adrian and Brunnermeir (2010) run their analysis both at the 5% and at the 1%, while Chan-Lau,
Espinosa and Solé (2009) focus only at the 1%. Table 1.4 shows the equivalent of our baseline
model, and Table 1.5 shows the model with one lag. One would expect that at higher levels of
stress, as represented here by the higher percentile, the conditional risk values would increase.
That is as Spain, for example, reaches its 99% VaR the conditional effect it has on other countries’
99% VaR will be higher, compared to my earlier estimates for the 95% VaR. However, both models
indicate that at least in some cases not only the effect is not higher but it actually changes sign, and
17Recall that my sample size (1476 observations per series) while not small, is still not extensively large
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becomes negative. This implies then that when a country reaches its own 99% VaR the conditional
effect on other countries is a drop in their corresponding 99% VaR. This finding isn’t the case for
all countries but rather is focused mostly on Greece and in some instances on some other Southern
eurozone countries.
More specifically, from Table 1.4 we see that Greece is still the most vulnerable country; it
suffers the highest increase in our conditional risk metric when other countries reach their 99%
VaR (an increase of 581 basis points). Greece is followed by Portugal once again with an average
increase of 45 basis points. In this model the most systemic country appears to be France; when
France hits its 99% VaR the average increase in other countries is 176 basis points, followed by
Austria (153 basis points). The interesting finding is with respect to the least systemic countries.
Greece and Ireland have a negative effect on other countries’ VaR once they hit their 99% VaR.
Greece in particular has a negative effect on each country with the exception of Spain. Ireland
on the other hand has the expected effect (i.e. positive) on every country but Greece. Ireland’s
negative effect on Greece is so big that it makes the average negative as well. Together with
Ireland, Portugal also has a negative effect on Greece of 185 basis points, making Portugal the
least systemic country with an average of negative 9 basis points.
Table 1.5 presents the results from the model with one lag. Once again Greece is the most
vulnerable counrtry followed by Portugal, with an average increase of 491 and 50 basis points in
their 99% VaR when an another country from the group hits a distress state. The most systemic
country is France followed by Austria, as in the previous model. An important difference from
the previous model is that the impact of Greece here is positive (with the exception of Ireland)
albeit very small; the average increase in other countries’ 99% VaR when Greece is in distress is
just 4 basis points or 17%. Moreoever, just as before Ireland and Portugal seem to have a negative
effect on Greece of -32 and -212 basis points respectively. I also still observe that due to the large
negative effect Portugal has on Greece, the average systemic impact of Portugal comes out to be
negative, making it the only country having a negative impact. The most interesting perhaps fact in
CHAPTER 1. CONDITIONAL RISK IN THE EURO-ZONE 24
these results, not evidenced in the previous model, is that the Netherlands show a negative impact
on Greece of -149 basis points. That is when the Netherlands reach their own distress state this
is associated with a reduction in our conditional systemic risk metric for Greece. The percentage
change is not large (-10%) but what makes this particular case interesting compared to the other
cases is the fact that before all the negative cases were associated with economies in the eurozone’s
periphery, in particular Ireland, Portugal, and Greece.
1.4.6 Conclusions
Based on all previous results I can draw three main conclusions. The first one, which is based
on the baseline models (with and without a lag) when q = 0.95, is that the unconditional V aR is
always lower than the conditional V aR or CoV aR, leading to a positive difference of the condi-
tional risk metric. In other words, the V aR of a country increases conditional on the event that
another country has reached it’s own V aR level. I also observe that countries in the periphery of
the eurozone do not appear to have a very large impact on the conditional risk of core economies,
as indicated by the smaller conditional risk metrics (i.e. their systmemic importance). Moreover,
countries in the periphery seem to be more vulnerable compared to core counties. Based solely
on this finding, one might argue that bailing out countries in the periphery of the eurozone was
not justified since they do not seem to pose a substantial systemic threat to the core eurozone eco-
nomies. Of course this would be a rather naive or myopic argument since it does not take into
account the socio-political implications of a sovereign default within the eurozone. In fact it only
highlights that in this particular definition/formulation of conditional risk, these smaller countries
might not be big contributors.
The second conclusion is that, at least for some countries, there appears to be a reversal of
their effect on the conditional risk. At higher percentiles (q = 0.95 vs. q = 0.99) the effect
instead of being larger as one would expect, becomes not only smaller but negative. As we’ve
seen however, this applies to a certain group of countries in the periphery, most notably Greece.
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A possible explanation for this is that as Greece’s risk reaches even higher levels it becomes the
epicenter of the concern. Thus what other countries experience might appear to be less alarming.
In this case Greece’s credit risk becomes so high that it dwarfs that of other countries’. If this is
true, then demand for protection against a Greek default would rise substantially while protection
against other sovereign defaults would go down. In other words, after a certain thershold for
Greece, investors might increase their holdings of Greek CDS while reduce their holdings of other
sovereign CDSs, explaining the negative conditional risk metric. The same would be true for the
cases of Ireland and Portugal.
The third conclusion is that there is a rather clear divide between periphery and core countries.
Countries in the periphery are more vulnerable compared to core countries in all models. Moreover,
countries in the periphery also appear to be the least systemic ones compared to countries at the
core.
1.4.7 Comparison of results with similar studies
In this section I briefly review the results of some studies similar to this one, either in the
main empirical question (qualitatively) or in their methodology (quantitatively). To the best of
my knowledge the study by Wong and Fong (2011) is the only one using the CoV aR setup using
country data 18. More specifically, the authors examine the interlinkages between 11 Asia-Pacific
economies 19, using country level CDS data. Using the same approach as the one here, Wong and
Fong (2011) find that for most of the countries considered the conditional risk (i.e. the CoV aR) is
significantly higher compared to the unconditional risk (i.e. the V aR). More specifically, they find
that the V aR of an economy at its 99th percentile increases on average by nine basis points or 45%,
when another economy reaches the same level of distress (i.e. reaches its own 99th percentile).
The highest ∆CoV aR (27 basis points) is atributed to Indonesia, making it the most vulnerable
18Other studies in which the CoV aR methodology has been employed use financial institution data.
19These are: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand
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country in their sample, while Australia and New Zealand have the smallest ∆CoV aR (3 basis
points). Finally, China and Korea appear to lead potentially the biggest impact (i.e. being the most
“systemic” countries) with an average of 13 basis points, while Singapore appears to lead to the
smallest impact (6 basis points).
In subsection 1.3.5 I reviewed some of the main papers that focus on the European sovereign
debt crisis in relation to contagion and spillover effects. Here I remind the reader of the main
results as they relate to spillover effects and also present two more relevant studies. Beirne and
Fratzscher (2013) do not find evidence of spillovers from countries in the periphery of the euro-
zone (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) to other core countries. In fact, they find
some evidence supporting a decrease in regional spillovers during the crisis period. Caporin et al.
(2013) show that correlations of CDS changes does not dependent on the size and sign of CDS mo-
vements. Moreover, they show that cross-counrty correlations actually declined as the sovereign
crisis intensified. The results of Kalbaska and Ga˛tkowski (2012) show that cross-country corre-
lations increase after August 2007. They also find evidence of a larger impact of core countries
(Germany, France, and the U.K.) compared to periphery countries in triggering contagion. Bai,
Julliard and Yuan (2012) spillover effects are largely driven by aggregate credit shocks. In particu-
lar, the authors find that credit shocks in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and the Netherlands can have a
significant impact on the aggregated credit shocks in other European countries. The work of Lucas,
Schwaab and Zhang (2014) shows that there are significant spillover effects which can lead to an
overall increase in conditional risk, stemming from a sovereign credit event. In Brutti and Sauré
(2013) it is shown that cross-country bank exposures is a major determinant in the transmission
of shocks. Heinz and Sun (2014) use a panel GLS error correction model focusing on the period
from January 2007 to December 2012 and find that during the European sovereign debt crisis,
CDS spread changes in Italy and Spain had the biggest impact on other eurozone country spreads.
During the global financial crisis however, Ireland was found to have the highest impact on other
euro area economies. Finally, Hurlin, Popescu and Turcu (2013) construct a systemic risk measure
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for sovereign risk (SsRisk) which is based on Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), as prpoposed by
Brownlees and Engle (2010). The authors estimate MES using a Dynamic Conditional Correlation
(DCC) model. They use daily government bond yields of eurozone countries together with quar-
terly sovereign debt data, on the period 2000-2011. The authors find that countries whose public
finances have worsened (and thus their sovereign yields are higher), also exhibit higher rankings
in their marginal contribution to systemic risk.
1.5 Extensions
1.5.1 Quantile examination
Another way to examine risk codependence based on the quantile regression model I have des-
cribed is by looking at how the estimated coefficients for the country variables (i.e. γˆi|jq ) change for
different levels of risk. That is solving the quantile regression stated earlier for different quantiles.
Chan-Lau, Espinosa and Solé (2009) refers to this coefficient as the risk dependence coefficient,
which as a function of q shows how the risk of country j affects country i. As the quantile q in-
creases, impliying a more stressfull regime, we would expect this coefficient to increase as well.
Thus at higher levels of risk, risk codependence is expected to be higher or the higher the risk of
country j is the greater the impact will be on country i. Fig. 1.10 shows the average 20 estimated
coefficient γˆi|jq for eurozone countries in the vertical axis as a function of the default risk of another
member, sorted by quantiles on the horizontal axis. For example the top right graph for Austria
(“source”) shows for a given level of default risk the corresponding default risk codependence ari-
sing from Austria as measured by the average value of the coefficient γi|jq estimated while setting
the default risk of countries in the rest of the eurozone as the dependent variable. All coefficients
are significant at the 5 percent level. Given that higher quantiles correspond to higher stress leves,
20This is the average across i = 1, ..., 11 with j 6= i. Thus in each of these graphs, country “j” or the “source”
country is fixed, while country “i” or the “recipient” country changes.
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the upward sloping pattern we see in Fig. 1.10 suggests that codependence rises as default risk
rises.
1.5.2 Different conditioning events
So far, the analysis has focused on the conditioning event being that another country is in dis-
tress, thus focusing on country pairs. However, we can also examine the impact of individual
countries on the system as whole, which in my case is the set of countries in the sample. Furt-
hermore, we can examine the impact that high risk countries have on low risk countries, and vice
versa. In other words, look closer at the relationship between core and periphery countries.
In order to examine the impact of individual sovereigns on the system of countries in our
sample we need a measure that represents sovereign credit risk in the eurozone. Since there are
no Eurobonds and consequently no CDS contracts for the system of countries, I take a weighted
average of the CDS spreads of the countries in my sample. I consider two different approaches
for the weights; in the first one, weights are determined using GDP and in the second one using
public debt. I used all the years in the sample for which annual data are available for both GDP and
public debt and I obtained the data from Eurostat. Table 1.8 presents the data and the corresponding
weights for the most recent year (2014) along with the averages for entire period (2008-2014) for
each country. The system variables are computed as follows:
X¯GDP =
11∑
i=1
wGDPi CDSi
11
(1.14)
X¯Debt =
11∑
i=1
wDebti CDSi
11
(1.15)
X¯Simple =
11∑
i=1
wSimplei CDSi
11
(1.16)
I estimate the quantile regressions this time using the constructed system variable as the de-
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pendent variable and compute the corresponding CoRisk measures. The corresponding quantile
regressions are as follows:
X¯GDP = αX¯
GDP |j
q +
K∑
m=1
βX¯
GDP |j
q,m Rm,t + γ
X¯GDP |j
q X
j
t + 
X¯GDP |j
t (1.17)
X¯Debt = αX¯
Debt|j
q +
K∑
m=1
βX¯
Debt|j
q,m Rm,t + γ
X¯Debt|j
q X
j
t + 
X¯Debt|j
t (1.18)
X¯Simple = αX¯
Simple|j
q +
K∑
m=1
βX¯
Simple|j
q,m Rm,t + γ
X¯Simple|j
q X
j
t + 
X¯Simple|j
t (1.19)
Table 1.9 presents my results for the GDP based and Debt weight system variables. For com-
parison purposes I also include the results from a model using a simple average to construct the
system dependent variable (i.e. a simple average of the changes in CDS spreads of the member
countries).
As we can see in Table 1.9 the Netherlands appear to have the largest impact on the system
regardless of the way the system variables is created. For example, when the Netherlands are at
their VaR level, there is an increase in VaR of the system of 124% using GDP weights and 138%
increase using Debt weights. The second largest contributor is Portugal with a 100% increase and
112% using GDP weights and Debt weights respectively. We also observe that both Greece and
Ireland are associated with the smallest increase. Thus despite their fiscal wows Greece and Ireland
seem to have a minor impact on the overall system, whereas Portugal’s one appears to be rather
large despite the fact the weight of Portugal both based on GDP and Debt is very small (1.84 and
2.28 respectively from Table 1.8. These results are fairly consistent with the ones presented in
Table 1.2 (the baseline model), where the Netherlands have the highest systemic index of 95% and
Portugal has a systemic index of 91%. The same is true for Greece and Ireland; in the baseline
model their systemic index is 30%, which is the lowest.
The last aspect of this analysis based on the conditioning event (i.e. which country is taken to
be in distress) is to examine core countries against periphery countries and vice versa. I follow both
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the relevant literature as well as the industry and the press, and include Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands in my set of core countries. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain form the group of periphery countries. Note that this classification is very different
than grouping countries based on debt or GDP. The core and periphery variables are based on the
average CDS spread changes of the countries in the respective groups. In order to compute the
systemic risk metrics (CoRisk) we need to specify the risk factor values for the group on which
the conditioning is based. I considered to ways to compute the values for the common risk factors
in this setting. The first one takes the average of the risk factor values of the countries of each
group. The second one is based on the created variables we have for the core and the periphery
countries. That is I first calculate the VaR of the two new series. Then the risk factor values are
the ones on which the VaR was registered. Once again if the VaR falls between two days I take a
linear interpolation as described ealier. Table 1.10 presents the results from the quantile regressions
evaluated at q = 0.95. As we can see the core group of countries appears to have a larger impact
on the periphery countries compared to the other way round, in both models. There is a significant
difference especially for the impact of the countries in the periphery depending on the way in
which risk factor values were computed. I believe that the second way (as depicted by Core2 and
Periphery2) is more appropriate because the values are based on the actual new series. Thus, we
see that even though core countries have a larger systemic impact on countries in the periphery, the
impact of all periphery countries is not negligible (87%).
1.5.3 Different time periods
In this section I perform the analysis on different time periods of the European sovereign debt
crisis. The breakdown of the different periods takes into account European Central Bank’s po-
licy interventions and announcements, credit events, the introduction of the European Financial
Stability Facility and later on the Securities Markets Programme, among others. Having broken
down the sample period into sub-periods I repeat the analysis and construct the new conditional
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risk metrics to examine if and how they differ in the different sub-periods.
Deciding which days to use as start and end points of the different subsamples is by no means
an easy task. There is plethora of potentially important events and announcements from different
sources that apply to different countries or in some cases to a group of countries. Moreover, these
announcements and/or events originate from different sources (e.g. politicians, the ECB, the press
etc.) and their effect and importance will most likely differ. Finally, some announcements have a
positive or “calming” effect on the markets (e.g. announcements of bailout packages and similar
deal agreements), while others have a negative or “stressing” effect on the markets (e.g. debt and
other budget statistics/revisions that do not meet pre-agreed benchmarks).
Keeping these considerations in mind, I have chosen to break the sample into fairly equal
subsamples. The first subsample runs from April 2008 to April 2010. The second subsample
from May 2010 to June 2012, and the third subsample from August 2012 to June 2014. The
choice to breakdown the sample in this particular way was motivated by considering the main
policy responses. The first period does not include any major policy actions regarding sovereign
concerns 21. In fact, it is toward the end of that period that Greece’s sovereign wows became
fully and widely disclosed 22.Thus, even though this period involves so-called credit events, it does
not involve policy actions. The second period starts with the EU and IMF announcing a e110
billion bailout package on May 2, 2010. The rest of this period is characterized by a number of
sovereign credit events and a widening of CDS spreads (including those of Ireland and Portugal,
and several other for Greece), as well as numerous policy actions. Finally, the third period shows a
gradual and steady decline in spreads. It is not that this third period does not include adverse credit
announcements or policy actions, as the sovereign debt crisis continues well beyond the end of my
sample. However, I believe that the impact that these events had on CDS spreads (and the market
21The exception to this is the case of Iceland, who is the very first sovereign victim. However, because Iceland is
not in my sample nor is part of the euro, I do not focus on its case
22“Fully and widely” are not minor points here, as there is a wide held belief that officials both at the IMF and the
EU were aware of Greece’s reporting practices and inaccurate statistics
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in general) have a less “shocking” component compared to those in the second period. Moreover,
as evidenced in the lowering of the spreads, there is a noticeable change in the pattern of the series,
which could be attributable to a lagging effect of some of the policy actions.
Before moving into the results for this part it should be noted that my purpose here is not to
examine and evaluate in detail the effect of policy and other announcements. Rather it should be
viewed as an extension of my baseline model and whether the previous results hold when looking
in different time periods. A closer examination of the impact of policy announcements, bailout
packages, and other related credit events or in potential ways that could be used to analyze them,
goes beyond the purposes of this paper.
Instead of focusing on the country by country analysis I chose to run the analysis using the
system variable that we created in the previous section using GDP weights. Table 1.11 presents my
results from the three time periods, together with the results from the full sample for comparison
purposes. As one can see, there are significant differences between periods for all countries studied.
Moreover, the differences are even more striking if we compare the average of the three periods
with the resutls from the full sample. For example, the average for the three periods for Germany
is 39% whereas in the full sample it is 82%. In other cases, such as Greece, the average of the three
periods is higher compared to the full sample (44% and 29% respectively).
These results do not point specifically into a general conclusion as in each period the countries
with the highest and lowest conditional metrics change. Moreoever, they are different compared
to the full sample case. Perhaps one important observation is that Greece does not have the lowest
conditional risk metric in any of the sample periods. In fact during the third period the incre-
ase in the VaR of the system conditional in Greece being at its 95th VaR level is 81%, which is
considerably larger compared to the full sample case of 29%.
Perhaps the only safe conclusion to be made given these results is that the time frame of the
analysis has a significant impact on the results. This should be expected in some sense since the
entire period is characterized by major changes in policy. A closer examination of the impact of
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policy changes and actions would be a promising route for future research. For example, in this
paper I chose to break the sample into three periods; before, during, and after major policy actions.
One could also look at the period before and after policy changes. Finally, it is importan to keep in
mind that the setup of this methodogy already focuses on extreme events, even in the full sample
case. Recall that the quantile regressions are conditional on country (or group of countries) j being
in distress. Moreover, the values of the risk factors used to compute the conditional risk metrics are
those when the VaR of country (or group of counties) j is observed. One might therefore argue that
key negative events are alread embedded in this setup, without breaking the sample into different
periods. Of course looking at different periods, will lead to different VaR levels and risk factor
values at these VaR levels, which is why the choice of break dates should not just be based on
some key event but should rather reflect a regime change.
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Figure 1.1: All over-the-counter derivatives; Source: https://www.bis.org
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Figure 1.2: Credit derivatives; Source: https://www.bis.org
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Figure 1.3: Sovereign CDS spread levels with Greece (top) and without Greece (bottom)
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Figure 1.5: Average CoVaR vs VaR of CDS spread changes with Greece (top) and without Greece
(bottom)
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Figure 1.6: Systemic Importance - Absolute Increase
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Figure 1.7: Systemic Importance - Percent Increase
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Figure 1.8: Vulnerability - Absolute Increase
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Figure 1.9: Vulnerability - Percent Increase
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Figure 1.10: Risk codependence as a function of quantile
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of the series
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Mean 0.0123 0.0086 0.0088 0.0219 0.0089 0.3181 0.0195 0.0478 0.0126 0.0932 0.0285
Max 48.7 36.67 12.8 22.82 12.1 5,672.66 119.18 72.15 27.5 174.99 54.09
Min -27.35 -56.64 -8.1 -29.7 -14.32 -16,477.48 -178.69 -72.23 -14.22 -192.17 -78.45
Std. Dev. 4.84 6.05 1.72 3.96 2.1 598.92 15.27 10.71 2.67 22.57 10.81
a Statistics are based on the CDS series in first differences
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Table 1.2: CoRisk metric for changes in sovereign CDS spreads baseline model evaluated at q = 0.95, Apr 2008 - Jun
2014
Percentage Increase (%)
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain S.I.b
Austria 37 29 24 34 68 38 48 46 44 35 40
Belgium 58 48 32 41 212 75 38 73 62 18 66
Finland 68 38 36 59 65 77 55 66 47 41 55
France 58 63 44 66 186 78 56 66 79 43 74
Germany 68 62 85 53 189 88 71 83 83 62 84
Greece 18 37 23 25 26 37 30 30 49 25 30
Ireland 23 30 7 18 23 70 34 27 43 21 30
Italy 65 63 53 67 57 175 90 78 102 61 81
Netherlands 75 90 58 71 65 229 101 89 101 71 95
Portugal 76 79 69 73 81 169 88 106 81 87 91
Spain 80 81 65 75 79 179 110 74 82 100 92
Vulnerability c 59 58 48 48 53 154 78 60 63 71 46
Absolute Increase (basis points)
Austria 3 1 2 1 150 8 8 2 14 6 19
Belgium 4 1 2 1 466 16 6 3 19 3 52
Finland 5 3 2 2 144 16 9 3 14 7 21
France 4 6 1 2 411 16 9 3 24 7 48
Germany 5 6 2 3 415 19 12 3 25 11 50
Greece 1 3 1 2 1 8 5 1 15 4 4
Ireland 2 3 0 1 1 153 5 1 13 4 18
Italy 5 6 2 4 2 386 19 3 31 12 47
Netherlands 6 8 2 5 2 504 21 14 31 12 60
Portugal 6 7 2 5 3 371 19 17 3 15 45
Spain 6 7 2 5 3 394 23 12 3 30 49
VaR d 7 9 3 6 3 220 21 16 4 31 17
Vulnerability 4 5 1 3 2 339 16 10 3 22 8
a Each cell gives the estimated increase in the VaR of the economy listed in the column conditional on the economy in the row being at its
own VaR level.
b Systemic Importance is the row average showing the additional risk experienced by other countries when the economy listed in the row is at
its VaR level.
c Vulnerability is column average, which shows the increase in risk suffered by the economy listed in the column when the other economies
are under stress.
d VaR is the 95th percentile of the change in CDS spreads.
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Table 1.3: CoRisk metric for changes in sovereign CDS spreads model with one lag, evaluated at q = 0.95, Apr 2008 -
Jun 2014
Percentage Increase (%)
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain S.I.b
Austria 33 27 27 41 74 43 48 46 48 39 43
Belgium 67 55 54 63 230 128 42 90 63 31 82
Finland 67 56 48 51 59 81 38 86 34 39 56
France 59 69 47 57 194 93 72 67 93 63 81
Germany 33 66 49 65 125 99 61 64 60 50 67
Greece 30 46 27 36 38 38 48 38 44 24 37
Ireland 30 20 25 15 25 141 40 32 50 30 41
Italy 68 61 50 53 61 180 103 79 89 49 79
Netherlands 62 103 56 83 78 222 111 99 112 77 100
Portugal 63 85 57 59 82 172 87 83 72 54 82
Spain 76 84 65 68 72 183 107 73 88 104 92
Vulnerability c 56 62 46 51 57 158 89 60 66 70 45
Absolute Increase (basis points)
Austria 3 1 2 1 163 9 8 2 15 7 21
Belgium 5 2 4 2 505 27 7 4 19 5 58
Finland 5 5 3 2 130 17 6 3 10 7 19
France 4 6 1 2 427 20 12 3 28 11 51
Germany 2 6 1 4 276 21 10 3 18 9 35
Greece 2 4 1 2 1 8 8 2 14 4 5
Ireland 2 2 1 1 1 312 6 1 15 5 35
Italy 5 6 1 3 2 395 22 3 27 9 47
Netherlands 5 9 2 5 3 488 23 16 34 13 60
Portugal 5 8 2 4 3 380 18 13 3 9 44
Spain 6 8 2 4 2 404 23 12 4 32 50
VaR d 7 9 3 6 3 220 21 16 4 31 17
Vulnerability 4 6 1 3 2 348 19 10 3 21 8
a Each cell gives the estimated increase in the VaR of the economy listed in the column conditional on the economy in the row being at its
own VaR level.
b Systemic Importance is the row average showing the additional risk experienced by other countries when the economy listed in the row is at
its VaR level.
c Vulnerability is column average, which shows the increase in risk suffered by the economy listed in the column when the other economies
are under stress.
d VaR is the 95th percentile of the change in CDS spreads.
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Table 1.4: CoRisk metric for changes in sovereign CDS spreads baseline model evaluated at q = 0.99, Apr 2008 - Jun
2014
Percentage Increase (%)
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain S.I.b
Austria 70 108 46 65 95 48 48 80 84 72 72
Belgium 98 98 51 82 77 79 55 106 94 80 82
Finland 66 36 42 40 15 83 49 66 67 58 52
France 88 70 109 79 107 99 69 158 101 81 96
Germany 62 48 50 47 55 71 64 86 84 91 66
Greece -17 -4 -5 -14 -33 -22 -23 -2 -3 10 -11
Ireland 23 15 34 8 27 -7 34 60 39 48 28
Italy 18 46 69 14 15 70 103 80 72 62 55
Netherlands 33 22 65 4 13 4 56 25 31 58 31
Portugal 35 30 36 23 38 -13 57 56 56 82 40
Spain 22 13 15 7 16 0 29 28 25 27 18
Vulnerability c 43 34 58 23 34 40 60 40 72 60 64
Absolute Increase (basis points)
Austria 14 5 6 4 1371 21 16 7 64 22 153
Belgium 17 5 6 6 1105 35 19 9 71 24 130
Finland 12 7 5 3 216 37 17 6 51 17 37
France 15 15 6 5 1542 44 23 13 77 24 176
Germany 11 10 3 6 795 31 22 7 64 27 98
Greece -3 -1 0 -2 -2 -10 -8 0 -2 3 -2
Ireland 4 3 2 1 2 -106 11 5 30 15 -3
Italy 3 10 3 2 1 1008 46 7 55 19 115
Netherlands 6 5 3 0 1 63 25 9 23 17 15
Portugal 6 6 2 3 3 -185 25 19 5 25 -9
Spain 4 3 1 1 1 1 13 9 2 20 6
VaR d 18 21 5 13 7 1441 44 34 8 76 30
Vulnerability 8 7 3 3 2 581 27 14 6 45 19
a Each cell gives the estimated increase in the VaR of the economy listed in the column conditional on the economy in the row being at its
own VaR level.
b Systemic Importance is the row average showing the additional risk experienced by other countries when the economy listed in the row is at
its VaR level.
c Vulnerability is column average, which shows the increase in risk suffered by the economy listed in the column when the other economies
are under stress.
d VaR is the 99th percentile of the change in CDS spreads.
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Table 1.5: CoRisk metric for changes in sovereign CDS spreads, model with one lag evaluated at q = 0.99, Apr 2008 -
Jun 2014
Percentage Increase (%)
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain S.I.b
Austria 90 116 71 67 79 80 105 72 82 91 85
Belgium 103 113 58 71 66 115 51 150 92 63 88
Finland 49 44 46 55 11 95 55 54 72 49 53
France 91 73 120 95 82 111 75 128 98 59 93
Germany 108 45 70 54 66 97 57 106 84 60 75
Greece 2 10 33 13 10 -12 39 15 19 38 17
Ireland 2 9 24 -4 17 -2 34 21 34 29 16
Italy 75 53 109 41 50 61 115 64 74 74 71
Netherlands 45 41 60 22 37 -10 83 53 60 76 47
Portugal 19 29 5 7 32 -15 50 41 14 55 24
Spain 6 20 22 10 42 3 52 36 39 42 27
Vulnerability c 50 41 67 32 48 34 79 55 66 66 59
Absolute Increase (basis points)
Austria 19 6 9 4 1136 36 36 6 62 27 134
Belgium 18 6 7 5 948 51 17 13 70 19 115
Finland 9 9 6 4 162 42 19 5 55 15 32
France 16 15 6 6 1184 49 23 11 74 18 140
Germany 19 9 4 7 955 43 20 9 64 18 115
Greece 0 2 2 2 1 -5 13 1 14 11 4
Ireland 0 2 1 -1 1 -32 12 2 26 9 2
Italy 13 11 6 5 3 874 51 5 56 22 105
Netherlands 8 8 3 3 2 -149 37 18 46 23 0
Portugal 3 6 0 1 2 -212 22 14 1 17 -14
Spain 1 4 1 1 3 40 23 12 3 32 12
VaR d 18 21 5 13 7 1441 44 34 8 76 30
Vulnerability 9 9 3 4 3 491 35 19 6 50 18
a Each cell gives the estimated increase in the VaR of the economy listed in the column conditional on the economy in the row being at its
own VaR level.
b Systemic Importance is the row average showing the additional risk experienced by other countries when the economy listed in the row is at
its VaR level.
c Vulnerability is column average, which shows the increase in risk suffered by the economy listed in the column when the other economies
are under stress.
d VaR is the 99th percentile of the change in CDS spreads.
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Table 1.6: Systemic Importance
Percentage Increase (%)
q Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
0.90 35 54 48 59 63 18 21 60 75 72 74
0.91 36 56 49 62 66 19 23 64 77 74 76
0.92 37 57 49 65 69 21 26 68 80 76 78
0.93 39 60 52 68 73 26 27 70 82 80 81
0.94 39 64 55 71 79 28 28 77 86 85 90
0.95 40 66 55 74 84 30 30 81 95 91 92
0.96 66 68 93 33 58 17 41 67 83 33 79
0.97 67 71 72 51 60 10 39 62 79 35 50
0.98 68 77 63 64 62 2 30 58 50 37 25
0.99 72 83 52 96 66 -11 28 55 31 40 18
Absolute Increase (basis points)
q Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
0.90 12.4 34.5 12.9 30.2 33.2 1.2 11.2 29.2 40.5 30 33
0.91 14.6 36.3 13 32.5 35.9 1.6 13.5 30.9 42.6 31.5 33.9
0.92 17.7 39.1 14.9 35.2 39 2.26 16 33.7 45.9 33.3 35.7
0.93 18.4 42.9 16.3 38.2 41.8 3.34 16.5 36.56 48.9 35.7 38.5
0.94 19 48.9 19 47.7 48.2 3.8 17.7 42.6 55.5 39.8 46.9
0.95 19.4 52.3 20.6 48.4 50.1 4.1 18.3 46.9 60.5 44.8 48.6
0.96 32.6 47.2 52.9 6.4 29.7 2.7 37.8 37 46.5 41.5 49.3
0.97 55.6 57.9 46.6 25.5 64.5 2 19.4 55.9 52.4 33.7 44.6
0.98 84.2 84.6 41.6 50.2 72.4 1.3 5.7 75.6 22.5 6.5 18.1
0.99 153.1 129.1 37 176.5 97.5 -2.5 -3.4 115.3 15.3 -9.1 5.5
a Systemic Importance showes the additional average risk experienced by other countries when the economy listed is at its
VaR level.
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Table 1.7: Vulnerability
Percentage Increase (%)
q Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
0.90 45 42 39 40 45 98 54 48 46 62 39
0.91 48 43 40 42 47 105 57 52 47 65 41
0.92 49 45 42 43 49 121 60 55 52 66 42
0.93 52 52 44 46 51 134 66 57 55 68 44
0.94 56 54 45 47 52 147 72 58 60 70 45
0.95 59 58 48 48 53 154 78 60 63 71 46
0.96 48 60 33 51 45 102 68 62 48 73 48
0.97 44 52 38 41 42 75 65 59 53 69 52
0.98 45 45 49 27 39 62 62 50 67 65 59
0.99 43 34 58 23 34 40 60 40 72 60 64
Absolute Increase (basis points)
q Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
0.90 1.7 2.4 0.7 1.5 1 79 6.7 5 1.1 10.3 4.4
0.91 2.1 2.7 0.7 1.7 1.1 105.9 7.8 5.9 1.2 12.3 5
0.92 2.4 3 0.9 1.9 1.2 145.4 8.9 6.7 1.5 14.7 5.4
0.93 2.8 3.8 1 2.3 1.5 212.4 11.2 7.5 1.8 16.9 6.1
0.94 3.7 4.4 1.1 2.6 1.6 262.5 13.5 8.2 2.2 19.2 7
0.95 4.4 5.2 1.4 3.1 1.8 339.5 16.5 9.7 2.6 21.7 8.1
0.96 4.1 5.9 1.1 3.7 1.7 300.3 17.3 11.4 2.2 25.8 9.7
0.97 4.3 6.1 1.4 3.5 1.8 519 18.4 13.0 2.7 28.2 13.2
0.98 5.2 6.8 2 2.9 1.9 429 21.4 13.1 4.2 36.7 17.8
0.99 7.5 7.2 2.9 2.9 2.3 581 26.7 13.8 6 45.2 19.4
a Vulnerability shows the average increase in risk suffered by the economy listed when the other economies are under
stress.
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Table 1.8: GDP, public debt and corresponding country weights
Country Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece e Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
GDP 2014 329 402 204 2,142 2,904 179 185 1,616 655 173 1,058
GDP 2008-14 b 307 377 195 2,048 2,679 210 175 1,613 638 174 1,073
Debt 2014 278 428 121 2,038 2,170 317 203 2,135 451 225 1,034
Debt 2008-14 b 246 381 95 1,734 2,020 324 164 1,913 397 186 756
GDP weights ’14 c 3.34 4.08 2.07 21.75 29.48 1.82 1.88 16.41 6.65 1.76 10.75
GDP weights avg c 3.23 3.97 2.05 21.58 28.21 2.22 1.84 17.01 6.73 1.84 11.32
Debt weights ’14 d 2.96 4.56 1.29 21.68 23.08 3.37 2.16 22.71 4.80 2.40 11.00
Debt weights avg d 3.06 4.75 1.16 21.49 25.17 3.64 1.98 23.89 4.95 2.28 9.19
a GDP and Debt values are in billions of euros
b The 2008-14 values for GDP and Debt are the annual averages of GDP and Debt for those years
c The GDP weight for 2014 is the GDP in 2014 for each country divided by the total GDP in 2014 of the 11 countries. The GDP weight average is
the average GDP weight for each country in 2008-2014
d The Debt weight for 2014 is the Debt in 2014 for each country divided by the total Debt in 2014 of the 11 countries. The Debt weight average is
the average Debt weight for each country in 2008-2014
e The Debt values for 2008-10 are not available for Greece, thus all Debt related values for Greece use years 2010-14
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Table 1.9: CoRisk metric for changes in sovereign CDS spre-
ads, evaluated at q = 0.95, Apr 2008 - Jun 2014
Percentage Increase (%)
System _ GDP b System_ Debt c System_ simple d
Austria 41 40 55
Belgium 90 106 174
Finland 54 52 72
France 73 93 137
Germany 82 100 147
Greece 29 22 18
Ireland 36 30 54
Italy 111 107 137
Netherlands 124 138 183
Portugal 100 112 146
Spain 97 99 147
Absolute Increase (basis points)
Austria 0.43 0.57 14.53
Belgium 0.95 1.5 45.8
Finland 0.57 0.73 19.02
France 0.77 1.32 36.04
Germany 0.86 1.41 38.65
Greece 0.31 0.32 4.79
Ireland 0.38 0.42 14.23
Italy 1.17 1.51 36.08
Netherlands 1.3 1.96 48.09
Portugal 1.05 1.59 38.45
Spain 1.02 1.41 38.52
a Each cell gives the estimated increase in the VaR of the system
conditional on the economy in the row being at its own VaR level.
b System_ GDP is the system variable using GDP weights
c System _ Debt is the system variable using Debt weights
d System_ simple is the unweighted average for the system variable
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Table 1.10: CoRisk metric for changes in sovereign CDS spreads: core
and periphery model evaluated at q = 0.95, Apr 2008 - Jun 20
Percentage Increase (%) Absolute Increase (basis points)
Core1 Periphery1 Core1 Periphery1
Core1 142 Core1 78
Periphery1 48 Periphery1 2
Core2 Periphery2 Core2 Periphery2
Core2 96 Core2 53
Periphery2 87 Periphery2 4
a Each cell gives the estimated increase in the VaR of the group listed in the
column conditional on the group in the row being at its own VaR level.
b Core1 and Periphery1 use the risk factor values based on the average of the risk
factor values of the countries of each group
c Core2 and Periphery2 use the risk factor values based on the created variables for
the core and the periphery countries
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Table 1.11: CoRisk metric for changes in sovereign CDS spreads, evaluated at q = 0.95, subsam-
ples
Percentage Increase (%) Absolute Increase (basis points)
Period 1b Period 2c Period 3d Full Sample Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Full Sample
Austria 42 70 34 41 0.2 1.39 0.16 0.43
Belgium 5 51 136 90 0.02 1.02 0.64 0.95
Finland 65 24 28 54 0.31 0.48 0.13 0.57
France 36 147 53 73 0.17 2.9 0.25 0.77
Germany 65 44 7 82 0.32 0.86 0.03 0.86
Greece 30 22 81 29 0.15 0.44 0.38 0.31
Ireland 30 3 89 36 0.14 0.06 0.42 0.38
Italy 20 88 74 111 0.1 1.74 0.35 1.17
Netherlands 47 131 36 124 0.23 2.6 0.17 1.3
Portugal 53 48 30 100 0.25 0.94 0.14 1.05
Spain 24 1 92 97 0.12 0.01 0.43 1.02
a Each cell gives the estimated increase in the VaR of the system conditional on the economy in the row being at
its own VaR level. The system variable uses GDP weights
b Period 1: April 01, 2008 - April 31, 2010
c Period 2: May 01, 2010 - July 30, 2012
d Period 3: August 01, 2012 - June 03, 2014
Chapter 2
The Greek sovereign debt crisis: A brief
historical account
2.1 Introduction
In trying to understand the deeper causes and roots of the undergoing Greek debt crisis, it is
important to choose the right starting point. In other words, one needs to go back far enough in
time in order to fully reveal the entire picture - simply starting at the onset of the crisis (about
6 years ago) would be insufficient. Of course, going back as far as the beginning of the Greek
modern state (around the 1830s) seems like a stretch. Rather, a more reasonable starting point
would be roughly two decades after the end of WWII 1.
After the end of the civil war in 1949 and up until the early 1970s, Greece’s macroeconomic
performance was characterized by strong growth and low inflation. During the 1970’s however,
the situation was reversed with growth slowing down and inflation rising. During the 1980s and
up until the early 1990s the Greek economy was in a rather bad state. Beginning in the mid-1990s
Greece’s economic performance started showing clear signs of improvement. In the years from
1The occupation of the Axis Powers ended in October 1944, with the liberation of Athens. Greece regained power
of the Dodecanese two years later, with the 1947 Peace Treaty of Italy.
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2001 to 2008 growth rates increased, inflation was contained, and unemployment fell. After 2008
and with the international financial crisis intensifying, the economy started slowing down, and by
late 2009 the economy entered into a recession, which has yet to come out.
In the next sections, I take a closer look at Greece’s macroeconomic performance in three
different time periods, namely the period after WWII and before Greece’s euro area participation,
the period after joining the euro and up until the mid-2000s, and finally the period from 2008 up
until early 2016.
2.2 The Greek economy after WWII and up until the early
1990s
Greece experienced an economic expansion after WWII, which in a sense is only natural after
a war time period. With the funds from the Marshall plan, Greece moved from being mainly an
agricultural country to an industrial one. As we can see in Fig. 2.1 the unemployment rate, was
however, high compared to today’s standards for most of the advanced economies 2, especially
during the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Moreover, while during the military dictatorship (1967-
1974) inflation was relatively modest, prices surged during the period from 1973 to the mid-1990s,
with inflation rising an average of about 17.7% 3 (see Fig. 2.2).
The steep rise in inflation in 1973 was not only due to the first oil shock of 1973/74, and the
subsequent rise in the prices of commodities and raw materials. Another important reason was
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system a couple of year earlier. Greece was part of the Bretton
Woods system from 1953 until its collapse in August 1971, with the drachma pegged to the US
dollar (which was pegged to gold). The final main reason for the acceleration of inflation after 1973
is slightly more complicated. As was mentioned earlier, the period after the end of the civil war in
2Here I do not refer to Greece’s current unemployment rate as today’s standard.
3This figure is based on the simple average change of the CPI inflation rate from 1973 to 1995.
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1949 was characterized by strong growth and monetary stability. Up until the onset of the military
junta in 1969, the political regime despite its repressive nature followed relatively prudent fiscal
and monetary policies. Investment both public (especially in large infrastructure projects) and
private increased considerably, while government consumption spending declined. The Currency
Committee4, which was established in 1946, was responsible for the conduct of monetary, credit,
and foreign exchange policy, and while the banking system was heavily controlled, the Committee
directed reserves and savings into high return sectors. Moreover, because labor unions were under
firm government control, labor cost increases were contained. This together with increases in
productivity helped keep inflation at low levels and created a favorable business environment,
which was also fostered by low business taxes and property rights legislation. Unfortunately, the
expansionary policies during the dictatorship, the great expansion of domestic demand, the high
reliance on foreign aid, and the high trade deficits, led to an overheating of the economy. By 1969
the Greek economy was operating near full capacity. This together with sticky wage and price
adjustment due to administrative controls is the third reason why inflationary pressures started in
the early 1970s.
Most of Greece’s governments after the military dictatorship tried to battle stagflation by follo-
wing expansionary fiscal policies, and in particular by leveraging deficit spending, while monetary
policy was to a large extend accommodative. It is important to realize that the first governments
after the dictatorship faced significant social pressures for a redistribution of income and wealth
(mostly through wage policy) and for a more liberal political system. Moreover, the public wan-
ted an active role of the state both as a producer as well as an employer, with the ultimate goal
of improving living standards to levels comparable to those of Western European countries. The
election of 1981 brought the socialist party Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and An-
dreas Papandreou into power who satisfied these demands, even to the point of excess, as did the
4The Currency Committee was part of a series of newly established government agencies. It reflected the need for
a closer cooperation between the government and the Bank of Greece in order to cope with the economic challenges
the country faced after the end of WWII and the civil war.
CHAPTER 2. THE GREEK SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 58
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
19
60
19
64
19
68
19
72
19
76
19
80
19
84
19
88
19
92
Figure 2.1: Unemployment Rate (1960 - 1993)
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Figure 2.2: CPI Inflation Rate (1960 - 1993)
following governments up until the early 1990s. Consequently, Greece’s public debt ballooned5
(see Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4).
5Greece had parliamentary elections in 1993, which were won by PASOK and Andreas Papandreou. The new
government did not follow the fiscal consolidation and structural reform plans of the departed government of New
Democracy (ND). The steep rise in the debt ratio in Fig. 2.3 is mostly due to the increase in interest payments.
Moreover, while the primary balance in 1992 was in surplus, after the elections in 1993 it turned into a deficit.
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Figure 2.3: General government consolidated gross debt as a % of GDP (1970 - 1993)
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Figure 2.4: General government deficit as a % of GDP (1970 - 1993)
At some point in the mid-1980s it had become apparent that the fiscal policies pursued were not
sustainable. This lead the government6, through the Bank of Greece, to two significant devaluations
of the drachma, in 1983 and 1985.7Moreover, in another attempt to control the fiscal situation, a
6PASOK at that time
7In 1983 the drachma was devalued by 16% against the US dollar and by 15% against the ECU. In 1985 the
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program of fiscal and monetary tightness, known as the 1986-1987 Stabilization Program, was
adopted in 1985 only to be abandoned in late 1987. This together with the relaxation of wage
controls and the political uncertainty during the years from 1987 to the early 1990s8 pushed the
inflation rate back up and worsened the deficit. In the elections of 1990 the new government of
ND initiated another medium-term adjustment program for the years 1991 to 1993 with the goal of
bringing the deficit down and lowering inflation. However, the measures did not prove sufficient
and there was also little progress concerning structural reforms, with large deviations from the
original targets. The political cycle and the elections of 1993 contributed to the deterioration of
fiscal figures. Moreover, the recession in the EU during the early 1990s had a large negative impact
on the Greek economy.
With high unemployment, high inflation, and rising debt and deficit levels it was no surprise
that Greece had to pay a much higher premium in international markets in order to borrow more,
compared to other countries in the upcoming monetary union (see Fig. 2.5).
2.3 The Greek economy from the mid-1990s and up until the
mid-2000s
Greece became the 10th member of what was then known as the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) in 1981, almost 20 years after its initial application.9 This long delay was partly
drachma was devalued by 15%.
8During this period a major political and financial scandal broke out, with George Koskotas, a then prominent
Greek banker being at the center. The scandal ultimately brought down the PASOK government in 1989 and had
major political consequences for both PASOK and ND, as well as for the general political scene and its relation to the
press and the banking system.
9Greece was in fact the first European country to sign an Association Agreement with the European Community,
which at the time included Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany, in July 1961.
This agreement, which is known as the Athens Agreement, provided for the establishment of a customs union, the
gradual development of common policies in the agricultural sector, free movement of labor and no transport barriers,
fiscal policy harmonization, and common rules for competition and economic policy. It also included provisions for
making resources available to Greece in order to facilitate its economic development.
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Figure 2.5: Yields on 10YR government bonds - 1992
due the suspension of accession efforts during the Colonels’ regime10, but also because Greece’s
economy was not entirely ready for an integration of this type.11 Full economic integration with
Europe was one of the main priorities of Greek governments starting in the mid-1990s. Securing
access to the European monetary union and adopting the common currency was Greece’s ultimate
goal. As such, Greece worked in an effort to lower inflation and bring down the deficits in or-
der to satisfy the obligations of the Maastricht Treaty12, which was the road to the creation of the
common currency. The Maastricht Treaty specified five obligations, the so-called Maastricht or
euro-convergence criteria. These were: 1) Inflation no more than 1.5% above the average of the
three lowest inflation rates of the other member states, 2) The annual government deficit to GDP
must be below 3%, 3) The government debt to GDP ratio must not be above 60%, 4) The nominal
long-term interest rate must not exceed 2% higher than the average of the three lowest inflation
10The Athens Agreement was suspended and limited only to matters of day-to-day management until democracy
and parliamentary structures were restored. The military dictatorship, more generally, was a period of diplomatic
isolation with Greece even having to leave the Council of Europe in 1969.
11There are other geopolitical reasons for this delay, which are inevitably related to economic performance, but their
analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper.
12The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 by twelve European countries, namely, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
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member states, and 5) Participation in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) for two consecutive
years with no devaluation of the domestic currency during that period.
Beginning in the mid-1990s successive Greek governments adopted a tight fiscal policy stance.
In 1994 the government (PASOK) announced a new convergence program for the years 1994 to
1999 in order to bring down the deficit, stabilize the debt to GDP ratio and lower inflation. Mo-
netary policy during that period was also tightened and focused on an exchange rate target (the
so-called “hard-drachma policy"). As we can see in Fig. 2.6 Greek inflation fell sharply during
the 1990s, reaching comparable average euro-area levels. Furthermore, with the participation of
the drachma into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1998 fiscal and monetary
policies were redefined once more. The government adopted additional budgetary measures, in-
cluding incomes policy and several structural reforms were introduced, such as privatizations in the
banking industry, labor market reforms, and liberalizations in the energy and telecommunications
sectors.
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Figure 2.6: Annual CPI Inflation
As noted earlier, one of the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty was that deficits had to be
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under 3% of GDP. As we can see in Fig. 2.7, deficits improved throughout much of the 1990s.
However, there has been much discussion concerning the deficit in 1999, which was the reference
year used when Greece gained access to the European and Monetary Union of the European Union
in 2000, and whether it was in fact below the 3% rule. The issue was raised by Eurostat, who
refused to validate the data that had been provided by the National Statistical Service of Greece.
The main reasons13 for the dispute were due to a change in the official EU calculation methodology
concerning national and regional accounts (ESA79 to ESA95)14, as well as a temporary change by
the Greek government in the way military expenses were recorded. An internal financial audit
conducted by the Greek government (New Democracy) in 2004 showed that indeed the deficit
numbers were below the 3% rule when using the old ESA79 methodology that was in place at the
time Greece and all other euro-zone members applied for entry. Under the ESA95 methodology
however, the deficit would have been slightly above the 3% limit, with Greece not being the only
country exceeding the 3% rule.
As mentioned earlier, Greece had met the Maastricht criteria, and thus qualified to join the euro
in 2000; one year after the original introduction of the common currency. However, it took another
year for Greece to actually be admitted (January 2001) 15. As we have seen earlier, Greece’s
national currency, the drachma, was subject to high rates of inflation. The adoption of the new
currency provided stability and confidence since it was backed by the European Central Bank.
Consequently, Greece was able to borrow at much lower rates in financial markets. As a result,
yields on Greek government bonds converged to the yields of other sovereigns that were part of
the euro-zone. Did financial markets all of a sudden dismiss their concerns regarding the Greek
economy and its rather unstable economic past? This is a question that has no easy answers and it
13For a detailed exposition on the revisions and for more background see “Report by Eurostat on the Revision of the
Greek Government Deficit and Debt Figures" 2004, and OECD Economic Surveys, Report on Greece 2005, pp. 44-50
14The ESA methodology for reporting national and regional accounts is adjusted periodically to reflect changes that
in the general economic environment. The adaptation in the way in which macroeconomic statistics are compiled and
Eurostat’s methodology is similar to the one used by the United Nations Statistical Commission (System of National
Accounts, or SNA). The current ESA methodology is the ESA 2010 which is in line with the 2008 SNA
15Euro coins and notes replaced all national currencies (12 at that time) in January 2002.
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Figure 2.7: General government deficit as a % of GDP (1988 - 2001)
is both relevant and of much interest. Looking at Fig. 2.8, we can see that after 2001 and up until
the Great Recession of 2008-09, Greek and German sovereign yields were almost the same. This
would imply that the sovereign credit risk of Greece and Germany were practically the same. Few
people today would agree that this was true. At that time, however, financial markets seemed to
think that the two countries had similar, if not identical, sovereign risk.
Greece certainly benefited from joining the common currency. Although recently another point
of debate–heated perhaps–is whether the prosperity that followed by adopting the common cur-
rency was real or fictional, most people would agree that at least for a number of years the benefits
exceeded the costs. And in fact, any negative consequences that might have come as a result of
giving up the drachma and monetary independence have to do more with Greece’s deep-rooted
structural problems, inefficiencies, and the lack of political will to correct them, and less with the
adoption of the euro per se. This is evidenced in Fig. 2.9. Greek quarterly GDP growth accelerated
in the years after it joined the common currency union. More specifically, between 1996 and 2006,
quarterly economic growth increased by an average of 3.9% compared to the previous year16. Du-
16Annualized rate
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Figure 2.8: Yields on 10YR government bonds (1993 - 2008)
ring the same period, the euro-zone as a whole grew at about 2.2%. Moreover, living standards
improved significantly. Real GDP per capita increased frome15,000 in 1995 toe22,000 in 200617
or by 47% (see Fig. 2.10).
Unfortunately, however, some other numbers also increased. Only these ones were not for
the best. I am of course referring to government finances, which worsened. All of the efforts
that Greece has made to improve its finances and bring down the deficits in order to join the
euro, seemed to phase-out and eventually deteriorate as we can see in Fig. 2.11, especially after
2002. While Fig. 2.11 gives us an aggregate picture of the problem, it is useful to examine the
government’s budget in more detail. In Fig. 2.12 we see the evolution of the main aggregates of
the general government. We can see that the general government’s total expenditures (i.e. including
interest) have been above total revenues for the entire period shown. Moreover, in 2000 primary
expenditures surpassed revenues and have been higher than revenues up until recently. It is also
worth noticing the upward trend of both primary and total expenditures after the late 1990s, while
17Per capita figures in 2010 Euros
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Figure 2.9: Quarterly real GDP growth rate (1996 - 2006)
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Figure 2.10: Real GDP/capita (1995 - 2006)
revenues remained relatively flat. Fig. 2.13 and Fig. 2.14 present the main revenue sources for the
general government (as a % of GDP and in billions of euros respectively). The main interesting
feature of the revenue figures is the low contribution to the overall revenue from taxes on income
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Figure 2.11: General government deficit as a % of GDP (1990-2008)
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
Revenue
Total Expenditure
 Primary Expenditure
Figure 2.12: Main aggregates of General Government as % of GDP
and property, compared to the taxes on production and from social contributions. Also, note how
closely taxes series follow total revenues. In fact, from 1995 to 2008 the overall contribution of
taxes to the revenues of the general government averaged 52.5%. In Fig. 2.15 and Fig.2.16 we
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Figure 2.13: Revenue of General Government as % of GDP
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Figure 2.14: Revenue of General Government (in bil. e)
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see the breakdown of expenditures of the general government (as a % of GDP and in billions of
euros respectively). We can see the upward trend in social benefits and their large share in primary
expenditures. Moreover, compensation of employees as a share of GDP remained relatively flat
in the period shown, together with intermediate consumption (i.e. goods and services). The large
spike in 2013 of capital transfers is due to the amounts that were transferred to financial institutions,
more specifically the four large systemic banks (National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank, Piraeus
Bank, and Eurobank Egrasias). These capital transfers were carried out by the Hellenic Financial
Stability Fund (HFSF), a Greek special purpose vehicle that was established in July 2010 as a state-
owned private legal entity. The HFSF is funded by the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF)
with the purpose of maintaining the stability of the Greek banking system. The capital transfers
during the year of 2013 were divided between banks’ recapitalizations, share capital increases, and
resolution cases following the merger of ten Greek banks into the four systemic banks mentioned
above.
Finally, Fig. 2.17 shows the primary and overall balance of the general government, while Table
2.1 and Table 2.2 present the data in detail.
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Figure 2.15: Expenditure of General Government as % of GDP
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Figure 2.17: Primary balance and overall balance of General Government as % of GDP
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Table 2.1: Main aggregates of general government, 1995-2004 (as percentage of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Revenue 36.3 36.9 37.6 38.9 40.4 42.4 40.5 39.8 38.8 38.8
Taxes on production and imports, receivable 12.3 12.6 12.7 12.4 13.0 13.1 12.7 12.8 12.1 11.6
Taxes on income and property, receivable 6.6 6.4 7.1 8.5 8.9 9.8 8.6 8.9 8.1 8.1
Social contributions 10.4 10.4 10.6 10.8 11.0 11.6 11.7 12.6 12.5 12.1
Other current revenue 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.9 4.7 4.7 5.5
Capital transfers, receivable 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.9 1.6 0.8 1.4 1.6
Total expenditure 46.0 45.1 43.7 45.1 46.2 46.4 46.0 45.8 46.6 47.6
Primary expenditure 35.3 34.8 35.4 37.5 38.6 39.6 39.7 40.2 41.7 42.8
Compensation of employees 10.2 9.6 10.3 10.2 10.3 10.5 10.4 10.9 10.6 11.3
Social benefits 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.3 13.8 14.5 14.9 14.9 15.5 15.1
Goods & services 5.3 5.5 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.3 6.0 5.7 5.9 6.4
Subsidies, payable 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Other current transfers, payable 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.6 2.0
Capital transfers, payable 4.8 4.6 5.6 7.0 7.3 7.6 6.9 7.2 8.0 8.0
Interest payments 10.7 10.3 8.3 7.7 7.6 6.9 6.3 5.6 4.9 4.8
Primary balance (excluding interest) 1.0 2.1 2.3 1.4 1.8 2.8 0.8 -0.5 -2.9 -4.0
Overall balance -9.7 -8.2 -6.1 -6.3 -5.8 -4.1 -5.5 -6.0 -7.8 -8.8
a Source: The Greek Economy, ELSTAT, various issues and OECD Economic Outlook, various issues
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Table 2.2: Main aggregates of general government, 2005-2014 (as percentage of GDP) cont.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Revenue 39.4 39.2 40.4 40.6 38.9 41.3 44.0 46.3 48.3 46.4
Taxes on production and imports, receivable 11.9 12.2 12.6 12.6 11.7 12.6 13.5 13.5 14.1 15.6
Taxes on income and property, receivable 9.0 8.3 8.3 8.1 8.5 8.3 9.2 10.8 10.5 9.7
Social contributions 12.3 11.9 12.4 12.7 12.4 13.1 13.2 13.8 13.5 13.4
Other current revenue 4.4 4.3 4.7 5.1 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.6 6.7 5.3
Capital transfers, receivable 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.2 1.4 2.1 2.6 2.6 3.5 2.3
Total expenditure 45.6 45.1 47.1 50.8 54.1 52.5 54.2 55.2 60.8 49.9
Primary expenditure 40.9 40.7 42.6 46.0 49.0 46.6 47 50.1 56.7 46.0
Compensation of employees 11.4 11.0 11.1 11.6 13.1 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.1 12.1
Social benefits 16.0 16.5 17.2 18.9 20.6 21.0 23.0 23.2 21.5 21.6
Goods & services 5.9 6.3 6.7 6.2 6.7 6.1 4.9 5.1 4.7 4.6
Subsidies, payable 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.9
Other current transfers, payable 2.1 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.0
Capital transfers, payable 5.4 5.2 5.7 7.3 6.6 5.1 4.3 6.9 15.6 4.8
Interest payments 4.7 4.4 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.9 7.3 5.1 4.0 3.9
Primary balance (excluding interest) -1.5 -1.5 -2.2 -5.4 -10.1 -5.4 -3.0 -3.7 -8.4 0.4
Overall balance -6.2 -5.9 -6.7 -10.2 -15.2 -11.2 -10.2 -8.8 -12.4 -3.6
a Source: The Greek Economy, ELSTAT, various issues and OECD Economic Outlook, various issues
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Before proceeding to the next section there are a few final points that are worth summarizing.
First, for the period from 1994 to 1999 it is important to note that the composition of fiscal con-
solidation was not ideal. While, as we have seen, deficits did decline, the consolidation was based
mostly on tax increases and falling interest payments, while at the same time primary expenditures
increased. Moreover, a major issue was that Greece entered the European Monetary Union with a
serious drawback: its debt to GDP ratio, although it had been stabilized, it was over 100% of GDP.
Second, the period from 2000 to 2004 was the first phase of euro participation, which inevitably
led to more lose monetary policy, including lower interest rates (as we have seen), the easing or
elimination of credit restrictions, and a drop in the reserve requirement. During this phase fiscal
policy instead of counterbalancing the fixed monetary stance, was progressively relaxed as well,
with tax reductions behind the revenue shortfalls and primary expenditure increased behind the
total expenditure overruns18. As a result, the primary surplus turned into a deficit in 2002, marking
the start of a significant deterioration both for the primary as well as the overall balance. These
adverse effects were not offset by the positive developments in economic activity, such as lower
inflation, low interest rates and higher GDP growth fueled by higher investment and consumption
growth. Thus, during the 2000-2004 period the debt to GDP ratio remained relatively flat. The
final outcome of this period was that Greece became subjected to the Excessive Deficit Procedure
(EDP)19 in May 2005, shortly after the Greek elections that were won by ND. Finally, given that
the EDP was initiated fiscal policy was in a sense predetermined. The government of ND had to
cut down the deficit at 3% of GDP by the end of 2006. Unfortunately, however the measures that
the government took to curb expenditures were not enough, and even though the deficit appeared
to be below the 3% limit by end of 2006, later revisions proved otherwise. In fact, the fiscal me-
asures deteriorated even further in 2007. But based on the figures reported initially, the EDP was
terminated, which raises some questions regarding the European Union’s and Eurostat’s degree of
18The expenditure overruns were also partly due to the Olympic Games of 2004, which were held in Athens
19EDP is the European Union’s detailed outline for the correction of excessive deficit (over 3% of GDP) or debt
levels (over 60% of GDP)
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responsibility in monitoring and verifying fiscal policy and fiscal data.
2.4 The Greek economy during the late 2000s and up until
early 2016
During the period leading to the financial crisis of 2008-09, Greek debt levels were relatively
high in line with the high deficit levels that were mentioned before. In addition, GDP growth
started to show the first signs of a slow-down. The overall heightened anxiety in financial markets
during that period also attracted investors’ attention to Greece, especially after the elections of 2009
which brought PASOK into power.20 The newly elect President George Papandreou revealed that
the actual deficit was over two times higher than the one that had been reported by the previous
government of New Democracy (ND) (12.6% vs. 6% of GDP). There were three main reasons
for the revision: 1) the GDP growth rate was also revised downward during that year, 2) the
adjustment for social security funds, and 3) the addition of data figures from a number of public
sector enterprises into the general government budget. This had a direct impact on Greek sovereign
yields as we can see in Fig. 2.18, which returned to pre-euro-zone entry levels. Clearly, Greek and
German debt were no longer considered to bear the same credit risk.
The period after the revelation of the revised deficit numbers (2009) and up until today is
characterized by constant efforts, negotiations, conflicts and tension between the European Com-
mission, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the several Greek go-
vernments that have come into power. The first period of negotiations led to Greece’s first bailout
package in May 2010. The Greek government promised to impose severe austerity measures (pen-
sion cuts, reduction of the public sector and reductions in public sector wages, higher taxes etc.)
in exchange for a e110 billion ($145 billion) loan. Unfortunately, these contractionary measures
had a negative effect on the Greek economy making the situation even worse. Greece received its
20PASOK came to power on October 6, 2009.
CHAPTER 2. THE GREEK SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS 76
0%
4%
8%
12%
16%
20%
24%
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Germany Greece
Figure 2.18: Yields on 10YR government bonds (1993-2015)
second bailout package of e240 billion in March 2012, which also did not prove enough to lift the
economy out of the recession. The recession, one the worst in Europe since the Great Depression,
has cut the size of the Greek economy by roughly 25% (see Fig. 2.19). Unemployment reached
an all time high since 1993 at over 25%, far higher than almost all other member states21 and
unfortunately with no credible signs of dropping to normal levels (see Fig. 2.20).
At the same time, the country’s overall debt load has deteriorated. This of course comes at
no surprise. Even though the two bailouts reduced the debt service burden, the drop was only
temporary and the key debt-to-GDP ratio continued to increase as GDP collapsed. Evidently this
makes the situation even worse as it becomes harder for pay off (see Fig. 2.21). With the Greek
economy declining approximately 25%, the unemployment level surging, steep pension and public
sector wage cuts, higher taxes in almost every single aspect of economic activity, and general
social and political unrest, while not achieving debt sustainability, it is reasonable to expect some
21The only member country that comes close is Spain with an unemployment rate of 22.3% in 2015. For comparison
purposes, the average unemployment rate in the 2009-2015 period was 20.5% in Greece, 22.4% in Spain, and 13.5%
in Portugal.
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Figure 2.20: Unemployment rate (1993 - 2015)
doubts regarding the effectiveness of the policies that the Troika (i.e. the European Commission,
the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) followed in the Greek case.
Throughout this period the Greeks have been asked to exercise their right to vote several times,
which as one would expect led to increased uncertainty and did little to calm financial markets. In
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January 2015, Greeks for the first time since the end of the military dictatorship and the end of the
civil war, gave power to a left-leaning party “SYRIZA” (Coalition of Radical Left), which formed
a coalition with the right party of “Independent Greeks” (“ANEL").22 The new government was
led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, with the hopes that Greece would be able to re-negotiate
and end the austerity measures that the new government believed led to the worst of its recession.
Unfortunately for Greeks, these negotiations were not as successful as the new government had
envisioned and the new deal with creditors that eventually materialized was hardly better than the
old deal. Instead, it led to a number of complications with severe negative effects for the Greek
economy, that are discussed next.
A first example was a slow motion run on Greek banks (see Fig. 2.22). And being a part of
the Eurosystem, this implied that Greek banks became increasingly reliant on funding from the
European Central Bank (see Fig. 2.23). The sharp rise in total liabilities during 2012 and 2015,
and the fall in 2014 largely reflect changes in the use of the emergency liquidity facility (ELA).
The ELA is a special type of loan facility that is provided by a national central bank (the Bank of
22The SYRIZA/ANEL government came into power on January 26, 2016.
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Greece in this case) of the Eurosystem to solvent financial institutions that face temporary liquidity
constraints. The European Central Bank’s (ECB) Governing Council sets the limit and imposes
any restrictions that may have an adverse effect on ECB’s policy. Liquidity through ELA is rather
costly, with rates much higher than regular ECB financing (typically 1.55% vs 0.05% in the case of
Greece23), but financial institutions that do not have adequate collateral for regular ECB financing
turn to this emergency facility, with the national central bank essentially acting as the “lender of
last resort".
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Figure 2.22: Deposits in Greek banks (EUR millions)
Another negative impact occurred during the summer of 2015 when the situation became even
worse for Greek banks and consequently for the rest of the economy and Greek citizens. The Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) ceased funding abruptly after Greek leadership called for a referendum
on whether the country should accept the bailout terms of its international creditors. Much has been
said regarding this referendum, from whether or not it violated the Greek constitution to whether
23The 1.55% is the rate that banks face for cash they receive from the ELA. There is an even more costly form of
ELA funding, when it is backed by issues guaranteed by the Greek state. In this case, banks pay an additional 1.15%
on the nominal value of the bonds they post as collateral that are then subject to significant haircuts. Thus, the most
expensive portion of ELA funding can go beyond 3.5%.
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Figure 2.23: Liabilities of Greek banks (EUR millions)
the question being asked was in fact valid.24 Moreover, following the end of the funding from the
ECB, the Greek government had to impose capital controls and a bank holiday, causing serious
social and political unrest right in the middle of the summer–Greece’s strongest season for its most
profitable sector–tourism. The capital controls, which are expected to be lifted by mid-2016, also
caused serious disruptions in imports and retail sales.
The Greeks voted “No” to the bailout terms with 61.31%, but with a voter turnout of slightly
more than 60%. Some percentage of those who voted “No” were in favor of the country leaving
the euro altogether. The majority of the “No” supporters however believed that the left-leaning
government would truly be able to re-negotiate with the creditors in better terms. Unfortunately,
this did not happen. And after several weeks of strenuous negotiations, a rather hostile climate,
and unprecedented uncertainty, a new package was drafted with even harsher terms. Since then the
Greek economy has been trying to absorb these new measures and come to terms with the fact that
political rhetoric, especially pre-election, hardly agrees with economic reality.
24Greece’s creditors argued that the referendum had in fact no value since the proposal and its terms were no longer
on the table when Greeks actually voted.
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To further illustrate the adverse effects of the re-negotiations and the new deal of the SYRIZA-
ANEL government it is helpful to look at some of the key macroeconomic indicators. Generally,
the first three quarters of 2015 were characterized by a strong deterioration of the economic climate
in Greece (see Fig. 2.24).
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Figure 2.24: Eurostat’s Economic Sentiment Indicator
Moreover, during the first half of 2015 GDP growth slowed down, while in the third quarter of
2015 the Greek economy returned to recessionary conditions, after the brief and anemic period of
growth it had experienced in 2014. Table 2.3 summarizes the main macroeconomic developments
during the past two years, and Table 2.4 those of the general government. The most important
factor behind the negative effect on GDP growth during the third and fourth quarters of 2015 is the
adverse development in domestic demand from 0.8% in the second quarter of 2015 to -2% in the
third quarter25. The bank holiday and the imposition of the capital controls are largely responsible
for the drop in domestic demand, as well as the sharp decline in fixed capital formation (from
2.9% in 2015Q3 to -11.4% in 2015Q3) and private consumption (from 0.7% in 2015Q3 to -0.3%
in 2015Q3). In addition, the upward trend in exports was reversed considerably, while imports de-
25% rate of change vis-a-vis the same quarter of the previous year.
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teriorated further, both due to the disruption in the domestic banking system. Overall, the positive
contribution to the rate of change of the GDP from the decline in imports was significantly higher
than the corresponding negative contribution from the drop in exports. The overall contribution of
the external sector to the rate of change of the GDP was strongly positive (3.3%), which played a
crucial role in reducing the intensity of the recession. The final point that deserves attention is the
change in inventories, which played a crucial role in the negative rate of change of the real GDP in
the 2015Q3. Once again the capital controls and the bank holiday were to blame. Since the smooth
flow of imports was heavily disrupted, the demand for imported goods and raw materials had to
be covered by the amount of stocks. Therefore, the contribution of the change in stocks to the rate
of change of the real GDP in the third quarter of 2015 was considerably negative. Fig. 2.25 shows
the contribution to the real GDP growth rate of its main components, and summarizes the previous
discussion.
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During the final quarter of 2015 as evidenced in Fig. 2.24, Fig. 2.25, and Table 2.3 there were
some gradual signs of recovery. However, it is rather unlikely that the economy will return to
positive real GDP growth rates during 2016. On the positive side, it appears that the uncertainty
regarding the country’s economic performance as well as its place within Europe has subsided
considerably. At the same time, and despite the relative stability, the domestic economic climate
remains rather fragile given the necessary structural adjustments that need to be implemented gra-
dually and in several pillars of economic activity, with the reform of pension system and social
security funds being the most critical. Finally, the recent geopolitical developments and the refu-
gee crisis, and their addressing pose a significant challenge for Greece.
In this chapter I tried to give a brief overview of the main developments in the Greek economy
after WWII in an attempt to find the root-causes of Greece’s ongoing sovereign debt crisis. Po-
litics and more specifically the fiscal policies that were followed during this period by all ruling
parties (albeit to varying extends) together with the accommodative monetary policies have played
a dramatic role in the magnitude of the problem. Table 2.5 lists the election year, the incoming
party(ies) and the Prime Minister, while Fig. 2.26 presents the general government’s deficit (as a
% of GDP) against election years. A graph which could serve as a rather good example of the
political business cycle. With the exception of 1996 and perhaps marginally 2000, all the other
election years are accompanied by a deterioration of the deficit.
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Table 2.3: Main macroeconomic indicatorsa
2014Q1 2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4
Private Consumption 1.1 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.7 1.7 -0.3 -0.9
Public Consumption 0.4 1.9 -3.5 -8.1 0.4 -1.5 -2 2.8
Gross fixed capital formation -9.1 -7.7 2.9 3.7 9.9 0.1 -11.4 5.7
Domestic demandb -0.2 -0.4 0.1 -0.8 1.6 0.8 -2 0.6
Exports of goods and services 5.1 4.7 9.2 10.5 3.3 1.5 -10.3 -8.8
Exports of goods 1.6 -0.6 2.3 11.2 5.8 2.1 1.7 3.3
Exports of services 10.9 11.5 16.6 10.2 1.1 0.4 -23.5 -20.9
Imports of goods and services -0.2 9.7 6 16.2 9.3 -3.3 -19.8 -12.5
Imports of goods -0.8 10.5 6.8 17.7 8.6 -4 -16.4 -10.4
Imports of services 2.7 6.3 2.2 9.5 12.1 -0.5 -33.5 -21.6
Balance of goods and services -45.5 83.2 -28.2 129.8 107.9 -43.5 -173.4 -48.6
GDP 0.4 0.2 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 -1.7 -0.8
a % rates of change compared to the corresponding quarter of the previous year (seasonally adjusted data at constant prices)
b Domestic demand is the sum of private consumption, public consumption, and gross fixed capital formation
c Source: National Accounts, ELSTAT (February 2016), own calculations
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Table 2.4: Main aggregates of general government, 2015 (as percentage of GDP)
2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3
Revenue 41.9 43.8 42.7
Taxes on production and imports, receivable 13.6 13.5 14.1
Taxes on income and property, receivable 8.0 11.9 9.4
Social contributions 14.1 12.6 13.8
Other current revenue 1.3 1.2 0.4
Capital transfers, receivable 4.9 4.6 5.1
Total expenditure 51.8 47.8 44.0
Primary expenditure 47.6 43.9 40.6
Compensation of employees 12.9 11.9 11.3
Social benefits 23.5 21.7 20.8
Goods & services 3.6 3.8 3.7
Subsidies, payable 0.7 1.0 0.9
Other current transfers, payable 2.5 1.2 1.1
Capital transfers, payable 4.3 4.2 2.8
Interest payments 4.2 3.9 3.4
Primary balance (excluding interest) -5.7 -0.1 2.1
Overall balance -9.9 -4.0 -1.3
a Source: The Greek Economy, ELSTAT (April, 15 2016)
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Table 2.5: Elections and governing parties: 1974-2015
Election Year Incoming Government Prime Minister
1974 (Nov) ND Konstantinos G. Karamanlis
1977 (Nov) ND Konstantinos G. Karamanlis
1981 (Oct) PASOK Andreas Papandreou
1985 (Jun) PASOK Andreas Papandreou
1989 (Jun) ND in Coalition with KKEaand EARb Tzannis Tzannetakis
1989 (Nov) National Unityc Xenophon Zolotas
1990 (Apr) ND Konstantinos Mitsotakis
1993 (Oct) PASOK Andreas Papandreou
1996 (Sep) PASOK Konstantinos Simitis
2000 (Mar) PASOK Konstantinos Simitis
2004 (Mar) ND Konstantinos A. Karamanlis
2007 (Sep) ND Konstantinos A. Karamanlis
2009 (Oct) PASOK George A. Papandreou
2012 (Jun) ND in Coalition with PASOK and DIMARd Antonis Samaras
2015 (Jan) SYRIZA in Coalition with ANEL and OPe Alexis Tsiprasf
2015 (Sep) SYRIZA in Coalition with ANEL and OP Alexis Tsipras
a Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and Greek Left (EAR). This coalition was also known as Synaspismos,
or Alliance of the Left and Progress.
b Supported by ND, PASOK, and the Coalition of the Left and Progress (KKE and EAR)
c In November 11, 2011 George A. Papandreou stepped down to allow the creation of a national unity
government in response to the debt crisis. The new coalition government of PASOK, ND, and Popular
Orthodox Rally (LAOS) was led by Lucas Papademos and lasted from November 2011 to May 2012 when
it failed. In May 2012 Panagiotis Pikrammenos was assigned head of caretaker government in order to lead
the country to the polls in June, 20 2012.
d Democratic Left (DIMAR)
e Ecologists Greens (OP)
f From August 27, 2015 to September 21, 2015 Vassiliki Thanou was assigned head of caretaker government
in order to lead the country to the elections of September 21, 2015 after Tsipras resigned due to
disagreements within SYRIZA concerning the bailout program.
Chapter 3
Fiscal sustainability in Greece: Evidence
from 1970 - 2015
3.1 Introduction
Ever since the Greek government debt crisis started in late 2009, the question of whether the
country’s debt is sustainable has been in the center of media and public attention, and has been a
subject of debate among economists and policy makers both within as well as outside the country.
Greece’s debt sustainability was once again in the forefront in relation to a Eurogroup1 meeting
on May, 24 2016. The meeting and its outcome were of particular importance to Greece, as the
decision on whether the country would receive the next tranche of financial support was one of the
main topics in the agenda. Greece has been receiving financial support from euro-zone countries
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since May 2010. The support is part of economic
adjustment programs, which include several measures aimed in correcting fiscal imbalances and
structural deficiencies. A discussion on Greece’s debt sustainability and the economy’s prospects
would be incomplete without a review of the economic adjustment programs. Moreover, under-
1The term Eurogroup refers to the informal meetings of the euro area finance ministers.
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standing the key features of these programs is in fact a necessary step if one wishes to examine
the sustainability of the debt. I briefly discuss next the main elements of the three economic ad-
justment programs that Greece has adopted and the economic developments that have taken place
during the corresponding period.2
The first economic adjustment program was agreed on May 2, 2010 between the Greek go-
vernment, euro area members and the IMF. Under the agreement Greece would receive a total C80
billion during a three year period, from May 2010 through June 2013. The interest rate was set
initially at 4.5% and the repayment period to 7 years. The amount would come in the form of
bilateral loans provided by the other euro area states, which was termed the “Greek Loan Facility”
(GLF). In addition, the IMF agreed to provide an extra C30 billion in the form of a Stand-By
arrangement (SBA). 3 The loans would be disbursed in installments to the Greek government con-
ditional on the latter putting forth a number of austerity measures and implementing widespread
structural reforms. The structural reforms aimed in increasing competitiveness and making the
Greek economy more open. For example, with respect to labor market the Greek government
would need to take steps to decrease union power and liberalize regulated professions. Reforms
in product markets included the breaking down of state monopolies and the privatization of state
assets. Moreover, reducing bureaucracy and tax evasion through a thorough modernization of pu-
blic sector administration was deemed necessary, as was the close monitoring on the reporting of
official fiscal statistics. The fiscal reforms and austerity measures were broken down in two fronts:
sizeable reductions in public sector spending by reducing public sector wages and lowering pensi-
ons, and increases in direct and indirect taxes by increasing tax rates and imposing new taxes on
real estate and other sources of wealth. The size and type of the austerity measures were set in
accordance to achieving certain target debt-to-GDP ratios in the coming years. Those target levels
were determined so as to ensure Greek debt sustainability and for Greece to regain access to capital
2Greece is currently on its third economic adjustment program.
3The Stand-By arrangement is one of the most widely used lending instruments of the IMF. More details can be
found at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sba.htm.
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markets. They were set according to IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) that was based on
a number of assumptions such as growth rates, revenues from taxes and privatizations, and public
spending cuts to determine the appropriate primary surpluses that had to be achieved each year
so as to attain the target debt-to-GDP levels. The compliance of the Greek authorities regarding
the implementation of the austerity measures and the structural reforms, would be reviewed by
officials assigned by the so-called “Troika” - comprising the European Commission, the European
Central Bank, and the IMF.
Unfortunately, the first program was not as successful as was initially anticipated. Partly due
to the overly ambitious objectives that were assumed, partly because the inevitable recession that
followed was much deeper than initially thought, and partly due to the political instability, social
unrest, and administrative problems, Greece did not make the progress that was needed and mis-
sed several important fiscal targets. This eventually led to the adoption of the second economic
adjustment program, whose financing was approved on March 14, 2012. The new program would
disburse the amount pending from the first program (approximately C34.5 billion) plus an additio-
nal C130 billion for the years 2012 to 2014. The financing of the second bailout package differed
from that of the first in several important ways. It was agreed that instead of using bilateral loans,
the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) would provide a new aid package totaling C100 bil-
lion with a repayment period of 15 years and an interest rate of 3.5%. The EFSF was established
in May 2010 as a special purpose vehicle in order to address the overall European sovereign debt
crisis and guarantee the stability of the financial system and the common currency. Moreover, a
feature of the second program that was absent from the first was the participation of the private
sector in financing the remaining C30 billion. More specifically, the private sector involvement
(PSI) entailed a 53.5% reduction in the nominal face value of Greek sovereign bonds held by pri-
vate investors, aimed to bring down Greece’s debt, making this the biggest debt restructuring in
history. This new rescue package for Greece was comprised of several layers of conditionality that
extended or reinforced those of the first program. These layers can be broadly summarized into
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four main areas: 1) the detailed timeline of a set of “prior actions” that would need to be completed
before disbursement of the first loan tranche; 2) the establishment of a special segregated account
to prioritize debt payments; 3) the tighter surveillance of the fiscal austerity program and the imple-
mentation of structural reforms; and 4) the strict implementation of the agreed privatization plan.
The set of “prior actions” included, among others: 1) additional fiscal measures to compensate for
slippages in previous budgets (worth approximately C3.2 billion or 1.5% of GDP); 2) measures to
enhance wage flexibility with the goal of further reducing labor costs and increase competitiveness;
3) actions aiming to downsize the public sector and improve government efficiency; 4) additional
steps to fully liberalize a range of closed professions; and 5) the recapitalization of the domestic
banking system after the Private Sector Involvement (PSI).
But things did not go as smoothly as planned yet again and the final review of the second
program pointed to important financing gaps. By the end of 2014 and despite a brief period of
economic improvement, the Greek economy slipped back into a recession which marked a new
period of political uncertainty and social unrest and the derailment of the second bailout program.
On January 2015, the newly elect government led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras entered a
long and strenuous period of negotiations with the Troika. The outcome of these negotiations was
the agreement on a third macroeconomic adjustment program for Greece, which was finalized in
August of 2015, but with various revisions up until today. The third program is set to run until
August 2018, with quarterly updates on its conditionality taking into account the progress achie-
ved. Under the new agreement Greece will receive up to C86 billion, which will be used for debt
servicing needs, bank recapitalization, budget financing and arrears clearance. The European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM) that has replaced the EFSF could, in principle, fully finance the program
if needed. However, the amount that the ESM will end up providing will depend broadly on whet-
her the IMF decides to participate in the third program and whether Greece will be able to access
capital markets during the duration of the program. Once again, the program reform agenda is
centered around four pillars: 1) restoring fiscal sustainability; 2) safeguarding financial stability;
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3) enhancing growth, competitiveness and investment; and 4) modernizing the state and public
administration.
It is worth going over some of the main points of the third program since it is currently into
effect. Included in the set of prior actions is a set of 18 key deliverables, notably: 1) a package of
fiscal austerity measures amounting to 3% of GDP to help reach a primary surplus target of 3.5%
of GDP in 2018; 2) fiscal contingency mechanism in the spirit of a balanced budget, that will be
activated if annual government accounts show deviations from the agreed primary surplus targets
of the previous years, 3) the establishment of a new Privatization Fund to manage revenues from
privatizations; 4) the finalization of the Non-Performing Loans (NPL) framework; and 5) the full
independence of the General Secretariat of Public Revenues. The main fiscal austerity measures
include a major social security pension reform, an overhaul of the pension income tax, an increase
in the top VAT tax from 23% to 24% and tax increases on gas and related fuels as well as increases
on cigarettes and tobacco products. As for the primary surplus targets, according to the program
those are as follows: 0.5% of GDP in 2016, 1.75% of GDP in 2017 and 3.5% of GDP thereafter.
These targets, as in the previous programs, are derived from the European Commission’s DSA,
and again are based in a number of assumptions such as the GDP growth rate of the economy. The
insistence on achieving primary surpluses is because those are essential for the sustainability of
Greek public debt in the years to come.
3.2 Statement of the problem
I believe that it is hard to argue against the statement that Greece’s debt sustainability pre-
sents an interesting case. Ever since the adoption of the first economic adjustment program there
have been numerous debt sustainability analyses and several projections regarding Greece’s future
macroeconomic performance, not all of which seemed to reach the same conclusion regarding sus-
tainability. Most notable is perhaps the recent disagreement between the European Commission
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and the IMF, which led the latter not willing to commit (at least at the beginning) to participate in
the funding of the third economic adjustment program for Greece.
The European Commission (EC) and the IMF examine sustainability prospectively in the sense
that sustainability is assessed by considering what types of policies should be implemented today
in order to eliminate the need for further future adjustments in the primary surplus and ensure
that the level of the debt (or debt-to-GDP ratio) is stable. Typically, the prospective analysis is
implemented using an accounting rather than an econometric framework. Both the EC and the
IMF use sensitivity and scenario analysis as well as stress tests to examine the fiscal adjustment
under time horizons. Debt sustainability and deficit adjustment is thus examined after considering
the impact of exogenous shocks on key variables such as economic growth, interest rates, debt
restructuring or deficit reduction and financial market pressure.
Fiscal sustainability can also be assessed retrospectively by examining whether a continuation
of past policies into the future would ensure the sustainability of fiscal policy, or whether a mo-
dification would be required to achieve sustainability. The retrospective approach, which is the
one I follow in this paper, is implemented using an econometric framework by utilizing historical
data. While the prospective approach might be more relevant for policy makers, I feel that the
retrospective approach using time series econometric techniques can yield valuable insights and
should be examined more thoroughly. Moreover, given that in the case of Greece the prospective
approaches of the EC and the IMF have not always been in agreement with each other4, I believe
that the use of a retrospective framework might offer a more insightful analysis.
4Often, subsequent updates to the DSA’s of both the IMF and the EC reached different conclusions from the ones
of earlier DSA versions with respect to what type of actions should be undertaken to ensure sustainability. Uncertainty
regarding future projections on growth, progress and implementation of austerity and structural measures, and the
reaction of market participants are among the main reasons for these differences.
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3.2.1 Motivation
Besides wanting to investigate the issue of fiscal sustainability in Greece using a retrospective
framework, my motivation for this paper is driven by two other main forces. The first one is
more general in nature and focuses on debt sustainability as it relates to economic policy. More
specifically, debt sustainability has important implications on a nation’s fiscal policy, such as tax
and incomes policy, the pension system and public spending on healthcare and infrastructure,
which in turn affect economic growth. These policies also influence the interaction between the
public and private sectors and have intergenerational effects. To this end, my paper aims to revisit
the issue of whether Greece’s public debt is sustainable amidst all the current hype surrounding it.
The second driving force is more practical in the sense that it relates to the methodology and
the data I use. As I discuss in the literature review, previous studies on the sustainability of Greek
public debt are either not recent enough and thus do not cover the ongoing fiscal crisis, or in the few
instances in which they do, the evidence is contradictory. My data spans the period from 1970 to
2015, which for fiscal variables is rather long. Moreover, I use a single source in order to minimize
data discrepancies and achieve consistency as much as possible. While the use of a single source
cannot rule out the existence of inconsistencies, I believe that it is an improvement compared to
using several different sources. In addition, previous studies on Greek debt sustainability, recent
or not, do not reach the same conclusion. Finally, while my empirical methodology is not novel, it
combines several econometric techniques not all of which are present together in previous studies.
3.2.2 Stylized facts
Before proceeding to examine the fiscal sustainability hypothesis, a visual inspection and de-
piction of the series is constructive. Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2 show the evolution of government debt in
billions of national currency 5 and as a % of GDP respectively. It is clear that there is an upward
5The national currency of Greece was the Greek Drachma up until 2000, when it was replaced by the euro.
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trend in both the debt level in absolute terms and in the debt-to-GDP ratio. We can divide the trajec-
tory of the debt-to-GDP ratio into six main sub-periods. The first one starts from the beginning of
my sample and ends around the late 1970s. The second period starts in the beginning of the 1980s
and ends around 1993. The third one covers the years 1994-1999, while the fourth period contains
the years from 2000 to 2004. The fifth period starts in 2005 and lasts until 2009, and the sixth and
last period is from 2009 and up to present. I next briefly highlight the main macroeconomic and
fiscal developments in these periods.
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Figure 3.1: General government consolidated gross debt (EUR, billions)
Throughout the 1970s the debt-to-GDP ratio was relatively stable and at low levels, averaging
around 18%. The main reasons for this is that during this period Greece maintained relatively low
fiscal deficits and enjoyed high growth rates. In 1981, the beginning of the second sub-period, the
debt-to GDP ratio rose to 25.5% from 21.5% in 1980. This increase was led by a sharp deterioration
of the general government deficit in 1981. The deficit went from 2.7% of GDP in 1980 to 9.1%
in 1981. The debt-to-GDP ratio continued to rise until 1993 when it reached 95% of GDP. The
rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio during these years can be explained by four main factors. First, there
was a substantial increase in government spending, especially during the early part of the 1980s, as
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Figure 3.2: General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)
the new socialist government elected in 1981 marked the beginning of a period of rising social and
welfare spending. Another reason is the low growth rates during this period, both in Greece as well
as at a global level and substantially high rates of inflation, averaging around 19%. Moreover, the
high interest rate environment that characterizes this period had a negative impact on debt interest
payments, making this the third reason for the higher levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, a
closer look at Fig. 3.3 can help us explain the last reason. The years in which we observe the steep
increases in the deficit numbers (1981, 1985, 1989, 1990, and 1993) are all elections years, where
government spending increased, as evidenced also in Fig. 3.4.
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 set out the rules for euro participation, which in-
cluded among others debt and deficit targets of 60% and 3% of GDP respectively. The Maastricht
Treaty came into force in 1993, which by no coincidence is a year after the beginning of the third
sub-period of the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio. As we can see in Fig. 3.2 there was a first reduction
in the debt-to-GDP ratio in 1994 and were maintained until 1999 . More generally fiscal policy
was tight during this sub-period. The general government deficit declined from 12% in 1993 to 3%
in 1999. On the negative side, interest payments were still considerably high at 10.7% of GDP in
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Figure 3.4: Total general government expenditures and revenues (% of GDP)
1995, but by 1999 they were down to 7.6% as can be seen in Fig. 3.5. The efforts of the government
during this period for fiscal consolidation, in order to ensure participation to the common currency,
were however not as disciplined and thorough as needed. More specifically, consolidation was
mostly based on tax hikes and falling interest payments; thus the composition was not broad ba-
sed. In addition, primary expenditures increased from 36% in 1994 to 39% in 1999. Nevertheless,
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the debt-to-GDP ratio was stabilized, albeit at a rather high point (around 100% of GDP) when
Greece entered the common currency union. The macroeconomic developments during the fourth
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Figure 3.5: Components of general government deficit (% of GDP)
period were generally favorable. Economic activity improved considerably and the average an-
nual growth of real GDP was around 4.6%, while inflation declined significantly and was around
3% (annual rate).6 Monetary policy loosened considerably since Greece became a member of the
euro-zone. Unfortunately, fiscal policy followed the same path with tax cuts and higher primary
expenditures, resulting in revenue shortfalls and expenditure overruns. As a result, the primary sur-
pluses that were previously achieved were initially eliminated and then turned into deficits starting
in 2002. As far as the debt-to-GDP ratio, it remained relatively stable during this period, despite
the high GDP growth rates and the low interest rates. Fiscal magnitudes significantly worsened in
2003 and especially in 2004. More precisely, in March 2004 Greece had parliamentary elections,
shortly after which the Greek authorities notified Eurostat that the deficit in 2003 was higher than
previously reported. From then on Greece had to follow the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)7 of
6The inflation rate was still much higher than the average of other European countries.
7The EDP is initiated when a member state exceeds the 3% and 60% of GDP for deficit and debt respectively. In
this event the European Commission sets a number or recommendations, deadlines, and targets that the member state
must follow in order to correct the deficit and/or debt levels.
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the European Union, and was asked to take corrective measures and eliminate the excessive deficit
by end 2005. The 2004 Olympic Games that were organized in Athens, further complicated the
problem because of fiscal mishaps and revisions regarding public expenditures. The fiscal audit
that took place, both internally from the Greek government as well as from Eurostat, led to several
revisions of the fiscal figures which created uncertainty about the validity of Greece’s finances.
In the start of the fifth period in 2005 Greece was already subjected to the EDP and fiscal policy
was essentially focused around the target of eliminating the excessive deficit by 2006. Authorities
reportedly did bring the deficit down to under 3%. However, as we can see in Fig. 3.3 the true de-
ficit number in 2006 is well above 3%. This is because after the initial reporting there were several
revisions. Despite this, Greece came out of the EDP in 2007, based on the 2006 report. The fis-
cal measures that authorities took to correct the excessive deficit were not sufficient however, and
fiscal conditions worsened once again in the last part of 2007. The macroeconomic and fiscal con-
ditions worsened significantly in 2008. GDP growth entered negative territory while revenues and
expenditures both departed from the targets needed to ensure consolidation. The deficit climbed
from 6.7% in 2007 to 10.2% in 2008, while the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 109% of GDP in 2009.
As the global financial crisis intensified, the spreads on the 10-year Greek government bonds were
negatively affected making the situation even worse.
The final period starts with another parliamentary election in October 2009. As can be seen
in Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4, fiscal magnitudes did not improve, but rather they registered new records.
More specifically, revenues fell from 40.6% of GDP in 2008 to 38.9% in 2009, while expenditures
reached an all-time high, rising from 46% of GDP in 2008 to 49% in 2009. As a result, the deficit
in 2009 climbed to a whopping 15.2% of GDP and the debt-to-GDP ratio reached almost 127%
of GDP. To no surprise, Greece was subjected to the EDP once again in 2009 based on the fiscal
outcomes of 2007 and 2008. It should be noted that the high deficits registered during these years
were structural and not cyclical as the result of the global financial crisis. The corrective measures
under the new EDP led to an improvement in the deficit figure as tax revenues increased and expen-
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ditures were cut. But these measures were seen as insufficient from financial markets and rating
agencies8 who downgraded Greek sovereign bonds. The increased pressure from financial markets
that send spreads on Greek government bonds to record levels and the round of downgrades forced
the Greek government to request official financial assistance by the European Union and the IMF.
This brought the first bailout package in May 2010.
3.3 Background of the Study
For the purposes of the present paper I have deliberately chosen to focus on empirical papers
that have examined fiscal sustainability in Greece, either as a sole case or as part of a group of
countries. In my opinion, Greece being a highly indebted advanced economy renders itself as
rather interesting case. Narrowing the literature review on studies that have previously examined
fiscal sustainability in Greece, facilitates the comparison of the methodologies and the possible
different time spans considered.
3.3.1 Literature review
To the best of my knowledge, the first study that considered public debt sustainability in Greece
(among other countries) was that of Corsetti and Roubini (1991). The authors examine the stati-
onarity of discounted public debt for OECD countries using annual data from 1960 to 1989. In
the case of Greece, 9 the authors find evidence that the Greek public debt is unsustainable. More
specifically, the authors consider four tests of fiscal solvency using the discounted public debt, the
debt-to-GDP ratio and the overall and current balance of the general government.10 Three models
are then considered to test for the stationarity of each of the series that vary depending on whether
8Fitch, S&P and Moody’s all downgraded Greece several times both in 2009 and 2010
9The data for Greece were from 1970 to 1989.
10The overall balance is the real inflation and seigniorage adjusted fiscal balance inclusive of interest payments. The
current balance is the real inflation and seigniorage adjusted fiscal balance inclusive of interest payments but net of
capital formation minus depreciation.
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a positive drift or time trend are considered. The main drawback of their approach is that the tests
do not account for structural breaks.11
Finally, the sustainability requirement examined in Corsetti and Roubini (1991) is known as
“strong form” sustainability and as Quintos (1995) argued, this type of sustainability is not neces-
sary for the IBC to hold in the long run. I discuss the differences between “strong form” and “weak
form” sustainability later in the paper.
Caporale (1995) using annual data for Greece (among other EU countries) from 1960 to 1991
also rejects the sustainability of the Greek government debt. The author adopts a method used to
detect speculative bubbles in financial markets and modifies it to examine whether governments
can engage in bubble finance. As in Corsetti and Roubini (1991), his approach does not account
for the presence of structural breaks.
Makrydakis, Tzavalis and Balfoussias (1999) study the sustainability of Greek fiscal policy
during the period from 1958 to 1995 using the market value of discounted central government
debt. In particular, they employ the sequential Zivot and Andrews (1992) test for a unit root that
accounts for the endogenous determination of a one time structural change in regime. The authors
identify a break in the series in 1979 and conclude that the Greek government does not satisfy
its IBC in the long term, rendering fiscal policy unsustainable. However, the disadvantage of this
methodology is that it accounts for only a single, one time break. In the presence of multiple
breaks, these results may not hold.
Contrary to the previous studies, Papadopoulos and Sidiropoulos (1999) using annual data from
1961 to 1994 for Greece and four other EU countries start by examining the stationarity of total
public deficit, government revenues and government expenditures using standard unit root tests
and conclude that all series are stationary in first differences. They then proceed to examine sta-
tionarity in the presence of a structural break using the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test and show
11It should be pointed out that at the time in which the Corsetti and Roubini (1991) paper was written, econometric
techniques for the study of unit roots in the presence of structural breaks were not fully developed.
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that Greek public deficit and revenues are stationary using Model A (the “mean” model). A break
is identified in 1979 for total public debt and in 1986 for government revenues. The Johansen
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) methodology is employed to test for cointegration be-
tween government revenues and expenditures. The authors find evidence that the two series are
cointegrated, with cointegrating vector (1, 0.39). Finally, using the Gregory and Hansen (1996a)
test for cointegration in the presence of regime shifts they are able to show that the variables are
cointegrated and thus do not drift apart in the presence of breaks.12 As with the Zivot and Andrews
(1992) tests, the Gregory and Hansen (1996a) tests only allow a single breakpoint.
Arghyrou (2004)13 was the first to study fiscal policy sustainability in the case of Greece, while
addressing both non-linear fiscal adjustment and the possibility of multiple structural breaks. Using
quarterly data from 1970Q1 to 2000Q4 on public debt, general government revenues and expen-
ditures. His empirical analysis is done in four parts; linear without structural breaks, linear with
structural breaks, non-linear without breaks and non-linear with breaks. His findings indicate that
conclusions regarding sustainability change when one considers both breaks and non-linearities.
In particular, the linear analysis without breaks is carried out by testing for cointegration between
government revenues and expenditures in a Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) setting14 as
well as by estimating an error correction model (ECM) relating the two variables. From this analy-
sis the results obtained are mixed; the results using DOLS are against sustainability while the ECM
test result is in favor. When non-linearities in the public debt adjustment are taken into account
using a Logistic Smooth Threshold Error Correction Model (L-STECM), while again not incorpo-
rating structural breaks, the results indicate that there is no sustainability. For the linear analysis
with structural breaks Arghyrou (2004) tests for multiple structural breaks using the Chi-square
test proposed by Quintos (1995) in which breaks are endogenously determined. He identifies two
12Papadopoulos and Sidiropoulos (1999) examine all three models, namely, level shift, level shift with trend and
regime shift.
13In a similar paper, Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) obtain broadly similar results.
14In the case of residual autocorrelation, the author uses Dynamic Generalized Least Squares (DGLS).
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breaks; one in the second quarter of 1980, and another one in the third quarter of 1990. A ro-
bustness check using Quintos (1995)’s LR+ test also identifies two breakpoints (in 1982Q4 and
1991Q3). Incorporating the two breaks in the sustainability analysis, the author now finds that the
Greek public debt is sustainable. In the last part, the non-linear framework is augmented to account
for the presence of breaks. The results are in favor of fiscal sustainability, a finding that highlights
the importance of accounting for multiple breaks.
Afonso (2005) collects annual data on general government debt, revenues and expenditures
from 1970 to 2003 for 15 EU countries including Greece. He conducts stationarity tests on general
government debt, with and without accounting for structural breaks15 (using the Perron (1989) and
Zivot and Andrews (1992) tests in the former case and Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Phillips and
Perron (1988) in the latter). In the absence of breaks from the analysis his findings regarding the
Greek case are mixed and depend on the choice of test used (ADF vs. PP) and whether a trend
is considered.16 Accounting for breaks, both tests considered indicate that the null hypothesis
of a unit root cannot be rejected and therefore the debt is unsustainable in the Greek case. In
testing for cointegration the author uses the Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) tests,
where both indicate no cointegration. He reaches the same conclusion when using the Gregory
and Hansen (1996a) test for cointegration in the presence of breaks. Afonso (2005) mentions that
unlike previous studies the data he uses come from a single source (the annual macro-economic
database), something that explains the small sample (33 observations).
Another study that focuses on the sustainability of Greek fiscal policy is by Katrakilidis and
Tabakis (2006). The authors use annual data from 1956 to 2000 on government spending and
revenues (as percentages of GDP). Using the Ng and Perron (2001), Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)
and Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) unit root and stationarity tests both series are found to be
15Only single, one time breaks were considered.
16In particular, if only a constant and no trend is included in the ADF and PP auxiliary regressions, then the ADF
test that the null of unit root cannot be rejected, while the PP test allows the rejection of the null. If a constant and a
trend are included, both tests do not reject the null of a unit root.
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integrated for order one. Their cointegration methodology follows that of Martin (2000) allowing
for multiple endogenous breaks. The authors find evidence of cointegration between the two series
and conclude that the Greek public deficit is weakly sustainable in the sense of Quintos (1995). In
addition, they identify three breaks (1979, 1986 and 1995).
More recently, Collignon (2012) examined the issue of fiscal sustainability in relation to the
European Union’s fiscal policy rules that require a deficit of no more than 3% of GDP and a debt
level no higher than 60% of GDP. He uses data from 1978 to 2009 for fourteen EU countries,
including Greece. He estimates the fiscal reaction function that relates the deficit and debt ratios to
changes in primary surplus, using the 3% and 60% rules as target reference values. The estimated
speed of adjustment coefficients by which the Greek government responds to deviations from these
targets suggest that Greek fiscal policy is sustainable.
Finally, Neaime (2015) uses data from 1977 to 2013 on a number of European Union countries
to revisit deficit and debt sustainability. His methodology uses the traditional unit root tests (ADF
and PP) on government revenues, expenditures, the budget balance and debt, as well as the ratios
of these variables to GDP. For Greece, all tests do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root.
Next, the author uses the Johansen (1988) methodology to examine cointegration between the
expenditures and revenues series and concludes that Greek fiscal policy is unsustainable.
Given the contrasting evidence that previous studies report regarding the sustainability of fiscal
policy in Greece, I believe that further examining the issue is beneficial. Moreover, my sample
extends beyond that of earlier studies, and even in the case where the additional observations are
few, they are important as they are part of the ongoing fiscal crisis. Finally, the question regarding
the consistency of data on public finances is a frequent one. By using a single source for our data,
I hope to address this issue.
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3.3.2 The concept of sustainability
Before proceeding to a formal discussion of the theoretical background of our study, it is
worthwhile to briefly discuss the concept of sustainability at a more intuitive level. Following
the literature, one way to examine the issue of debt sustainability is by examining whether go-
vernments satisfy their intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) in present value terms. This implies
testing whether the time series properties of fiscal variables are consistent with the no-Ponzi game
condition whereby creditors expect the current debt to be equal to the sum of expected future
primary surpluses. If this is found to be the case, then debt and fiscal policy are considered sustai-
nable.
To test for fiscal sustainability in this framework there are two main empirical methodologies.
The first one test the stationarity of the government debt or deficit series. If the debt or deficit series
are non-stationary, then this implies that it is growing without bound over time. Consequently,
subsequent debt will also grow without bound, which implies that both debt and fiscal policy are
unsustainable. In this case, the present value IBC is not satisfied and the no-Ponzi game condition
is violated. On the other hand, a stationary debt (or deficit) implies that the series is reverting to a
certain mean over time, and in this case, debt and fiscal policy are sustainable, since the deficit is
kept under control.
The second one examines whether there is a long run equilibrium relationship between go-
vernment revenues and expenses using cointegration tests. Evidence of a long run relationship
between the two series suggests that the government is not spending without bound and is taking
into account the amount of revenues that is generating. This implies that it will not have to resort
to deficit financing to cover future expenditures. Debt in this case would be sustainable and would
not grow without bound.
In the section that follows I discuss the theoretical background for examining debt sustainabi-
lity, while in Section 3.4 I discuss the empirical tests based on the theoretical background, their
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implications and the corresponding conditions for sustainability.
3.3.3 Theoretical background
The starting point for examining fiscal policy sustainability is the government budget constraint
used to derive the present value of the budget. The first equation describing the relationship bet-
ween government expenditures, government revenues, and the public debt is given below:
Bt = (1 + rt)Bt−1 − St (3.1)
where Bt is the outstanding debt at the end of period t, r is the (one-period) ex post interest rate,
and St is the primary surplus defined as government revenues (Rt) minus government expenses
(Gt) exclusive of interest payments on the debt (St ≡ Rt − Gt). There are several measures that
can be used for government debt. In this paper, I restrict my attention to real debt and debt as a
percentage of GDP. As Hakkio and Rush (1991) point out, the interpretation of the interest rate in
equation (3.1) depends on what measure is used to define the fiscal variables. In my case, when
real variables are used, rt is the real interest rate. If the variables are expressed as percentages of
GDP, then rt is the real interest rate adjusted for the growth rate of real GDP.
The flow budget constraint in equation (3.1) describes the time path of the stock of debt given
the time paths of rt and St. In other words, it describes the dynamics of debt accumulation or
decumulation. To see this more clearly rewrite equation (3.1) as:
∆Bt = −St + rtBt−1 (3.2)
,which states that the change in public debt is equal to the primary surplus inclusive of interest
payments (rtBt−1). Assuming that the variables in equations (3.1) and (3.2) are all expressed in
real terms we can make three important observations as outlined in Cuddington (1999). First, note
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that if the primary surplus is equal to zero (St = 0) then ∆Bt = rtBt−1, which states that the stock
of real debt will grow at a rate equal to the real interest rate. If, on the other hand, the government
runs a primary deficit (St < 0) the stock of debt will grow at a rate exceeding the real interest
rate since the deficit represents an addition to the stock of debt.17Finally, if the government runs
a primary surplus (St > 0), the stock of debt will grow at a slower rate than the interest rate.
In the special case where the primary surplus is greater than interest payments on existing debt
(St > rtBt−1 with St > 0), the real debt will actually shrink over time.
Solving equation (3.1) for Bt−1 and iterating it forwards n-periods we get from the flow budget
constraint version to the n-period intertemporal budget constraint (IBC). If we assume that the real
interest rate is constant18and positive over time we get:
Bt−1 =
n∑
s=0
1
(1 + r)s+1
(Rt+s −Gt+s) + Bt+n
(1 + r)n+1
(3.3)
where R is government revenues and G is government expenditures excluding interest payments.
Letting n approach infinity we get:
Bt−1 =
∞∑
s=0
1
(1 + r)s+1
(Rt+s −Gt+s) + lim
n→∞
Bt+n
(1 + r)n+1
(3.4)
Sustainability requires that the last term in equation (3.4) is zero:
lim
n→∞
Bt+n
(1 + r)n+1
= 0 (3.5)
Equation (3.5 is known as the no-Ponzi game condition. It states that the discounted value of the
future stock of debt converges to zero as the time horizon approaches infinity. In other words, the
17In the case where the deficit is constant, the growth rate of the debt will converge asymptotically toward the
interest rate.
18I assume a constant interest rate for simplicity and ease of exposition. Similar results can be obtained for time-
varying interest rates.
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no-Ponzi game condition implies that the government cannot continuously rely on the issuance
of new debt in order to cover interest expenses on existing debt. The limit in equation (3.5) will
converge to zero as n goes to infinity if the real stock of debt grows at a rate that is slower than the
rate of interest r. If equation (3.5) is satisfied, it follows that equation (3.4) becomes:
Bt−1 =
∞∑
s=0
1
(1 + r)s+1
(Rt+s −Gt+s) (3.6)
, which states that the current outstanding stock of real debt,Bt−1, is equal to the present discounted
value of current and future primary surpluses. Equations (3.5) and (3.6) are therefore equivalent in
this context and the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied.
One can also express equation (3.1) with the variables expressed as ratios of GDP. Assume a
constant real interest rate and that output grows at a constant rate of y :
Yt = (1 + y)Yt−1 (3.7)
Then, dividing each term of equation (3.1) by GDP yields:
Bt
Yt
= (1 + r)
Bt−1
Yt
− St
Yt
(3.8)
Substituting equation (3.7) into equation (3.8) yields:
Bt
Yt
=
(1 + r)
(1 + y)
Bt−1
Yt−1
− St
Yt
(3.9)
Rewriting, we obtain:
bt =
(1 + r
1 + y
)
bt−1 − st (3.10)
where the lower-case letters are the ratios of the corresponding upper-case letters of equation (3.1)
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to GDP, and y is the growth rate of GDP between periods t−1 and t.19. Solving equation (3.10) for
bt−1 and iterating it forwards n-periods and taking the limit as n approaches infinity, we get from
the flow budget constraint version to the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) with the variables
expressed as ratios of GDP:
bt−1 =
∞∑
s=0
(1 + y
1 + r
)s+1[
ρt+s − gt+s
]
+ lim
s→∞
bt+s
(1 + y
1 + r
)s+1
(3.11)
where again lower-case letters are the ratios of the corresponding upper-case letters of equation
(3.4). The corresponding no-Ponzi game condition is:
lim
s→∞
bt+s
(1 + y
1 + r
)s+1
= 0 (3.12)
and if satisfied, equation (3.11) reduces to:
bt−1 =
∞∑
s=0
(1 + y
1 + r
)s+1[
ρt+s − gt+s
]
(3.13)
Equations (3.12) and (3.13) are identical to the earlier versions when using real variables. This
goes back to the point of Hakkio and Rush (1991) mentioned earlier regarding the interpretation of
the interest rate - when real variables are expressed as ratios to GDP the real interest rate is adjusted
for the real growth rate of GDP. However, while equations (3.12) and (3.13) are equivalent to
equations (3.5) and (3.6) respectively, the interpretation is slightly different. Equation (3.12) states
that as n approaches infinity the discounted value of the future debt-to-GDP ratio converges to
zero, and as before implies that the government cannot rely continuously on the issuance of new
debt in order to finance interest payments on existing debt. Equation (3.13) states that the current
outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio, bt−1, is equal to the present discounted value of current and future
primary surpluses expressed as a ratio of GDP. If r > y, the limit in equation (3.12) will converge
19From equation (3.10) the change in the public debt is ∆bt ≡ bt − bt−1 = r−y1+y bt−1 − st
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to zero if the debt-to-GDP ratio grows at a rate that is slower that the real interest rate adjusted for
the growth of real GDP.20
Irrespective of whether one examines the IBC in real terms or as shares of GDP, as Chortareas,
Kapetanios and Uctum (2008) and Uctum, Thurston and Uctum (2006) point out the IBC can
be interpreted as restricting the future long run relationship between government revenues and
expenditures. The restriction is twofold: first, the two series should not drift too far apart from
each other, and second, the government should generate enough future net primary surpluses to
pay back the outstanding stock of debt. Moreover, provided that the IBC is not violated, short run
primary deficits that would lead to debt accumulation would be offset by future primary surpluses
and the budget to be balanced in present value terms, and the debt process will be mean reverting.
In the section that follows I discuss the econometric tests of the sustainability concept.
3.4 Methodology: Empirical tests on fiscal policy sustainability
3.4.1 Fiscal policy sustainability using government debt series: Unit Root
tests
To examine whether the no-Ponzi game condition and the IBC are satisfied I follow the standard
practice in the literature and test the hypothesis that the debt series is non-stationary. As mentioned
earlier, if the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected then the data generating process of the
debt series is mean reverting and fiscal policy is considered sustainable. If, however, the null
hypothesis is not rejected then the fiscal stance followed is not sustainable and the government
violates the present value constraint and the no-Ponzi game constraint. To empirically test whether
equation (3.5) is satisfied (and consequently equation (3.6)) one of the standard practices in the
20Note that as Uctum and Wickens (2000) point out equations (3.5) and (3.12) do not require that the real stock
of debt or the debt-to-GDP ratio goes to zero. In the first case, the requirement is that the real stock of debt grows
at a rate slower that the real interest rate. In the second case, the debt-to-GDP ratio grows at a rate slower than the
growth-adjusted real rate.
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literature is to check whether government debt follows a stationary process, using standard unit
root tests, such as those of Dickey and Fuller (1979) or Perron (1989).
However, a common problem with macroeconomic time series is the presence of structural
breaks that may bias the results of traditional unit root tests such as those mentioned above. Perron
(1989) showed that most macroeconomic variables are not nonstationary; rather they are trend
stationary with a structural break. The presence of structural breaks in the series reduces the power
of the ADF type tests, and leads to not rejecting the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. Perron
(1989)’s approach introduces break dummy variables in the ADF regression, which permits for
stationarity with a one-time permanent break in the trend stationary model. The break point dates
in this approach are imposed exogenously either by visual inspection of the data or based on a
priori information or a combination of both. This approach has been criticized because imposing
the breaks exogenously has been shown to bias the results of the unit root tests toward rejecting the
unit root null with no structural break (see Christiano (1992)). Even if one knows when a change
has occurred (e.g. the adoption of the euro as a common currency), it is very difficult to determine
whether the change affected the estimates before, during, or after the break. To address these
shortcomings Zivot and Andrews (1992) proposed a modified version of Perron’s test that allows
for the break dates to be determined endogenously. Zivot and Andrews (1992) formulate three
different models following the work of Perron (1989) to test for a unit root against the alternative
of trend-stationarity with an unknown break point. In our case, these models can be stated as
follows:
Bt = α0 + α1Bt−1 + α2t+ µ1DL +
k∑
i=1
βi∆Bt−i + t (3.14)
Bt = α0 + α1Bt−1 + α2t+ µ2DP +
k∑
i=1
βi∆Bt−i + t (3.15)
Bt = α0 + α1Bt−1 + α2t+ µ1DL + µ2DP +
k∑
i=1
βi∆Bt−i + t (3.16)
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whereDL = 1 if t > τ (0 otherwise) is a level dummy that represents a one-time permanent change
in the mean, and DP = t − τ (0 otherwise) is a slope dummy, which again represents a one-time
permanent change. Consequently, Model A permits a one-time permanent change in the mean of
the series, Model B allows a shift in the trend, while Model C combines both one-time changes
in the mean and trend. Equations (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16) correspond to Model A, Model B and
Model C of the original paper. The null hypothesis in all three models is that α1 = 1. The Zivot
and Andrews (1992) method regards every point as a potential break point (τ ), and each model is
estimated for all possible break points successively in an interval that excludes the endpoints of
the sample, typically specified as [0.15,0.85]. The trimming of the region in which the break dates
can occur is deemed necessary because as the authors point out, if the breaks occur outside of the
[0.15,0.85] region, the test suffers power loss. The ADF t-statistics for testing the null hypothesis
that α1 = 1 are computed for each possible break point within the specified region. For each
model, I picked the t-statistic that maximized the rejection of the null hypothesis. The decision
rule was to reject the unit root null if the minimum t-statistic was less than the critical value from
the asymptotic distribution provided by Zivot and Andrews (1992) for each of the three models.
3.4.2 Fiscal policy sustainability using government revenues and expenditu-
res: Cointegration tests
Another way to approach the issue of fiscal sustainability is by examining the relationship
between government revenues and expenditures. Start by rewriting equation (3.4) as follows:
Bt =
∞∑
s=1
1
(1 + r)s
(Rt+s −Gt+s) + lim
s→∞
1
(1 + r)s
Bt+s (3.17)
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Taking first differences of equation (3.17) gives:
GGt −Rt =
∞∑
s=1
1
(1 + r)s
(∆Rt+s −∆Gt+s) + lim
s→∞
Bt+s
(1 + r)s
(3.18)
whereGGt = Gt+rBt−1.21 The termGGt−Rt is the total gross deficit andGG represents primary
expenditures plus interest payments. Starting with the RHS of equation (3.17), we need to check
the stationarity of the first difference of the R and G series. If these two series are nonstationary
in levels and their first differences are stationary, then R and G are integrated of order one (I(1) in
levels). Maintaining the assumption of the no-Ponzi-game condition ensures then the stationarity
the RHS of equation (3.17). Clearly for the equation to hold the LHS must also be stationary.
This in turn implies that the series GGt and Rt should be cointegrated so their first differences are
stationary. More specifically, the two series should be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1,-
1). This is the approach of Hakkio and Rush (1991) who argue that cointegration between Rt and
GGt is a necessary condition for the intertemporal budget constraint to hold and the cointegrating
vector should be (1,-1) in order to rule out bubble terms.
To summarize, starting with the government revenues and expenditures series there are three
possible scenarios. In the first one unit root test show that one of the series is an I(0) process while
the other is an I(1). In this case, there is no sustainability. In the second scenario, both series are
found to be I(0) and we have fiscal sustainability. The third possibility is when both series are
found to be I(1). In this case, we proceed with the cointegration tests between the two series, R
and GG. If we conclude that the two series are not cointegrated, then according to Hakkio and
Rush (1991) there is no sustainability and the government would need to alter its fiscal stance.
Quintos (1995) proposed weak and strong sustainability conditions and argued that it might be
possible for fiscal policy to be sustainable even if the two series are not cointegrated provided that
government revenues are higher than expenditures22. To illustrate Quintos (1995) weak and strong
21∆Bt = −St + rBt−1 = Gt −Rt + rBt−1
22This however is generally uncommon for most countries
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form sustainability conditions consider the cointegrating regression that we wish to test:
Rt = α + βGGt + ut (3.19)
Quintos (1995) shows that if 0 < β < 1 then the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied
in the weak sense regardless of whether Rt and GGt are cointegrated. Moreover, there is also
weak sustainability when β = 1 and the two series are not cointegrated. The case where β = 1
and Rt and GGt are cointegrated then corresponds to the Hakkio and Rush (1991) sustainability
condition, which Quintos (1995) defines as strong form sustainability. Finally, if β = 0 and the
series are not cointegrated, then there is no sustainability. The strong form sustainability implies
then that the limit term in equation (3.17) converges to zero as opposed to the no sustainability
case. Weak sustainability implies that while the limit term converges to zero, it does so at a slower
rate compared to the one under strong form sustainability. Moreover, under weak sustainability the
limit term will converge to zero faster is the series are cointegrated.
Quintos (1995) discusses a very important point regarding the policy implications of sustai-
nability in the weak sense. More specifically, she states that a debt process which is found to be
sustainable in the weak sense may lead to financing constraints for the government in the long
run because it will face difficulties in marketing its debt. In other words, when government spen-
ding is continuously higher that revenues, the risk of default coming from a rising debt increases.
This point is particularly important in the case of Greece. In fact, in the absence of strong form
sustainability, weak form sustainability would seem to explain the ongoing crisis in Greece rather
well. Government expenses have exceed government revenues for almost the entire period 1970
to 2015, as can be seen in Figure 3.4, which might be evidence of weak form sustainability. Evi-
dence of weak sustainability in the case of Greece would indicate that it has in fact led to financing
constraints and a strangling of the economy with an explosive debt (as evidenced in Figure 3.1).
In light of the above discussion, mt approach in this paper will be to consider the strong form
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sustainability condition as a necessary and sufficient condition for the IBC to hold. Thus sustai-
nability in the cointegration framework will require that both the series are cointegrated and that
the cointegrating vector is (1,-1). Moreover, if there is evidence of weak form sustainability my
interpretation is that it is actually a sign of looming unsustainability unless the government changes
its policy. I discuss these points in more detail in Section 3.5 where I present my results.
With respect to the econometric methodology, there are several approaches that can be used
to test for cointegration. For example, one way is to use the Engle-Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris
cointegration tests, which are both essentially unit root tests on the residuals from a regression of
government revenues and expenditures. More specifically, to conduct the Engle-Granger test one
starts by estimating the following regression:
Rt = a+ bGGt + ut (3.20)
Then the test uses the parametric ADF approach to estimate the following regression:
∆uˆt = αuˆt−1 +
p∑
j=1
δj∆uˆt−j + et (3.21)
The Phillips-Ouliaris cointegration test differs from the Engle-Granger in the way it accounts for
serial correlation in the residual series ut. More specifically, the Phillips-Ouliaris method uses the
nonparametric Phillips-Perron methodology to examine whether the residual series are stationary.
Thus, the auxiliary regression is estimated by running the unaugmented version of equation (3.21):
∆uˆt = αuˆt−1 + wt (3.22)
Given that the series R and GG are found to be I(1) sustainability requires that the residuals from
this regression be stationary and not have a unit root. Then R and GG are cointegrated.
One can also test for cointegration by estimating an error correction model. We start by esti-
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mating the long run equilibrium relationship in equation (3.20). We then test that the residuals are
stationary using any standard unit root test. The next step is to estimate the error correction model
(ECM) of the following form:
∆Rt = α0 +
k1∑
i=1
γ1i∆Rt−i +
k2∑
i=1
δ1i∆GGt−i + λECMt−1 + t (3.23)
where k1 and k2 are the number of lags and the term ECM is the saved residual series from the
previous step. The number of lags to include in equation (3.23) is determined using information
criteria. As Arghyrou (2004) notes a nonsignificant parameter λ suggests lack of cointegration
between the two series, Rt and GGt, which contradicts the sustainability hypothesis.
An important defect with either the Engle-Granger or the Phillips-Ouliaris method is that the
estimation of the long-run equilibrium regressions in equation (3.20) requires us to place one vari-
able on the LHS and use the other one as a regressor on the RHS. This implicitly assumes that the
two variables, GG andR are jointly determined and therefore one can use the residuals from either
of the two long-run equilibrium regressions in conducting the tests. If the test for cointegration
depends on the variable choice, then it is possible to reach different conclusions depending on the
long-run equilibrium regression used. Another important limitation of the two methods is that be-
cause of the two-step process, any misspecification introduced in the first step, i.e. the estimation
of the long-run equilibrium relationship, is consequently carried over to the second step, i.e. the
estimation of the auxiliary regression using the estimated errors from the first step. The cointegra-
tion test based on the estimation of the ECM, like the Engle-Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris tests,
also depends on the choice of variable we use as the dependent one. Finally, another problem
with the ECM approach is that the inclusion of the error correction term23 in equation (3.23) might
introduce estimation error as a form of measurement error in the regression model. To circumvent
these issues, I consider instead two alternative approaches, which are presented next.
23As opossed to inserting directly Rt−1 and GGt−1.
CHAPTER 3. FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY IN GREECE 117
The first approach to testing cointegration is with the use of an Autoregressive Distributed Lag
(ARDL) model. This approach was developed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran, Shin and
Smith (2001). One starts by considering the following Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)
representation of equation (3.20) in first differences:
∆Rt = α0 +
p∑
i=1
α1i∆Rt−i +
q∑
i=0
α2i∆GGt−i + β1Rt−1 + β2GGt−1 + et (3.24)
where et is a white noise error. The first part of equation (3.24 represents the long run relationship,
whereas the terms β1Rt−1 + β2GGt−1 correspond to the short run dynamics of the model. Testing
for cointegration using the Bounds Test involves testing the null hypothesis that Ho : β1 = β2 = 0
against the alternative that the null is not true using an F-test.24 The null hypothesis is therefore that
there is no cointegration among the variables. The Bounds Test of procedure of Pesaran and Shin
(1999) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) has several advantages over other testing procedures
for cointegration. In my case, the most important advantage25 is that it involves only one equation
set-up, more specifically equation (3.24), and therefore the estimation of the short-run and long run
coefficients is achieved simultaneously. This makes both implementation and interpretation easier.
The second approach is the Johansen methodology, which starts by considering the vector
autoregression (VAR) of order p given below:
yt = A1yt−1 + · · ·+Apyt−p +Bxt + t (3.25)
where yt is an nx1 vector of non-stationary I(1) variables, xt is a dx1 vector of deterministic terms,
t is an nx1 vector of innovations,A1 toAp andB are coefficient matrices. The VAR in equation
(3.25) is in level form. We can reparametrize it and express it as a Vector Error Correction Model
24The distribution of the test statistic in this case is non-standard. We discuss this point in more detail in our results
using this test.
25Another very important advantage of this test is that it can be applied to series that are either I(0) or I(1) or a
mixture of both.
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(VECM) to get:
∆yt = Πyt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γi∆yt−i +Bxt + t (3.26)
where:
Π =
p∑
i=1
Ai − In, Γi = −
p∑
j=i+1
Aj (3.27)
The coefficient matrix Π (nxn) is called the impact matrix and determines whether the variables
in yt are cointegrated. To see this, note that in the VECM the term ∆yt and all its lags are I(0),
therefore the only term that can potentially include I(1) variables is Πyt−1. For equation (3.26) to
hold (i.e. for ∆yt to be I(0)) it must be the case that Πyt−1 is also I(0). It follows that the term
Πyt−1 must contain the cointegrating vectors if they exist. The Johansen approach to cointegration
is based on the relationship between the rank (r) of the Π matrix and its characteristic roots. There
are three cases to consider. The first case is for r = 0. This implies that the variables in yt are not
cointegrated, all rows are linearly dependent and there is no combination of variables that leads to
stationarity. If this is the case, then estimation should be done by first differencing all the variables
in yt to make them stationary. The VECM in equation (3.26) is thus reduced to a simple VAR in
first differences:
∆yt =
p−1∑
i=1
Γi∆yt−i +Bxt + t (3.28)
The second case, is for r = n (the number of variables). This implies that Π has full rank and
is therefore non-singular. This means that it has n linearly independent rows (columns) and all
variables are stationary. In this case the level VAR is consistent. Note that this case is essentially
excluded from our discussion above since we have assumed that the variables in yt are nonstatio-
nary. The two previous cases can be viewed as extreme cases. The last case is when Π has reduced
rank, with 0 < r < n. This implies that yt is I(1) and the system is nonstationary, but that there
are r linearly independent cointegrating vectors and n − r common stochastic trends. Moreover,
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given that Π has reduced rank, it can be expressed as:
Π = αβ′ (3.29)
where α and β are nxr matrices both of which have rank r. The elements of α are known as the
adjustment parameters in the VECM and each column of β is a cointegrating vector. The VECM
becomes:
∆yt = αβ
′yt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γi∆yt−i +Bxt + t (3.30)
where β′yt−1 ∼ I(0) since β is a matrix of cointegrating vectors.
The Johansen procedure involves estimating equation (3.30) via maximum likelihood for diffe-
rent values of the rank r of the matrix Π, under the assumption that the errors follow a multivariate
normal distribution for each t and are independent across observations. Testing the number of
cointegrating vectors is equivalent to testing the rank of Π. Since the rank of a matrix is equal to
the number of its characteristic roots that are different from zero, we can get the number of distinct
cointegrating vectors by checking the characteristic roots (i.e. the eigenvalues) of Π. Given the
eigenvalues of Π, Johansen proposed two likelihood ratio tests to determine the number of cointe-
grating vectors. In the trace test the null hypothesis is that r = r1 and the alternative is that r = r2,
for r1 < r2 ≤ n. The trace statistic is computed as:
λtrace(r1, r2) = −T
r2∑
i=r1+1
ln(1− λˆi) (3.31)
where T is the sample size and λˆi is the i-th largest estimated eigenvalue of the Π. This is a
sequential test in the sense that we start from the null of at most 0 cointegrating vectors and up
to at most r1 against the alternative. In the maximum eigenvalue test the null hypothesis is that
there are at most r cointegrating vectors against the alternative of at most r + 1. The maximum
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eigenvalue statistic is computed as:
λmax(r, r + 1) = −T ln(1− λˆr+1) (3.32)
For this test, we also start from the null that r = 0 against the alternative that r = 1, and proceed
until the null hypothesis of an eigenvalue equal to zero cannot be rejected. The asymptotic dis-
tributions of both the trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistics are nonstandard but have been
tabulated for different values of r. The critical values depend on the choice of deterministic terms
that are included.
From our previous analysis we know that the government revenue and expenditure series are
both I(1) thus yt = [Rt, GGt]′. To implement the Johansen methodology in my setting I first
determine the optimal number of lags to be included in the unrestricted VAR in equation (3.25).
The AIC and the SBC both indicated one lag.26
My next step is to specify and estimate the VECM model of equation (3.30). Johansen (1995)
considers five cases for the deterministic terms. Here I will only consider three of these specificati-
ons since the other two are either too restrictive (Case 1: no deterministic components in the level
data and all intercepts in the cointegrating equations are zero), or they are not appropriate given
my data (Case 5: the level data have quadratic trends and the cointegrating equations have linear
trends). In Case 2 there are no linear trends in neither the data nor in the cointegrating equations,
but the cointegrating equations have non-zero means ρ0. The VECM model in this case is:
∆yt = α(β
′yt−1 + ρ0) + t (3.33)
Case 3 allows for linear trends in the level data (γ) but only intercepts in the cointegrating relations
26I checked different specifications for the deterministic component in the VAR, namely no constant, constant and
constant and linear trend. In all three cases the optimal lag was one based on the multivariate generalizations of the
AIC and SBC.
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(ρ0). This is modeled as:
∆yt = α(β
′yt−1 + ρ0) + γ + t (3.34)
Finally, in Case 4 both the level data and the cointegrating relations have linear trends. The VECM
in this case is:
∆yt = α(β
′yt−1 + ρ0 + ρ1t) + γ + t (3.35)
where ρ1t is the linear trend term of the cointegrating relation.
Unlike the residual based tests (Engle-Granger and Phillips-Ouliaris) and the ECM test for
cointegration, the Johansen test for cointegration does not depend on which variable is selected
as the dependent one since in the VAR specification no variable is singled out. There is however
another limitation of the cointegration tests that we have reviewed so far, namely not accounting
for structural changes. In the Johansen procedure one could include additional strictly exogenous
variables (such as break points) other than the ones spelled out in the five cases of the Johansen
procedure. However, because the critical values for the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics
change depending on the choice of deterministic terms, tabulated critical values for these tests
would not be usable but would need to be estimated using for example bootstrap techniques. In
this paper, instead I have chosen to address this issue by performing two tests that account for
cointegration in the presence of structural breaks. I discuss these tests in the following section.
3.4.3 Fiscal policy sustainability using government revenues and expenditu-
res: Cointegration tests in the presence of structural breaks
In this section, I discuss my approach in testing for cointegration between government revenues
and expenditures in the presence of structural shifts. Given my data, this step is deemed necessary.
I consider two different approaches. In the first approach, I use the Gregory and Hansen (1996a) re-
sidual based test for cointegration. In the second approach, I use Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares
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(DOLS) to model the relationship between government revenues and expenditures without breaks.
I then test for shifts in fiscal policy by conducting tests of structural breaks in the cointegrating
relationship between Rt and GGt and ρt and ggt. The break dates were identified using the Bai
(1997) and Bai and Perron (1998), Bai and Perron (2003a) methodology for structural change and
parameter stability by allowing for multiple breaks that are determined endogenously.
My first approach is based on that of Gregory and Hansen (1996a) who examine tests for coin-
tegration that allow for possible structural breaks. They consider four models that differ on their
assumptions regarding the structural breaks, which I outline below in the case of two variables:
• Model 1: Standard Cointegration
yt = µ+ αxt + et (3.36)
This model describes the long-run equilibrium relationship between yt and xt where the
parameters µ and α are constant over time (t = 1, · · · , n). Structural changes in the above
long run equilibrium relationship are reflected as changes in the intercept µ and/or changes
in the slope α. In Gregory and Hansen (1996a) the time that the break occurs is unknown
and determined endogenously. To model the structural change the authors define a dummy
variable φtτ as follows:
φtτ =
 0 if t ≤ [nτ ]1 if t > [nτ ]
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is the relative timing of the break point, and [ ] is the integer part. The next
three models are considered to account for structural changes:
• Model 2: Level shift (C)
yt = µ1 + µ2φtτ + αxt + et (3.37)
In this model there is only a change in the intercept µ, thus µ1 is the intercept before the
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break and µ2 is the change in the intercept when the break occurs. In this level shift model
the equilibrium relationship shifts in a parallel fashion as the result of the break.
• Model 3: Level shift with trend (C/T)
yt = µ1 + µ2φtτ + βt+ αxt + et (3.38)
The level shift with trend model as the name implies includes a time trend (βt) as well as a
level shift in the long run equilibrium relationship.
• Model 4: Regime shift (C/S)
yt = µ1 + µ2φtτ + α1xt + α2xtφtτ + et (3.39)
This model allows changes in slope in addition to the intercept changes of Model (3.37),
where α1 is the cointegrating coefficient before the break and α2 is the change in the slope
coefficients. This parametrization allows for both rotation and parallel shift of the equili-
brium relationship.
To test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration based on the
above models, Gregory and Hansen (1996a) have constructed three test statistics that are modified
versions of the traditional ADF and Phillips residual based unit root tests. These test statistics are
as follows:
Zα∗ = inf
τ∈T
Zα(τ)
Zt∗ = inf
τ∈T
Zt(τ)
ADF ∗ = inf
τ∈T
ADF (τ)
where τ is the relative timing of the break point, or regime shift, with τ ∈ T and T being the set
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of all possible break points, with T = (0.15, 0.85).27 In my case, the implied specification of the
three Gregory and Hansen (1996a) models is:
Rt = µ1 + µ2φtτ + αGGt + et (3.40)
Rt = µ1 + µ2φtτ + βt+ αGGt + et (3.41)
Rt = µ1 + µ2φtτ + α1GGt + α2GGtφtτ + et (3.42)
The Gregory and Hansen (1996a) approach is essentially an extension of similar approaches for
unit root tests with structural breaks, such as the Zivot and Andrews (1992) tests. The break date
is determined by estimating the cointegration equations for all possible break dates in the sample.
Then, the chosen break date is the one where the test statistics are minimized. There are two points
worth mentioning: 1) the Gregory and Hansen (1996a) approach allows only one break, and 2) the
tests do not examine whether there is a structural change per se; rather the alternative hypothesis
is that there is cointegration with a possible change in regime. I thus proceed with my second
approach that allows to examine multiple breaks, and then use my findings to test for cointegration
separately.
The starting point for the second approach is the cointegrating relationship in equation (3.20).
For convenience, this is reproduced here:
Rt = α + βGGt + ut
The cointegration analysis is done with the DOLS method as presented in Stock and Watson
(1993). In particular, I estimate the following model:
Rt = α + βGGt +
r∑
j=−q
γj∆GGt+j + vt (3.43)
27As the authors point out, T can be any compact subset of (0,1); however, it will need to be small enough so that
all of the statistics discussed can be calculated. The choice for T = (0.15, 0.85) follows the earlier literature.
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The long-run dynamic equation (3.43) augments equation (3.20) by including q lags and r leads of
the differenced explanatory variables, GG in our setting.
My next step is to incorporate structural breaks. To do so I employ the methodology of Bai
(1997) and Bai and Perron (1998), Bai and Perron (2003a). The authors have developed several
statistics in order to identify the possible break points. The authors start by considering the multiple
linear regression model with T periods and m breaks (leading to m+ 1 regimes) below:
yt = x
′
tβ + z
′
tδj + ut (t = Tj−1 + 1, · · · , Tj) (3.44)
where regime j = 1, · · · ,m + 1, xt and zt are the explanatory variables whose parameters are
constant across j in the former case or change in the latter. The break points (T1, · · · , Tm) are
explicitly treated as unknown with endpoints T0 = 0 and Tm+1 = T . In estimating equation
(3.44), the authors develop global optimization procedures that identify m multiple breaks for
which the sum of squared residuals in equation(3.44) is minimized using standard least squares.
The procedure is termed global because it produces the m break points and the corresponding
coefficient estimates that minimize the sum of squared residuals across all possible sets of m
partitions. Bai and Perron (1998) use the global breakpoint estimates from the above procedure
to form several breakpoint tests and their corresponding test statistics. These are briefly outlined
below:
• To test the null hypothesis of no break (m = 0) against the alternative of some fixed number
of breaks (m = k) a supF type test is used. The null hypothesis of no breaks is tested using
the full sample and for every partition (T1, · · · , Tk). The alternative hypothesis is tested
against the pre-specified number of k breaks that involves estimation of every subsample
with Ti = [Tλi](i = 1, · · · , k). To evaluate the null hypothesis that the coefficients δs in
equation (3.44) are constant across regimes (δ1 = δ2 = · · · = δk+1) Bai and Perron (2003a)
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propose the following test statistic:
FT (λ1, · · · , λk; q) = 1
T
(T − (k + 1)q − p
kq
)
δˆ′R′(RVˆ (δˆ)R′)−1Rδˆ (3.45)
where δˆ is the optimal k-break estimate of δ, (Rδ)′=(δ′1− δ′2, · · · , δ′k − δ′k+1), and Vˆ (δˆ) is an
estimate of the variance covariance matrix of δˆ that may be robust to serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity.
• To test the null hypothesis of no breaks against the alternative of an unknown number of m
breaks up to some upper bound M , Bai and Perron (1998) formulate a class of tests termed
double maximum tests because in this setting the maximization is done both for a given m
and across different values of the test statistic for m. In the equal-weighted version of the
test, called UDmax, the procedure choses the alternative that maximizes the test statistic
across the number of breakpoints. The second test, called WDmax, applies weights such
that the marginal p-values of the test statistics are equal across m, where 1 ≤ m ≤M .
The previous two approaches are presented in Bai and Perron (1998). The next approach is a
sequential procedure presented in Bai (1997).
• Bai (1997) develops a sequential testing methodology to estimate multiple breaks. The star-
ting point is to test for parameter stability using the full sample. If the null is rejected, the
break date is determined and then the sample is split into two subsamples each of which is
again tested for parameter stability. Break points are added whenever there is a rejection of
the null. The procedure is repeated until the null hypothesis of l = 1 vs. the alternative of
l + 1 = 2 breaks cannot be rejected.
Going back to Bai and Perron (1998) I outline the last two approaches as follows:
• To test the null hypothesis of l vs. l + 1 breaks instead of following the previous sequential
methodology that performs a parameter constancy test in each subsample that results from
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the procedure, I only test the single subsample where the sum of squared residuals is lowest.
• The last approach which also tests the null hypothesis of l vs the alternative of l + 1 breaks
combines the sequential and the global optimization methodologies. The possible l break-
points for each step in the sequential procedure are obtained by global minimization of the
sum of squared residuals, and each subsample is tested for parameter constancy.
Finally, information based criteria can be used to determine the appropriate number of breaks.
More specifically, Yao (1988) suggests the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Liu, Shiying
and Zidek (1997) proposes a modified version of the Schwarz criterion termed (LWZ). These
criteria can be used in conjunction with the procedures described earlier to guide the choice of
the optimal number of breaks. The optimal number of breaks is given when these criteria are
minimized. To the best of my knowledge this is the first paper that uses the Bai (1997) and Bai and
Perron (1998) methodology to determine structural breaks using Greek data for the study of fiscal
sustainability.
Having determined the break dates, my next step is to test for cointegration by incorporating
the breaks into my analysis, and more specifically, I incorporate the breaks directly into the model
and use the DOLS methodology described earlier.
I begin by defining a slope dummy variable for every break identified using the Bai (1997) and
Bai and Perron (1998) method. In this part, I follow Arghyrou (2004) and Arghyrou and Luintel
(2007) and define the slope dummies as:
Dit =
 0 if t ∈ (1, · · · , Ti)1 if t ∈ (Ti+1, · · · , N)
where i = 1, · · · , k with k being the number of the identified breaks, and Ti is the date that break
i occured. The DOLS regression in equation (3.43) is augmented by including the break dummies
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and takes the following form:
Rt = α + βGGt +
k∑
i=1
δiDitGGt +
r∑
j=−q
γj∆GGt+j + vt (3.46)
and more specifically,
Rt = α + βGGt + δ1D1GGt + δ2D2GGt +
r∑
j=−q
γj∆GGt+j + vt (3.47)
As Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) point out, defining the dummy variables this way allows us to
determine the long-run effect of each regime change, and when these are jointly estimated, their
significance can be evidence of the distinct effect of each one. Moreover, a positive sign on the
slope dummies implies a move towards strong-form sustainability, whereas a negative sign a move
away.28
3.4.4 Data description and sources
All data were collected from the European Commission Annual Macroeconomic Data (AMECO)
database. As I mentioned previously, while the AMECO database is a single source, it still relies
on data collected and provided by member states, and more precisely data provided to Eurostat
by member states. Thus, possible data inconsistencies might still be present. However, given that
the alternative of using multiple sources might amplify this problem, and with the hope that both
Eurostat and AMECO data managers have been diligent in removing the inconsistencies, I believe
that justifies my choice of source.
More specifically I obtained annual data on general government public debt, general govern-
ment revenues and expenditures, the price deflator of final private consumption expenditure, and
GDP at market prices. My sample covers the period from 1970 to 2015, using annual observa-
28This is because when β ∼= 1 the bubble term in equation 3.3 converges faster to zero, compared to when β < 1.
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tions 29. For my empirical analysis, the general government debt, general government revenues
and general government expenditures are all expressed in real terms using the price deflator of
final private consumption expenditure. For the unit root tests, I use two different debt series: real
general government debt in national currency, and real general government debt as a percentage
of GDP. For the cointegration analysis I use the real general government revenue and real general
government expenditure in levels as well as a percentage of GDP.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Unit Root tests
I begin by considering the lag structure of the debt series. While with annual data typically two
lags are used, in my case I used only one lag based on the Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannan-Quinn
information criteria. Table 3.2 below presents all three information criteria for the government
debt series both with one and two lags. Real debt is denoted by Bt and debt as a share of GDP is
denoted by bt. As we can see all three criteria are minimized when using only one lag. I therefore
proceed with the unit root tests including one lag, and more specifically, the ZA test for a unit root
test against the alternative of stationarity with structural change at a single unknown breakpoint.
As discussed earlier, there are three different models that vary according to the null hypothesis
regarding the break. I estimate all three models and I report the results on Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
Unlike some of the previous studies that have used the ZA test, I am not able to reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root at conventional levels using any of the three models. More specifically,
Papadopoulos and Sidiropoulos (1999) were able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root using
Model A and their result is significant at the 5% level. Their finding however is based on total
public deficit, rather than debt, and their data are from 1963 to 1994. Makrydakis, Tzavalis and
29For 2014 and 2015 values we used the official forecasts of the European Commission, contained in the AMECO
database
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Balfoussias (1999) reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the debt-to-GDP ratio using Model
B using data from 1958 to 1995. Their result is significant at the 5% level. Their estimated
coefficient on the trend term, (µ2), is however positive and equal to 0.185. Moreover, the sum
of the coefficients on the trend term and the slope dummy (α2 and µ2 in my notation in equation
(3.15)) sum up to a 0.26. As Uctum, Thurston and Uctum (2006) argue, there are three possible
cases that are compatible with the concept of sustainability in small samples. As they point out, in
the case where α2 > 0 (increasing trend), then α2 + µ2 must be negative to ensure sustainability.
In other words, if there is an increasing trend initially it must be followed by a decreasing one after
the break for sustainability to hold, which is not the case in the paper by Makrydakis, Tzavalis
and Balfoussias (1999). In my results, the coefficient of the trend term is always positive and the
coefficient on the slope dummy in Models B and C is also positive, which suggest an increasing
trend, and is inconsistent with sustainability. The breakpoints in Model B and Model C are identical
(1989), but there is a substantial difference with that of Model A (2004) for my real debt measure,
Bt. For the debt-to-GDP ratio (bt) we observe the opposite pattern, the breakpoints are identical in
Models A and B (2008), but Model C the breakpoint is much earlier (2003).
Before closing this section, it should be noted that results above are based on the undiscounted
debt and debt-to-GDP ratio. However, as Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Uctum and Wickens
(2000) have argued, among others, to properly assess the fiscal sustainability hypothesis, the dis-
counted market value of debt should be used instead. To consider this case, I followed Uctum and
Wickens (2000) in constructing the discounted market value of the debt series based on debt and
the debt-to-GDP ratio. More specifically, I first multiplied each series by its implicit market price,
(1+it)
−1, where it is the return on government debt. I used the 12-month Treasury bond rate, which
I obtained from the AMECO database. The discounted debt and debt-to-GDP ratio at market value
were subsequently obtained by multiplying the debt and debt-to-GDP series at market value, by
the backward discount factor, qt. The backward discount factor is defined as qt =
∏t
j=1(1 + rj)
−1.
A final point that should be mentioned, is that real interest rates on Greek government debt were
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negative over an extended period of time in my sample. More specifically, adjusting the 12-month
nominal rate for inflation and real output growth results in a real rate that is negative from 1973 to
1988. Makrydakis, Tzavalis and Balfoussias (1999) argue that even though real interest rates have
been negative over an extended period of time, the reversal into positive territory should guarantee
that the economy is not dynamically inefficient, in the sense that it is not possible to make one
generation better off without making another worse off. Following their argument I conducted the
ZA unit root test on the discounted market value of real debt30 and the debt-to-GDP ratio. For both
series I was not able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at conventional levels using any of
the three models.
To summarize, my results from the univariate tests with breaks31 indicate that fiscal policy in
Greece during the period examined has violated the conditions for sustainability.
3.5.2 Cointegration tests
In this section, I present our results on the sustainability of fiscal policy through cointegration
tests between government revenues, inclusive of interest, and government expenditures both in
real terms and as shares of GDP. As with the government debt series, I determine the appropriate
lag length using the information criteria of Akaike, Schwarz, and Hannan and Quinn. Table 3.7
presents these results. Based on these results, I proceed using only one lag for both series. My next
step in this process is to determine whether the series are I(0) or I(1) via unit root tests. If both
series are I(0) then we know that the sustainability condition is satisfied. If one of the series is I(0),
while the other is I(1), then there is no sustainability. In my case, as we will see, both series were
found to be I(1) in levels, and therefore I(0) in first differences. This allows us to proceed with the
cointegration tests between government revenues and government expenditures.
30i also examined discounted debt and the debt-to-GDP ratio in nominal terms, adjusting the series only for the
nominal rate of output growth. My conclusions did not change.
31I have also used the traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, both of which do not account
for breaks. My results, in line with the ZA tests, point to the rejection of sustainability.
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The ADF and PP tests were used to examine the stationarity of the two series. Table 3.8
presents the results for the series in levels, while Table 3.9 for the first differences. As we can
see, both tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the series in levels for both when using
both real variables or ratios to GDP. Stationarity is not rejected however for the first differences of
the two series. More specifically, as we can see in Table 3.9, both tests reject the null hypothesis
on a unit root at the 1% level. Thus, government revenues and expenditures are both found to be
integrated of order one. Having determined that both series are I(1) in levels and therefore I(0) in
first differences, I now turn to the cointegration tests between the two series.
The results for the Bounds Test for cointegration using the ARDL model described earlier
are reported in Table 3.10. I estimated equation (3.24) and used the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and the Schwarz Criterion (SBC) to determine the appropriate number of lags. Both the AIC
and SBC indicated an ARDL(1,0) for the variables expressed as ratios to GDP and an ARDL(2,1)
for the variables in real terms.32 The null hypothesis of the Bounds Test is that there is no long run
relationship between the variables, in my case Rt and GGt, and ρt and ggt. The asymptotic distri-
bution of the test statistic is non-standard under the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Pesaran,
Shin and Smith (2001) provide asymptotic critical value upper and lower bounds for the F-statistic.
The lower bound corresponds to the case where all variables are I(0) and the upper bound to the
case where all variables are I(1). If the test statistic is below the lower bound, then there is no
cointegration. In my case, the test indicates that the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot
be rejected; the F-statistics (0.04 for using the variables in real terms and 2.59 using the variables
expressed as ratios of GDP) are well below even the lower bound at the 10% level, 4.04.
The results from the Johansen test for cointegration are presented in Table 3.11. The top panel
presents the results using the variables in real terms, whereas the bottom panel presents the results
for the variables as shares of GDP. As we can see both the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue
test indicate that there is no cointegration between the two series, both when using real measures
32I have also experimented with different lag orders and our results were unchanged.
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and as ratios of GDP. Moreover, this is true regardless of which specification I tested for the deter-
ministic part corresponding to Cases 2, 3 and 4. I have also compared the estimated values for the
test statistics with the 10% critical values and our conclusions are unchanged. Since none of the
results is significant I do not report the cointegrating vectors. Thus, the Johansen test agrees with
the all the previous tests that I have considered.
As I have discussed earlier, absence of cointegration between R and GG or ρt and ggt implies
no sustainability in the strong sense, which is the definition I adopt in this paper. Therefore, my
results from the cointegration tests agree with my results from the univariate unit root tests on the
debt measures.
3.5.3 Cointegration tests in the presence of structural breaks
The results of performing the Gregory and Hansen (1996a) tests are presented in Table 3.12.
For the ADF type tests I used the Akaike information criterion and the Schwarz Criterion to deter-
mine the appropriate number of lags by allowing a maximum of 8 lags. The lags selected where
(0,1,4) for models C, C/T, and C/S respectively for the variables expressed as shares of GDP. For
the variables in real terms the lags selected where (0,0,1) for models C, C/T, and C/S respectively.
Irrespective of which model is used (C, C/T, or C/S), the null hypothesis of no cointegration is not
rejected.33 Moreover, this result is true for both the real measures as well as the measures as ratios
to GDP.
As I argued earlier there are two shortcomings of this approach. The first one is that it only
accounts for one break, and the second one that it does not examine whether there is a structural
change per se. My next step therefore is to use the DOLS approach. I first estimate equation
(3.43) for the whole sample without breaks. Then I use the Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998)
methodology to identify the breaks and incorporate them into the analysis. In estimating equation
(3.43) I experimented with different values for leads and lags. Table 3.13 presents my results on
33While I only report the 5% critical values, the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 10% either.
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the estimated coefficients on GGt and ggt (βs) along with the t-statistics. As I have discussed
in Section 3.4.2, fiscal sustainability requires that the two series are cointegrated and that β = 1
(strong form sustainability). Moreover, if 0 < β < 1 implies weak sustainability irrespective of
whether the two series are cointegrated. Moreover, if β = 1 and the series are not cointegrated, then
weak sustainability is again satisfied. If β = 0 then there is no sustainability. My view is that strong
form sustainability is the only appropriate definition for fiscal policy sustainability. Weak form
sustainability, either when β = 1 and the series are not cointegrated or when 0 < β < 1 and the
series are or are not cointegrated, is not a sufficient condition for fiscal policy sustainability. In fact,
I interpret the evidence of weak sustainability as an indication of potential fiscal unsustainability.
Thus, evidence of weak sustainability might be used as an alarming sign by the policy makers. It
implies that the government might face financing constraints in the future if it continues its current
fiscal policy stance.
To test the restriction that β = 1 I use a Wald test, which is χ2 distributed. The Wald test sta-
tistics are also reported on Table 3.13. My results indicate a strong rejection of the null hypothesis
that β = 1 and thus strong form sustainability is rejected. Moreover, a Wald test on the restriction
that β = 0 also rejects the null hypothesis. The rejection of the null that β = 1 together with the
rejection that β = 0 which suggests evidence of weak form sustainability. My results again agree
with my previous analysis since strong form sustainability is rejected.
Table 3.14 presents my results on the determination of the breakpoints. For my analysis I have
chosen to use the sequential procedure in Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998) that tests the null
hypothesis of l breaks against the alternative of l + 1 and information criteria.34 I use equation
(3.20) to determine the breaks but I also checked the DOLS specifications with up to 3 leads and
lags and my results regarding the break dates were not changed. The method identifies two breaks
34I have used the same procedure to examine multiple breaks in my debt measures. However, the test did not identify
more than one break. As a robustness check I conducted the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997)unit root test which allows
for up to two breaks that are endogenously determined. Since I was not able to reject the unit root null and therefore
my results are unchanged, I do not report these findings.
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in 1994 and 2010 when the estimation is done using the series expressed as shares of GDP. For
the series in real terms the test also identifies two breaks; one in 1997 and another one in 2008.35
The BIC and LWZ criteria also confirm this finding. This results in three regimes; a first one
from 1970 to 1993, a second one from 1994 to 2009 and a third one from 2010 to 2015 for the
ratios. Accordingly, for the series in real terms the first regime is from 1970 to 1996, the second
from 1997 to 2007, and the third one from 2008 to 2015. Despite the differences, the resulting
regimes are fairly close with respect to the measure of the data (real vs. ratios). Going back to my
discussion in Section 3.2.2 these break dates broadly coincide with some of my proposed periods,
specifically the beginning of the third period and the entire last period. The breaks in 1994 and
1997 can be explained by the fiscal consolidation efforts that were put into force and resulted in
a reduction of the deficit. As for the second break points, they coincide with the beginning of the
fiscal crisis. More specifically, the break in 2008 can be justified with the sharp deterioration of
fiscal magnitudes and more importantly of the deficit, whereas the break in 2010 coincides with
the agreement of the First Economic Adjustment Program.
Having determined the break dates, my next step is to test for cointegration by incorporating the
breaks into my analysis. Given that the estimated break dates result in three subsamples with very
few observations in each36, performing the cointegration analysis in individual subsamples does
not seem plausible. Instead I incorporate the breaks directly into the model and use the DOLS
methodology described earlier. In my case where I have identified two breaks in 1993 and 2009
(recall that 1994 and 2010 are the dates of the new regime), when variables are expressed as ratios
to GDP, the dummies take the form:
D1 =
 0 from 1970 to 19931 from 1994 to 2015
35Note that this is the date of the new regime, based on the way EViews carries out the tests.
3624, 16 and 6 for the first, second and third regime respectively when the variables are expressed as ratios to GDP
and 27, 11, and 8 when the variables are in real terms.
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D2 =
 0 from 1970 to 20091 from 2010 to 2015
Accordingly, for the variables in real terms the dummies are:
D1 =
 0 from 1970 to 19961 from 1997 to 2015
D2 =
 0 from 1970 to 20071 from 2008 to 2015
I estimated the DOLS regressions with the inclusion of the two dummy variables for up to three
leads and lags, and for comparison purposes I also estimated the following simple OLS model:
Rt = α + βGGt + δ1D1GGt + δ2D2GGt + vt (3.48)
I then test the null hypothesis that the coefficient onGGt and the slope dummies is equal to one and
equal to zero, using a Wald test. In other words the null tested isH0 : β+δ1+δ2 = 1. A rejection of
the null implies that there is no strong-form sustainability and in line with my previous discussion,
is interpreted as no sustainability. I also test the null H0 : β + δ1 + δ2 = 0. Since β + δ1 + δ2 = 0
imply no sustainability (neither strong nor weak), rejecting the null of zero together with a rejection
of the null of overall unity, is evidence in favor of weak form sustainability, and as argued earlier
Table 3.15 presents my results for testing for cointegration by including the two breaks. More
specifically, as described in Section 3.4.3, Table 3.15 shows our DOLS estimates from equations
(3.47) with up to three leads and lags, as well as from equation (3.48). My results indicate that the
null hypothesis H0 : β + δ1 + δ2 = 1 is strongly rejected. Therefore, strong form sustainability
is rejected. Moreover, the null hypothesis H0 : β + δ1 + δ2 = 0 is also strongly rejected. The
two rejections when considered together point to weak form sustainability. As I have argued, I
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consider fiscal policy as sustainable only if the strong sustainability conditions are satisfied. Weak
sustainability implies that the government runs the danger of potentially violating its intertemporal
budget constraint. As Quintos (1995) acknowledges, the implication of weak sustainability is that
the government has a higher risk of default and would have to offer higher interest payments to
service its debt. This implication in the case of Greece is in line with the current situation.
An examination of the coefficients on the break dummies offers intuitive economic and policy
implications. As I mentioned earlier, Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) points out that a positive sign
on the break dummies implies a move towards strong form sustainability, whereas a negative sign
is a move away from it. This is because when the coefficients on the slope dummies are positive,
the bubble term in equation (3.3) converges to zero faster compared to when the coefficients are
negative. For example, consider δ1 and δ
′
1 in Table 3.15. These are the coefficients associated
with the first break, with D1 = 1 from 1997 to 2015 and zero otherwise for the series in real
terms and D1 = 1 from 1994 to 2015 and zero otherwise for the ratios to GDP. The positive
and significant coefficient in both cases can be explained by the fiscal consolidation efforts prior to
securing membership in the eurozone and therefore a move towards strong sustainability. Consider
next the coefficients on the second break dummies, δ2 and δ
′
2 for the series in real terms and the
ratios to GDP respectively. The associated second breaks are D2 = 1 from 2008 to 2015, zero
otherwise for the series in real terms and D2 = 1 from 2010 to 2015 and zero otherwise for the
ratios to GDP. Note that while δ∗2 is negative, δ
′
2 is positive. These coefficients might appear to
be harder to interpret because the breaks are very close yet have opposing signs. However, one
possible interpretation is that the positive coefficient, δ′2 may be associated with the start of the first
economic adjustment program in 2010, and at least in principle should help Greece move toward
strong sustainability. The negative coefficient δ′2 of the break in 2008 is consistent with the marked
deterioration of the deficit that started that year, as evidenced in Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4, which in turn
implies a move away from strong sustainability.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the issue of fiscal sustainability in Greece using the two most
common approaches in the literature; namely unit root tests on government debt series, and cointe-
gration tests between government revenues and expenditures. Since, as it has been well documen-
ted in the literature, the traditional unit root tests are prone to over rejecting the null hypothesis of
a unit root, I employed the Zivot Andrews unit root test to account for possible structural breaks.
Accounting for breaks lead to a rejection of the sustainability hypothesis. More specifically, the
Zivot Andrews tests showed a positive and significant trend which is inconsistent with the concept
of sustainability.
In my cointegration analysis I distinguished between the weak and strong forms of sustainabi-
lity as first proposed by Quintos (1995). My approach was to consider the strong form sustainabi-
lity condition as a necessary and sufficient condition for the IBC to hold, or in other words the weak
form sustainability is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Moreover, evidence of weak
form sustainability was interpreted as a sign of looming unsustainability. I chose to follow this
definition because as Quintos (1995) points out weak sustainability implies that the government
runs a higher risk of default and may face financing constraints regarding its debt. I have argued
that this approach is appropriate for the case of Greece since it describes the actual situation rather
well.
In my cointegration analysis without breaks the two tests that I used confirmed the absence of a
long run relationship between my two measures of revenues and expenditures. Overall, my results
from the cointegration analysis without breaks are consistent with our univariate analysis - strong
form sustainability was rejected. In the Dynamic OLS framework I found evidence suggesting
weak form sustainability which I interpret as a warning sign for fiscal authorities. While the deficit
process might be sustainable in the context of weak sustainability, the long run implications for
sustainability are worrisome.
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When I allowed for structural breaks my results were unchanged regarding strong form sus-
tainability, but I reached several other important implications related to the concept of weak sus-
tainability. The Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998) methodology was used to test for multiple
structural breaks that are endogenously determined. I was able to identify two breaks for each pair
of fiscal variables (real vs. ratios); the first one in 1994 and the second one in 2010 for ratio me-
asures and 1997 and 2008 for the real measures. All breaks can be justified by the economic and
political developments in Greece during the specified period. More specifically, the breaks in 1994
and 1997 can be explained by the fiscal consolidation efforts that were put into force and resulted
in a reduction of the deficit. As for the second break points, they coincide with the beginning of
the fiscal crisis. More specifically, the break in 2008 can be justified with the sharp deterioration
of fiscal magnitudes and more importantly of the deficit, whereas the break in 2010 coincides with
the agreement of the First Economic Adjustment Program.
Finally, Dynamic OLS was used with the inclusion of break dummy variables. In this last
part of my analysis, strong form sustainability was once again rejected, but I found evidence that
might be interpreted as indicative of weak form sustainability. As I argued, weak sustainability is
worrisome for the long run. Moreover, while the inclusion of breaks did not change the rejection
of strong sustainability, it allowed me to study the policy implications of weak sustainability in
more depth. More specifically, the signs of the coefficients on the break dummies provided rather
satisfactory implications on the move either towards or away strong form sustainability.
It should be noted that my analysis is based on a rather small number of observations due to the
limited availability of fiscal data. This can have a non-trivial impact on the power of the tests that
I have used in this paper. Moreover, even though I use a single source for my data, fiscal variables,
and especially for Greece, are notorious for not being consistent and adequate. Nevertheless, I
believe that the present analysis has combined several methodologies, some of which have not
been previously used in this setting. Future research might prove insightful by using quarterly data
and by testing for cointegration with multiple structural breaks that are determined endogenously
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and specified explicitly in the null and alternative hypotheses. In addition, it would be interesting
to further explore the case of weak sustainability and examine how countries that have satisfied
sustainability in the weak sense performed in subsequent periods and formally examine whether
weak sustainability could be used by policy makers as a warning indicator for unsustainability.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the series
Debt Revenues Expenditures Debt (%) Revenues (%) Expenditures (%)
Mean 106.5 36.2 43.2 76.6 34.4 41.1
Max 356 98.4 128.4 194.8 48.3 60.8
Min 0.2 0.3 0.2 15 22.5 22.6
Std. Dev 119.2 35.9 43.1 50.2 7.4 9.6
Obs. 46 46 46 46 46 46
a Debt, Revenues and Expenditures are all in billions of national currency. Percentage figures are % of GDP
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Table 3.2: Lag selection using Information Criteria
Two lags One lag
Akaike Schwarz Hannan-Quinn Akaike Schwarz Hannan-Quinn
Bt 8.032 8.15 8.077 7.97 8.05 7.999
bt 6.909 7.031 6.954 6.848 6.929 6.878
a Bt and bt stand for the real general government public debt in national currency and as a
percentage of GDP respectively
Table 3.3: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root tests for Public Debt -
Model A
Variable Break date Lags α1 α2 µ1
Bt 2004 0 -0.15 1.14 17.6
(-2.61) (3.09) (2.01)
bt 2008 0 -0.18 0.56 12.46
(-2.29) (2.13) (3.43)
a Model A:
Bt = α0 + α1Bt−1 + α2t+ µ1DL +
∑k
i=1 βi∆Bt−i + t
b Bt and bt stand for the real general government public debt in
national currency and as a percentage of GDP respectively
c Values in parentheses are test statistics. The test statistic of α1 is
for testing the null hypothesis that α1 = 1.
d The 1%, 5%, and 10% asymptotic critical values for Model A are
-5.34, -4.8 and -4.58, from Table 2 in Zivot and Andrews (1992).
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Table 3.4: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root tests for Public Debt -
Model B
Variable Break date Lags α1 α2 µ2
Bt 1989 0 -0.31 0.40 3.74
(-3.06) (1.00) (2.59)
bt 2008 0 -0.33 1.04 3.06
(-3.24) (3.34) (3.55)
a Model B:
Bt = α0 + α1Bt−1 + α2t+ µ2DP +
∑k
i=1 βi∆Bt−i + t
b Bt and bt stand for the real general government public debt in
national currency and as a percentage of GDP respectively
c Values in parentheses are test statistics. The test statistic of α1 is
for testing the null hypothesis that α1 = 1.
d The 1%, 5%, and 10% asymptotic critical values for Model B are
-4.93, -4.42 and -4.11, from Table 3 in Zivot and Andrews (1992).
Table 3.5: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root tests for Public Debt - Model C
Variable Break date Lags α1 α2 µ1 µ2
Bt 1989 0 -0.28 0.24 -6.47 3.41
(-2.88) (0.35) (0.78) (2.49)
bt 2003 0 -0.34 1.17 -13.32 2.59
(-3.38) (3.32) (-2.52) (3.80)
a Model C: Bt = α0 + α1Bt−1 + α2t+ µ1DL + µ2DP +
∑k
i=1 βi∆Bt−i + t
b Bt and bt stand for the real general government public debt in national
currency and as a percentage of GDP respectively
c Values in parentheses are test statistics. The test statistic of α1 is for testing
the null hypothesis that α1 = 1.
d The 1%, 5%, and 10% asymptotic critical values for Model B are -5.57, -5.08
and -4.82, from Table 4 in Zivot and Andrews (1992).
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Table 3.6: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root tests for the First Difference of Public Debt
Model A Model B Model C
Break date t-stat lags Break date t-stat lags Break date t-stat lags
∆Bt 1990 −6.384∗∗∗ 0 2007 −6.831∗∗∗ 0 2005 −7.166∗∗∗ 0
∆bt 1994 −7.948∗∗∗ 0 2004 −7.382∗∗∗ 0 1995 −8.031∗∗∗ 0
a *** indidates significance at the 1%
b ∆Bt and ∆bt stand for the changes in real general government public debt in national currency and as a percentage of
GDP respectively
c The results on the first differences are merely for comparison purposes. They are not used as a test for sustainability and
rejection of the null is not interpreted as such.
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Table 3.7: Lag selection using Information Criteria: 2
Two lags One lag
Akaike Schwarz Hannan-Quinn Akaike Schwarz Hannan-Quinn
GGt 6.32 6.39 6.35 6.26 6.38 6.31
Rt 5.15 5.23 5.18 4.66 4.78 4.71
ggt 4.79 4.88 4.82 4.76 4.87 4.80
ρt 3.59 3.72 3.64 3.55 3.63 3.58
a GGt are real government expenditures inclusive of interest and Rt are real governent revenues,
whereas ggt and ρt are respectively government expenditures inclusive of interest and
government revenues both expressed as percentages of GDP.
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Table 3.8: Unit Root tests: ADF and PP for Government
Revenues and Expenditures
Intercept, No Trend Intercept and Trend
ADF PP ADF PP
tADF tPP tADF tµ1 tPP tµ1
Rt -0.39 -0.22 -2.96 1.89 -2.47 1.93
GGt -1.48 -1.42 -1.87 1.83 -2.53 0.34
ρt -0.10 0.29 -3.02 3.31 -2.97 2.94
ggt -1.22 -1.03 -2.07 1.78 -3.13 2.99
a The ADF and PP regressions shown are both estimated with one
lag but the results are robust to lag specification.
b GGt are real government expenditures inclusive of interest and Rt
are real governent revenues, whereas ggt and ρt are respectively
government expenditures inclusive of interest and government
revenues both expressed as percentages of GDP.
c tADF and tPP are the test statistics for testing the null hypothesis
that α = 0 and tµ1 is the test statistic on the trend term.
d MacKinnon’s 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for the
ADF-t-statistic in the intercept only model are -3.59, -2.93 and
-2.6., whereas for the intercept and trend model are -4.18, -3.52,
and -3.19. The critical values based on the Phillips-Perron model
are insignificantly different.
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Table 3.9: Unit Root tests: ADF and PP for the First Differences of Go-
vernment Revenues and Expenditures
Intercept, No Trend Intercept and Trend
ADF PP ADF PP
tADF tPP tADF tµ1 tPP tµ1
∆Rt −4.53∗∗∗ −5.65∗∗∗ −4.47∗∗∗ 0.24 −5.60∗∗∗ 0.19
∆GGt −4.96∗∗∗ −9.14∗∗∗ −4.99∗∗∗ -0.36 −9.23∗∗∗ 0.29
∆ρt −4.86∗∗∗ −6.05∗∗∗ −4.84∗∗∗ 0.61 −6.11∗∗∗ 0.61
∆ggt −5.66∗∗∗ −10.72∗∗∗ −5.62∗∗∗ -0.72 −11.01∗∗∗ -0.65
a The ADF and PP regressions shown are both estimated with one lag but the results
are robust to lag specification.
b GGt are real government expenditures inclusive of interest and Rt are real
governent revenues, whereas ggt and ρt are respectively government expenditures
inclusive of interest and government revenues both expressed as percentages of
GDP.
c tADF and tPP are the test statistics for testing the null hypothesis that α = 0 and
tµ1 is the test statistic on the trend term.
d MacKinnon’s 1%, 5%, and 10% critical values for the ADF-t-statistic in the
intercept only model are -3.59, -2.93 and -2.6, whereas for the intercept and trend
model are -4.18, -3.52, and -3.19. The critical values based on the Phillips-Perron
model are insignificantly different.
e *** indidates significance at the 1%
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Table 3.10: ARDL Bounds Test for Cointegration
ARDL
F -stat k
Rt 0.04 1
ρt 2.59 1
a Rt and ρt are real governent revenues and government revenues
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
b The asymptotic critical value bounds for the ARDL Bounds Test
are 4.04-4.78 at 10%, 4.94-5.73 at 5%, and 6.84-7.84 at 1%. These
are obtained from Table CI(iii), case III (unrestricted intercept, no
trend) for lag order, k=1 on page 300 in Pesaran, Shin and Smith
(2001).
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Table 3.11: Johansen Cointegration tests
Rt - GGt Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Hypothesized # of CEs λtrace λmax λtrace λmax λtrace λmax
None 10.37 7.37 6.63 6.50 11.20 6.68
At most 1 3.00 3.00 0.13 0.13 4.51 4.51
ρt − ggt Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Hypothesized # of CEs λtrace λmax λtrace λmax λtrace λmax
None 16.45 11.71 10.31 9.29 19.23 11.48
At most 1 4.75 4.75 1.01 1.01 7.75 7.75
a GGt are real government expenditures inclusive of interest and Rt are real
governent revenues, whereas ggt and ρt are respectively government expenditures
inclusive of interest and government revenues both expressed as percentages of
GDP.
b The 5% asymptotic critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992)
c Case 2: The 5% critical values for λtrace are 19.96 and 9.24 and for λmax are 15.67
and 9.24, where the two values correspond to the hypothesized # of CEs, in our case
0 and 1.
d Case 3: The 5% critical values for λtrace are (15.41, 3.76) and for λmax are (14.07
and 3.76).
e Case 4: The 5% critical values for λtrace are (25.32, 12.25) and for λmax are (18.96
and 12.25).
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Table 3.12: Gregory-Hansen cointegration test with regime shifts
Rt - GGt ADF type test Phillips type test
Model ADF ∗ Break date Z∗α Break date Z
∗
t Break date
Model 2 (C) -4.23 1996 -32.69 1996 -4.56 1996
Model 3 (C/T) -4.92 1996 -33.52 1996 -4.78 1996
Model 4 (C/S) -4.46 1996 -33.87 1996 -4.75 1996
ρt - ggt ADF type test Phillips type test
Model ADF ∗ Break date Z∗α Break date Z
∗
t Break date
Model 2 (C) -3.59 1994 -23.96 1994 -3.68 1994
Model 3 (C/T) -3.71 2002 -19.72 1994 -3.63 2002
Model 4 (C/S) -3.75 1990 -24.82 1994 -3.78 1994
a GGt are real government expenditures inclusive of interest and Rt are real governent revenues,
whereas ggt and ρt are respectively government expenditures inclusive of interest and
government revenues both expressed as percentages of GDP.
b The 5% asymptotic critical values are from Gregory and Hansen (1996a), Table 1 on page 109
for m = 1, where m is the number of regressors excluding a constant and/or trend. Note that
the critical values for ADF ∗ and Z∗t are the same.
c 5% critical values for the ADF ∗ and Z∗t are -4.61, -4.99, and -4.95, whereas for Z
∗
α are
-40.48, -47,96, and -47.04 for models C, C/T, and C/S respectively.
c We used an EViews code provided by Ocakverdi, E. and Tang, C.F. (2009), which can be
found at http://forums.eviews.com/viewtopic.php?f=15&t=976#p3427.
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Table 3.13: DOLS estimates - Full sample without breaks
Rt - GGt DOLS(0,0) DOLS(1,1) DOLS(2,2) DOLS(3,3) OLS
β 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.83
t-stat 32.41 59.94 83.07 30.82 34.38
Wald χ2 (β = 1) 43.7∗ 130∗ 227.2∗ 21.57∗ 49.7∗
Wald χ2 (β = 0) 1,050.6∗ 3,593∗ 6,000∗ 950∗ 1,181.8∗
ρt - ggt DOLS(0,0) DOLS(1,1) DOLS(2,2) DOLS(3,3) OLS
β 0.728 0.729 0.729 0.719 0.71
t-stat 15.54 16.73 13.87 11.95 14.59
Wald χ2 (β = 1) 33.6∗ 38.7∗ 26.5∗ 21.8∗ 35.4∗
Wald χ2 (β = 0) 241.5∗ 280∗ 192.3∗ 142.9∗ 212.9∗
a All models estimated using a constant.
b GGt are real government expenditures inclusive of interest and Rt are real governent revenues,
whereas ggt and ρt are respectively government expenditures inclusive of interest and government
revenues both expressed as percentages of GDP.
c * denotes significance at the 1% level.
Table 3.14: Bai-Perron sequential break point tests
Rt - GGt Break test F -stat Scaled F -stat Critcal Value Break date
0 vs. 1∗∗ 66.00 132.0 11.47 2008
1 vs. 2∗∗ 16.67 33.35 12.95 1997
ρt - ggt Break test F -stat Scaled F -stat Critcal Value Break date
0 vs. 1∗∗ 37.48 74.97 11.47 1994
1 vs. 2∗∗ 8.32 16.63 12.95 2010
a ∗∗ denotes significance at the 5% level
b GGt are real government expenditures inclusive of interest and Rt are real governent
revenues, whereas ggt and ρt are respectively government expenditures inclusive of
interest and government revenues both expressed as percentages of GDP.
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Table 3.15: DOLS estimates with breaks
Rt - GGt DOLS(0,0) DOLS(1,1) DOLS(2,2) DOLS(3,3) OLS
β 0.84∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
δ1 0.07∗ 0.04∗ 0.13∗ 0.20∗ 0.10∗
δ2 -0.13∗∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.06∗∗
Wald χ2 (β + δ1 + δ2 = 1) 274.5∗∗∗ 572.5∗∗∗ 197.5∗∗∗ 497.6∗∗∗ 127.1∗∗∗
Wald χ2 (β + δ1 + δ2 = 0) 487.3∗∗∗ 121.8∗∗∗ 413.6∗∗∗ 972.7∗∗∗ 200.2∗∗∗
ρt - ggt DOLS(0,0) DOLS(1,1) DOLS(2,2) DOLS(3,3) OLS
β
′ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
δ
′
1 0.14
∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
δ
′
2 0.03
∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗
Wald χ2 (β ′ + δ′1 + δ
′
2 = 1) 196.1
∗∗∗ 193.8∗∗∗ 122.2∗∗∗ 101.8∗∗∗ 173.9∗∗∗
Wald χ2 (β ′ + δ′1 + δ
′
2 = 0) 356.5
∗∗∗ 374.1∗∗∗ 221.1∗∗∗ 141.3∗∗∗ 277.6∗∗∗
a All models estimated using a constant.
b GGt are real government expenditures inclusive of interest and Rt are real governent revenues, whereas ggt
and ρt are respectively government expenditures inclusive of interest and government revenues both expressed
as percentages of GDP.
c ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Appendix A
Data sources for Chapter 2
For the unemployment rate (%) I used the Annual Macroeconomic (AMECO) database of the Eu-
ropean Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, as well as Eurostat
for the period from 1960 to 2015. The CPI inflation rate (%) from 1960 to 2015 was obtained from
the National Statistical Service of Greece (ELSTAT) for Greece and from Eurostat for the rest of
the Euro area. The general government consolidated gross debt (as a % of GDP) was obtained from
AMECO and Eurostat and from 1970 to 2015. For the general government deficit (as a % of GDP)
I used AMECO, Eurostat, and various issues of OECD’s Economic Outlook, covering the period
from 1970 to 2015. The quarterly GDP growth rate (%) was obtained from Eurostat and ELSTAT
from 1996 to 2015, whereas per capita GDP (in 2010 euros) was obtained from Eurostat from
1995 to 2006. Deposits in and liabilities of Greek banks were retrieved from the Bank of Greece,
in millions of euros and from 2001 to 2015. The main aggregates of the general government (as a
% of GDP) from 1995 to 2015 were obtained from ELSTAT’s publication The Greek Economy and
from various issues of OECD’s Economic Outlook. Finally, the main macroeconomic indicators
were obtained from ELSTAT for the period 2014Q1 to 2015Q4.
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